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Abstract 
Corporate governance is an important variable that can serve to enhance firm 
performance. This dissertation focuses on a key corporate governance variable, that 
of managerial ownership. While Jensen and Meckling's (1976) "convergence of 
interest" hypothesis suggests that increases in managerial ownership can enhance firm 
performance, Fama and Jensen (1983) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that at high 
levels of managerial ownership there are "entrenchment effects" (that is, managers 
will pursue their own interests). Although there are mixed results, the UK and US 
literature in general suggests that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance is non-linear in nature and conforms to a cubic relationship 
corresponding to "alignment-entrenchment-alignment" (that is, alignment at low 
levels of managerial ownership, followed by entrenchment at intermediate levels of 
managerial ownership and alignment once again at high levels of managerial 
ownership). It is doubtful whether this relationship is the same under different 
corporate ownership structures. Claessens et al. (2000) document the fact that most of 
the firms in the East-Asian region are characterised by a concentrated form of family-
controlled ownership, in contrast to the diffuse form of ownership in the UK and the 
US. Hong Kong is a prime example of an economy dominated by a family-controlled 
ownership structure. 
The thesis contributes to the academic literature on corporate governance by its 
examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance III Hong Kong. Based on the regressIOn results of 1406 firm-year 
.. 
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observations of Hong Kong listed companies from 1995 to 1998, it is found that under 
the family-dominated ownership structure in Hong Kong, there is a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance which corresponds 
to a pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". This is in contrast to the 
pattern ("alignment-entrenchment-alignment") found in the UK by Short and Keasey 
(1999) and in the US by Morck et al. (1988). While the finding of a non-linear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in this study 
supports both the "convergence of interest" hypothesis over certain ranges of 
managerial ownership and "entrenchment effects" over other ranges of managerial 
ownership, the discovery of a pattern which is opposite to that found in UK and US 
studies indicates that managerial ownership affects firm performance in a different 
way in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the convergence of interest effect only dominates 
the entrenchment effect in the intermediate range of managerial ownership, leading to 
the conclusion that a policy of providing management with larger amounts of equity 
within this intermediate range of managerial ownership should enhance firm 
performance. In contrast, increasing managerial share ownership in cases where the 
existing level of managerial share ownership is either low or high will have the effect 
of reducing firm value. The design of an optimal managerial compensation strategy 
for Hong Kong firms thus has to take account of the existing level of managerial share 
ownership. 
In contrast to the finding of other studies, the results reported in this study show that 
board structure variables (board size, board composition and directors' remuneration) 
are not significantly related to firm performance. An explanation for this may be 
found in the different character of the board in Hong Kong. For example, the number 
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of independent non-executive directors in Hong Kong is low and they are very often 
not truly independent, while the remuneration of directors is typically not subject to 
review by any board committees. If these aspects of Hong Kong board structures can 
be successfully reformed then corporate performance should be enhanced, in line with 
the results reported from other countries. 
The data concernmg managerial ownership and performance was partitioned in 
accordance with the East-Asian financial crisis, which began in late 1997. The 
findings from this further empirical analysis suggest that the macro-economIC 
conditions in existence before and after the crisis affect the nature of the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. It is found that the 
convergence effect is stronger in the "prosperous years" prior to the crisis, as shown 
by the wider alignment range from the regression results based on the data before the 
East-Asian financial crisis (1995-1997). The entrenchment effect is, however, more 
prominent during the "difficult years" as indicated by the narrower range of alignment 
in the regression results based on the data for the year after the crisis (1998). 
The importance of corporate governance in Hong Kong was brought into sharp 
prominence by the East-Asian financial crisis. Weaknesses in corporate governance 
regimes have been widely identified as an important factor leading to the fast 
downturn in economies within the whole East-Asian region. Enhancing corporate 
governance practices is thus important for corporate recovery and growth. Various 
international organizations, professional bodies, regulators and academics have spent 
a great deal of effort over the past six years in a wide range of activities to enhance 
corporate governance practices in the region, and these are reviewed in the thesis. 
IV 
Due to the different cultural backgrounds and ownership structures in different 
countries, it can be argued that there is no single "best" corporate governance system. 
A secondary aim of this thesis is the evaluation of the corporate governance initiatives 
of various international organizations and the identification of areas for improvement 
and for reform in Hong Kong. Specific policy recommendations are made for the 
structural improvement of the corporate governance regime in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives of the Study 
This thesis is concerned with corporate governance in Hong Kong. It is conducted by 
way of both qualitative and quantitative analyses. The qualitative analysis includes a 
study of the development of corporate governance regimes in different countries and a 
comparison among them. The contemporary efforts by international authorities and 
professional organisations to improve global corporate governance practices are also 
analysed to identify areas for improvements in Hong Kong. The quantitative analysis 
makes use of a set of four-year panel data of Hong Kong listed companies to study the 
relationship between corporate performance and managerial ownership under the 
predominantly family-owned corporate structure in Hong Kong. It also investigates 
the impact of the East-Asian financial crisis on the above relationship. 
Recommendations for the improvement of the corporate governance regime in Hong 
Kong are made by reference to the findings of both the qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. This section details the motivation for this thesis. 
This research was initially motivated by the East-Asian financial crisis which took 
place in late 1997. The crisis was first triggered by the financial turmoil in Thailand in 
July 1997 when the Thai Government decided to float the Thai Baht on 2 July 1997. 
Since then, most countries in the East-Asian region experienced financial and 
economic turmoil (Chow, 1999) and it then became known as the East-Asian financial 
CrISIS. Hong Kong, though possessing a fairly healthy financiaL banking and 
economic system, was caught up in the crisis in October 1997 when the Hong Kong 
Dollar came under speculative attack. GDP growth dropped tremendously from 5% in 
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1997 to -5.3% in 1998. There was much decline in the inflation rate from 5.8% in 
1997 to 2.8 in 1998. From 1999 onwards, Hong Kong has experienced deflation 
(1999: -40/0,2000: -3.8%,2001: -1.6%). The unemployment rate increased sharply 
after 1997 and reached a record high level of 7.8% in July 2002. Corporate collapses 
were commonplace in the years following 1997. 
Before the East-Asian financial crisis, there was a well-documented bubble economy 
in Hong Kong (HKSAR Report, 2002). The Hang Seng index hit a then record level 
of 16,820 in August 1997. The property market was also flourishing; the average 
price went up by 48 percent during the period from January to October 1997. 
However, apart from the overheating economy, which was a factor contributing to the 
fast rate of collapse of the economy, there were other factors which also contributed to 
the financial turmoil in Hong Kong. Among them an important factor was the 
structural weaknesses in many of Asia's financial markets and, in particular, the lack 
of sound corporate governance systems. It has been argued by a number of 
governments, academics and professionals that those markets with weak corporate 
governance systems were subject to more volatile shocks in the financial crisis (e.g. 
Chow, 1999; Tsui and Gul, 2000). Hong Kong in fact experienced less shock when 
compared to the other Asian capital markets, which was probably due to its relatively 
more mature corporate governance mechanism and better-regulated capital market 
than other East-Asian countries (Tsui and GuL 2000). 
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The East-Asian financial crisis highlighted the importance of corporate governance 
and brought it to the top of the agenda of various international authorities and 
professional organisations. The argument of a number of academics and professionals 
that Hong Kong has suffered to a lesser degree compared to other East-Asian countries 
due to its better corporate governance system prompted me to study Hong Kong's 
corporate governance system. The question addressed is, therefore, the extent to which 
Hong Kong's corporate governance system differs from that in the other East-Asian 
countries, and whether there are areas for further improvement. These questions 
prompted me to perform the qualitative part of the research, to identify the differences 
between the corporate governance system in Hong Kong and other countries, so as to 
determine whether Hong Kong's corporate governance system is better and to identify 
possible areas for further improvement. 
Since Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom (UK) for one and a half 
centuries, it follows the common-law system and it has adopted most of the UK's law 
and regulations. This raises the question of whether or not, because of this historical 
background, Hong Kong's corporate governance system is better than some other 
East-Asian countries. However, since Hong Kong people are mostly Chinese and the 
ownership structure of Hong Kong companies is majority family-ownership, which is 
very different from the diffuse form of ownership in the UK, the question arises as to 
whether these factors will have any impact on corporate governance. One important 
aspect of corporate governance research is the relationship between managerial 
ownership and corporate performance. However, so far most of the empirical research 
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has been carried out III the United States (US) and only limited study has been 
perfonned in the East-Asian region (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In the US, the 
corporate ownership structure is diffuse rather than concentrated. Thus, I have carried 
out an empirical study of the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance in Hong Kong to identify whether the relationship is different under a 
predominantly family ownership structure. In addition, in order to ascertain whether 
the East-Asian financial crisis, that is, the macro-economic condition, was also a factor 
responsible for the fast rate of corporate collapses, I extend the empirical study to 
ascertain the impact of the crisis on the above relationship. 
With the above motivations in mind, the research is perfonned to achieve with the 
following principal aims and objectives: 
1. to find out whether and how Hong Kong's corporate governance system is 
different from that in the UK, given that the rules and regulations in Hong 
Kong were adopted from those in the UK; 
2. to compare the corporate governance systems III vanous jurisdictions to 
identify the differences between them and to analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Hong Kong corporate governance system; 
3. to study the efforts made by various international authorities and professional 
organisations to enhance corporate governance and to identify the initiatives 
and practices that can be applied in Hong Kong; 
4. to ascertain the possible impact of culture and ownership structure on corporate 
governance, as measured by the effect of managerial ownership on finn 
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performance under the family-owned corporate structure in Hong Kong, and to 
compare the findings with the results of research performed in the Anglo-
American context; 
5. to ascertain the impact of the East-Asian financial crisis on the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong; and 
6. to draw conclusions from the qualitative and quantitative studies in this 
research in order to make recommendations for further improvements of the 
corporate governance system and in corporate governance practices in Hong 
Kong. 
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1.2 An Overview of the Study 
Motivated by the East-Asian financial crisis III late 1997 and the suggestion by a 
number of academics and professionals that corporate governance was an important 
factor in causing the fast rate of corporate collapses during and after the crisis, the 
thesis begins, in Chapter Two, with a comparative analysis of the historical 
development of corporate governance in the UK and in Hong Kong. It is necessary to 
study the UK's system because it is generally recognised as having a better set of 
corporate principles. Until 1997 Hong Kong had been a colony of the UK for one and 
half centuries and so most of its laws and regulations were adapted from those in the 
UK. However, while the UK has a well-developed code of best practice for corporate 
governance, Hong Kong only started to develop its corporate governance system in the 
mid 1990s. In addition, Hong Kong has not fully adopted the Combined Code, which 
is the code of best practice for corporate governance in the UK. Hence, the first part 
of Chapter Two studies the development and characteristics of the corporate 
governance systems in the UK and in Hong Kong. Comparisons are made between the 
two systems in order to ascertain why Hong Kong is not following the UK's practices 
in certain aspects and to identify areas where further improvements can be made. 
The second part of Chapter Two investigates corporate governance systems and 
practices in a number of countries. Comparisons are made among them in order to 
identify common features and also different practices. The countries included in the 
comparative study include the two countries generally recognised to have well-
developed corporate governance systems: the UK and the US; leading countries in 
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Europe and Asia: France, Germany and Japan; the "four little dragons" in East-Asia: 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong and also Hong Kong's 'home' country: the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). Recommendations for further improvements in 
the Hong Kong corporate governance system are drawn from the qualitative analyses 
and outlined in Chapter Seven. 
The East-Asian financial crisis was a critical factor contributing to the rapid corporate 
collapses in the region. Hence, the qualitative analysis is extended further in Chapter 
Three to concentrate on the work contributed by a number of international and 
professional organisations, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the World Bank and the Hong Kong Society of Accountants 
(HKSA), following the crisis. These international organisations have made continual 
efforts to enhance corporate governance as part of the recovery process after the crisis. 
Chapter Three of the thesis not only evaluates the corporate governance initiatives of 
these organizations, but also recognizes from the work of the organisations that there 
is no single corporate governance system that can be applied universally. Each 
country has its own historical and cultural background and hence corporate 
governance practices have to be adopted sensibly. The qualitative study in Chapter 
Three also includes an evaluation of the effectiveness of the audit committee in Hong 
Kong, which is an important device for improving corporate governance. Despite the 
fact that it has been a requirement in the UK and in some other countries that there 
must be an audit committee on the board of every listed company, Hong Kong only 
introduced this requirement with effect from 1 January 1999. Therefore, it is of 
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interest to find out why Hong Kong is lagging behind others countries in this respect 
and to assess the effectiveness of this corporate governance device. As with Chapter 
Two, conclusions are drawn from the qualitative analyses at the end of Chapter Three 
and recommendations are made in Chapter Seven for further improvements to 
corporate governance practices in Hong Kong. 
Chapter Two finds that Hong Kong has not adopted all of the UK's corporate 
governance practices. In addition, the independence of the non-executive directors in 
Hong Kong is questionable and the quality of the board is found to be in need of 
improvement. One of the findings in Chapter Three is that there is no single 'best' 
corporate governance system that can be applied anywhere in the world. These 
findings might be due to the existence of differing cultures and historical backgrounds 
and corporate ownership structures in different countries. Culture and the nature of 
the corporate ownership structure are likely to play a role in affecting corporate 
performance. In particular, since Hong Kong is an oriental city comprised of mostly 
Chinese people and since Hong Kong companies are family-owned and controlled, it 
is interesting to explore whether this Chinese "family" culture has been influenced by 
Western culture, given that Hong Kong had been under the sovereignty of the UK for 
many years, until 1997. Before proceeding with the quantitative study, a literature 
review of the culture and ownership structure aspects of corporate governance is 
provided in Chapter Four. In particular, the "five cultural dimensions" of Hofstede are 
discussed, from which it may be argued that the "long-term orientation" dimension is 
responsible for the fast rate of growth in most of the East-Asian economies in the latter 
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part of the twentieth century (Hofstede, 2001, pg.3 51). The "long-term orientation" 
index value of Hong Kong is 96, which ranks second after China's index value of 118. 
The index values of the US and the UK are 29 and 25 respectively, which ranks them 
seventeenth and the eighteenth out of the 23 countries in the "long-term orientation 
index value study" (Hofstede, 2001, pg.336). In computing the index, "the importance 
of family" is the component which accounts for the high index values (Hofstede, 
2001). These index values help to explain and reinforce the conclusions of this 
research that the Chinese culture in Hong Kong, and its family-owned corporate 
structure, have an impact on corporate performance in Hong Kong. 
In addition to outlining the five cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Chapter Four reviews 
the academic literature on corporate governance, in particular, on the relationship 
between managerial ownership and corporate performance. So far most empirical 
studies of the relationship between ownership and performance have analysed data 
from the US or the UK (e.g. Morck et aI., 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999). Limited 
studies have been performed in the Asian context (e.g. Mak and Li, 2001). In Chapter 
Four, the literature on corporate governance is reviewed, with particular emphasis 
placed on the "convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the 
"entrenchment effect" argument of Fama and Jensen (1983), the "combined effect" 
argument of Morck et ai. (1988) and the "endogeneity issue" of Cho (1998). The 
literature review in Chapter Four provides the theoretical background knowledge for 
the empirical part of this research. 
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La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) document the fact that most East-
Asian corporations have a concentrated form of ownership and that most of them are 
family-owned and controlled. It is thus doubtful whether the findings of the prior 
research can be applied to the East-Asian environment, where the ownership structure 
is very different from that of the US and the UK. Hong Kong is, in fact, a prime 
example of an economy dominated by concentrated family ownership in the corporate 
sector. The quantitative part of the thesis investigates the impact of ownership 
structure on corporate performance, as measured by the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, using data on Hong Kong listed 
companies as the evidence. The aim is to identify the relationship and to ascertain 
whether it is different from the findings in the literature in the Anglo-American 
context. OLS regressions are performed on a set of panel data which consists of 1,406 
firm-year observations of Hong Kong listed companies for the period from 1995 to 
1998. Chapter Five describes the research methodology, including the hypotheses 
tested, the method of data collection and the use of OLS regression on the panel data. 
In the first part of Chapter Six, OLS regression analyses are performed on the panel 
data of 1406 firm-year observations to determine the relationship between managerial 
ownership, various corporate governance variables, and firm performance during the 
period from 1995 to 1998. This study finds that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance is non-linear and cubic in nature. The particular 
pattern found is "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment", that is, at low levels of 
managerial ownership, managers' interests become entrenched, resulting in a reduction 
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in firm performance. When managerial ownership increases further, managers then 
align their interests with their companies, resulting in better firm performance. The 
alignment range is found to be approximately between the levels of 16% and 62% of 
managerial ownership. When managerial ownership further increases to levels above 
62%, managers' interests become entrenched once again, resulting in deteriorating 
firm performance. This pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" supports 
the "combined effect" argument of Morck et al. (1988). That is, the alignment range 
supports the "convergence-of-interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
while the two entrenchment ranges support the "entrenchment" effects suggested by 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and La Porta et al. (1999). The wide range of alignment 
found in this study is consistent with the high score of the "long-term orientation" 
index for Hong Kong due to its Chinese culture and the importance of family 
(Hofstede, 2001). 
However, the pattern found in this study ("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") is 
the reverse of that found in the UK by Short and Keasey (1999) and in the US by 
Morck et al. (1988). They both found an "alignment-entrenchment-alignment" 
relationship in their studies. This suggests that the concentrated ownership structure in 
Hong Kong affects the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance in a different way, compared to the less concentrated ownership 
structures in the UK and the US. This finding is also supported by the suggestion of 
the recent study of Fan and Wong (2002) that studies based on UK or US data are not 
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necessarily applicable to East-Asian corporations due to differences in the degree of 
ownership concentration. 
Apart from finding a reverse pattern of the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance when compared with the studies of Morck et al. (1988) and 
Short and Keasey (1999), the OLS regressions in Chapter Six also find that board size, 
board composition and directors' remuneration do not have any significant impact on 
the performance of Hong Kong companies, though they are important corporate 
governance variables and, in some prior literature, significant results are obtained. 
This indicates that these variables have a different impact in the Hong Kong 
environment. For example, the number of non-executive directors on Hong Kong 
boards are low in comparison to the US and the UK, and they are very often not truly 
independent, while directors' remuneration packages are often not governed by 
remuneration committees. The results from both the qualitative and the quantitative 
analyses suggest that board structure and quality are areas for improvement in the 
corporate governance regime in Hong Kong. The detailed recommendations arising 
from this are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Another aim of the empirical study is to ascertain whether the East-Asian financial 
crisis had any effect on the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate 
performance. The second part of Chapter Six reports the results of OLS regressions in 
which the original sample was partitioned into the pre-crisis period of 1995-1997 and 
the post-crisis year 1998. The regression analyses are also performed on the 
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individual years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively. The results suggest that the 
different macro-economic environments prior to and after the crisis, and in individual 
years, did affect the relationship. During prosperous years (1996 and 1997) the 
convergence effect is more dominant. For most of the ownership ranges, managers 
align their interests with those of their companies. However, they become entrenched 
at very high levels of managerial ownership, and this behaviour is even more intense 
during the difficult times after the East-Asian financial crisis in 1998 and in the less 
prosperous year of 1995. The findings from this chapter suggest that the East-Asian 
financial crisis did play an important role in affecting the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. 
The thesis concludes in Chapter Seven by summanzmg the findings from the 
qualitative analyses and the empirical studies in all of the prevIOUS chapters. 
Recommendations are made by reference to the findings for improvements in corporate 
governance principles and practices in Hong Kong, in order to speed up the recovery 
process. For example, since that the results show that at high levels of managerial 
ownership (more than 62%), there is an entrenchment effect; if it is possible to control 
the management shareholding (say, to maintain it within the alignment range of 
between 16% and 62%), the accounting return can be maximised. Moreover, should a 
company's managerial ownership be highly concentrated (say, more than 62%) the 
company should pay even more attention to improve its corporate governance practices 
in order to enhance its performance. The need to improve corporate governance is 
even more crucial during difficult periods as it is found that the East-Asian financial 
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crisis did result in more entrenchment effects and deteriorating firm performance. The 
areas for attention include improving the effectiveness and the quality of the board and 
the audit committee. The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board should also be increased and their independence should be ensured. Companies 
should also consider setting up a remuneration committee. These recommendations are 
derived from the findings from the qualitative analyses and are reinforced by the results 
in the empirical studies in the preceding chapters. ( 
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1.3 Contributions of the Study 
This thesis contributes to the literature on corporate governance in the following ways: 
1. Filling a gap in the academic literature: 
Most empirical studies to date have been based on US evidence. According to 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997, pg.740): "Most of the available empirical evidence 
[on corporate governance}. .. comes from the United States ... Unfortunately ... 
there has been extremely little research done on corporate governance around 
the world .. " However, the ownership structure in the US is quite different 
from that in many other countries where the structure takes a more 
concentrated form (La Porta et ai., 1999). For example, the ownership 
structure in most East-Asian countries is characterized by family-ownership 
and control, in contrast to the more diffuse form of ownership in the UK and 
the US (Claessens et ai., 2000). 
There has been limited research performed in concentrated ownership 
environments. One of the few empirical studies using a concentrated 
ownership structure as evidence is that of Mak and Li (2001). However, it 
does not follow that the results based on Mak and Li's Singapore evidence are 
representative of all other countries with concentrated ownership. This is 
because, apart from family members, the Government is another important 
blockholder in Singaporean corporations. The corporate ownership structure in 
Singapore can best be described as a mixture of family-based and Government-
based ownership, rather than just family-based ownership (Mak and Li. 2001). 
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This research fills in a gap in the literature by examining the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance in a concentrated family-
owned form of corporate structure, using Hong Kong listed companies as 
evidence. The results show that the relationship is different from the findings 
of UK, US and also Singaporean studies. 
2. Demonstrating that the family-controlled ownership structure in Hong 
Kong has an effect on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance: 
Based on the regression results of 1406 firm-year observations of Hong Kong 
listed companies from 1995 to 1998, it is found that under the family-
controlled ownership structure in Hong Kong, the pattern of the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance is "entrenchment-
alignment -entrenchment". This is in contrast to that ("alignment-
entrenchment-alignment") found in the UK by Short and Keasey (1999) and in 
the US by Morck et al. (1988). While this finding supports both the 
"convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the 
"entrenchment" effects argued by Fama and Jensen (1983), the opposite pattern 
from that found in UK and US studies suggests that ownership structure affects 
the relationship between firm performance and managerial own ~rship under 
different ownership ranges. This finding is also supported by the argument of 
Fan and Wong (2002) that studies based on UK or US data are not necessarily 
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applicable to East-Asian corporations due to differences III the degree of 
ownership concentration. 
3. Demonstrating that culture and historical background have an impact on 
the pattern of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance: 
Apart from finding a reverse form of relationship in Hong Kong 
("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") when compared with the UK and 
US studies ("alignment-entrenchment-alignment"), it is also found that the 
range of alignment of the relationship in Hong Kong is very wide (between the 
levels of approximately 16% and 62% of managerial ownership). This can be 
explained by the "long-term orientation" dimension of Hofstede's studies on 
culture. The family-oriented Chinese culture in Hong Kong is beneficial to 
firm performance as evidenced by the fast rate of economic growth in most of 
the East-Asian countries in the latter part of the twentieth century (Hofstede, 
2001). This supports the finding in this research that there is a wide range of 
alignment between managerial ownership and firm performance: under the 
family-owned corporate structure, firm performance lmproves when 
managerial ownership increases and this occurs at most of the ownership levels 
(from 160/0 to 620/0). The aggregate result of individual firms' improvement in 
performance is economic growth. As suggested by Hofstede, this is brought by 
the "long-term orientation" of the "five cultural dimensions", though he also 
recognises that it is difficult to prove this link (Hofstede, 2001). 
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4. Demonstrating that macro-economic conditions affect the nature of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance: 
Most previous studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance do not consider the possible impact of macro-economic 
conditions. This research analyses the impact of the East-Asian financial crisis 
on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. It is 
found that the convergence effect is stronger in the prosperous years, as shown 
by the wider alignment range of the regression results for the data before the 
East-Asian financial crisis (1995-1997). The entrenchment effect is, however, 
more prominent during the difficult times as indicated by the narrower range of 
alignment in the regression results for the year after the crisis (1998). 
5. Highlighting deficiencies III the nature of board structure and 
remuneration in the Hong Kong context: 
Apart from managerial ownership, which is the key explanatory variable used 
in the regression analyses in this study, the board structure and remuneration 
variables are also used as independent variables to control for their possible 
effects on firm performance. It is found from the regression analyses that 
board size, board composition and directors' remuneration do not have any 
significant relationships with firm performance. This finding is also supported 
by the qualitative analyses performed in this thesis. The results suggest that 
these variables have a different impact in the Hong Kong context in 
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comparison to other countries. For example, the number of independent non-
executive directors is not sufficient and very often they are not truly 
independent, and the remuneration of directors is not governed by any 
committees. These are possible reasons which could explain why the board 
structure and remuneration variables, which are found in some studies to have 
significant relationships with firm performance in some countries, do not 
explain firm performance in Hong Kong. These are the areas for improvement 
in corporate governance practices in Hong Kong, which may serve to enhance 
corporate performance. 
On the whole, the studies performed in this thesis find that the pattern of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong is 
different from that found in US and UK studies. The findings contribute to the 
literature on corporate governance and add weight to the view that empirical results 
based on US and UK evidence are not necessarily applicable to the East-Asian context 
due to the different form of ownership structure, and also the different cultural and 
historical backgrounds. Macro-economic conditions may also exhibit influences on 
the pattern of the relationship between managerial ownership and performance. The 
results from both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses in this thesis support the 
view that there is no single best corporate governance model that can be applied 
universally. It follows that each entity has to design a corporate governance system 
that suits its own culture, ownership structure and corporate environment in order to 
optimize firm performance. 
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2.1 Chapter Objectives 
Governments and companies in various nations, as well as individual and institutional 
investors, have become more aware of the importance of corporate governance in 
recent years. In Western countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States (US), corporate governance rules are widely recognized to be better developed 
than in other countries, especially those from emerging nations. It is argued by 
international investors that the East-Asian financial crisis in late 1997 was caused by 
inadequate financial disclosure and lack of corporate transparency (Tsui and Gul, 
2000). After the financial crisis, all the East-Asian countries have come to regard 
corporate governance as an important issue and have put it further up their policy 
agendas (Chow, 2000). 
What is corporate governance? Why is it so important? In what aspects are the 
corporate governance systems in the UK and the US different from other countries? 
This chapter begins by defining corporate governance and identifying its importance. 
It is followed by an examination of the historical development and characteristics of 
the corporate governance regimes in the UK and Hong Kong, and then makes a 
comparison between them. In studying corporate governance, it is necessary to 
explore the system in the UK as a benchmark because it is recognized over the world 
to have a well-developed set of guidelines for corporate governance (Chow, 2000). 
Hong Kong, which was a colony of the UK for one and a half centuries, has adopted 
most of its law and regulations from the UK. However, mainly due to differences in 
the cultural backgrounds of the two countries, there are quite a number of ditTerences 
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in the code of best practice of Hong Kong compared to that of the UK. Hence, one of 
the aims of this chapter is to perform a qualitative analysis by comparing the two 
systems in order to ascertain the areas where Hong Kong is not following the UK 
corporate governance practices; and thereby to identify the possible areas for further 
improvements in the Hong Kong corporate governance system. 
The comparative analysis is also extended to the corporate governance systems in 
other jurisdictions. Key features of the corporate governance practices from these 
jurisdictions are identified. Comparisons are then made by references to the studies 
carried out by various consultancy firms and organisations specialising in corporate 
governance research. The jurisdictions covered under the comparative study include 
the two countries recognised to have 'better' corporate governance systems: the UK 
and the US; leading countries in Europe and Asia: France, Germany and Japan; the 
"four little dragons" in East-Asia: Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong and also 
Hong Kong's home country: the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
Conclusions are drawn from the qualitative analyses in this chapter with 
recommendations made in Chapter Seven for further improvements in the Hong Kong 
corporate governance system. 
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2.2 What is Corporate Governance? 
2.2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
Tricker (1995) described Corporate Governance as "the exercise of power over the 
corporate entity". Corporate governance can be broadly defined as a set of 
interactions among key participants in a corporation, by which the broad objectives of 
the corporation are determined, the means of reaching those objectives are agreed and 
performance is evaluated. The key participants being mainly the management, the 
board of directors, the owners and the other stakeholders (OECD, 1998). 
Corporate governance can also be defined as a system by which companies are run. 
At the centre of the system is the board of directors. Their actions are subject to law, 
regulations and the shareholders in general meetings. The shareholders in tum are 
responsible for appointing the directors and the auditors. The relationships among the 
parties can be summarized in Figure 2.1 (Tricker, 1995): 
Figure 2.1 The Relationships and Boundaries of Corporate Governance 
Shareholders 
Regulators Board of Other 
and Auditors Directors Stakeholders 
Top 
Management 
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It can be observed that corporate governance involves a set of relationships among a 
company's management, its board of directors, its shareholders and other stakeholders 
(e.g. employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, communities and societies). These 
relationships are subject, in part, to law and regulation and, in part, to voluntary 
adaptation. It provides the structure through which the shareholders, directors and 
managers set the broad objectives of the company, the means of attaining those 
objectives and the monitoring of performance. 
2.2.2 Importance of Corporate Governance 
The board of directors is generally regarded as the central governing body which is 
concerned with supervising and monitoring performance and ensuring accountability 
of management to shareholders and other stakeholders. There has been increasing 
concern over what constitutes good principles and codes of best practice for corporate 
governance (Chow, 1996). There have also been studies indicating that a firm's 
corporate governance structure affects its disclosure behaviour and the quality of 
disclosed information (e.g. Forker, 1992). 
The quality of corporate disclosure will influence the information used in making 
investment and loan decisions, which will affect the performance of the companies 
concerned. The Working Group on International Financial Crisis of the International 
Organization of Securities Commission (lOS CO) has stressed that adherence to 
improved international disclosure rules is an essential element for reforming the 
international financial architecture (lOSCO, 1998). Strengthening the financial 
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infrastructure and corporate governance system, including more corporate disclosure, 
are important measures for improving corporate performance. 
The drive to improve international corporate governance standards has been taking 
place at both the national and supranational levels. For example, the OECD plays an 
active role in enhancing corporate governance. The OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, published in May 1999, have become the focal point of official efforts. 
The OECD Principles were essentially based on existing legal and regulatory 
arrangements and best practice among OECD member countries. The Principles are 
intended to assist member and non-member governments in their efforts to evaluate 
and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate 
governance in their countries. They also aim to provide guidance and suggestions to 
stock exchanges, investors and corporations that have a role in the process of 
developing good corporate governance (OECD Principles, 1999). Support for this 
OECD project has been reaffirmed by various international organizations as part of 
the effort to construct a more sound international financial architecture after the East-
Asian financial crisis. Other organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, also use the OECD Principles as a point of reference 
(Thompson, 1999). The initiatives that are undertaken by the OECD and other 
international organizations are discussed further in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
Specific corporate governance structures have also been recommended by varIOUS 
regulatory bodies, such as the United States Treadway Commission in 1987 and the 
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United Kingdom Cadbury Committee in 1992 (to be discussed in later sections of this 
chapter). However, while the system of corporate governance in the US and the UK 
reflects the separation of ownership and control and the diffuse nature of 
shareholdings in these countries, in most East-Asian countries ownership and control 
are more closely aligned, giving rise to different systems of corporate governance. 
Claessens et al. (2000) report that most East-Asian countries are characterised by 
concentrated corporate ownership structures that are mostly famIly owned and 
controlled. Hong Kong is an example of such an ownership structure. In Hong Kong, 
many listed companies are majority-controlled by a family or an individual (HKSA, 
1995). The ten wealthiest families in Hong Kong owned 46.8 percent of the total 
market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1996 (Xiang, 1996). 
Also, the scope of Hong Kong's corporate disclosure requirements is much narrower 
than those in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries (Gray and Vint, 1995). The 
nature of corporate ownership in East-Asia and the East-Asian financial crisis have 
raised concerns among governments, professionals and academics about the quality of 
corporate governance regimes and whether they can provide the platform for a 
sustained recovery of economies and corporations in the region. A quantitative study 
will be performed in this thesis to determine the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance under the concentrated family ownership structure in 
Hong Kong; and the effect of the East-Asian financial crisis on the relationship. 
Given the differences in culture and forms of corporate ownership and control 
between Western and East-Asian countries, the corporate governance systems adopted 
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in Western countries may not be applicable in East-Asian countries. Nevertheless, it 
is beyond doubt that good corporate governance regimes, whether in the West or in 
the East, can help to reinforce the confidence of investors, reduce the cost of capital 
and ultimately induce more stable capital flows. These are important ingredients to 
enhance corporate performance in the longer term. According to the Global Investor 
Opinion Survey performed by McKinsey & Company in co-operation with the Global 
Corporate Governance Forum on over 200 institutional investors in April and May 
2002, corporate governance is of great concern for investors. A significant majority 
of respondents stated that they are willing to pay a premium for companies exhibiting 
high governance standards. The countries that have implemented governance-related 
reforms are welcomed by investors. Corporate governance is important and it is at the 
"heart" of making investment decisions (McKinsey, 2002). 
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2.3 Historical Development of the Corporate Governance 
Regime in the United Kingdom 
2.3.1 Background 
Concern with what is now called "corporate governance" is not unique to the 1990s or 
the early years of the Twenty-first Century. In the 1970s, following the oil crisis of 
1973 and the demise and restructuring of industrial giants such as British Leyland, 
Rolls-Royce, Tele-funken and Chrysler, fundamental questions concerning the 
adequacy of corporate stewardship and the discharge of duties by directors and senior 
management were topics of debate. The de-regulation of financial markets following 
the "Big Bang" in 1986 made it easier for companies to raise the finance for takeover 
activities (Chow, 1996) but a number of companies which grew in this way collapsed 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Notable examples include the Maxwell 
Corporation in the UK and the Bond Corporation in Australia. The reasons for their 
failure included unsound business management and inadequate financial reporting. 
The review of the UK's corporate governance system started with the establishment 
of the Cadbury Committee in 1991. Its formation was again prompted by business 
scandals, such as the Guinness affair and the collapse of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI). The intensive privatization activities in the UK in 
late 1980s and early 1990s and the promotion of an "equity culture" also provided 
further impetus for improvements to corporate governance. 
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Following the Cadbury Report, there were also further official reports: the Greenbury 
Report, the Hampel Report and the Turnbull Guidance. The reports are discussed in 
the following sections to assess their contribution towards the corporate governance 
regime in UK. 
2.3.2 The Cadbury Report 
Chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the Cadbury Committee was formed in 1991 to 
review the UK's system of corporate governance from a financial reporting 
viewpoint. On 1 December 1992, the Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance (the "Cadbury Report") was published. 
A Code of Best Practice, which codified the elements of best practice already found 
within the then existing regime, was attached to the Report. The key elements of the 
Code were related to the structure and responsibilities of the board, the conduct of 
board meetings, the overall control of the business and the independence of external 
auditors. Details of the Code of Best Practice are listed in Appendix 1 at the end of 
the thesis. 
Under the Cadbury Report, corporate governance is defined as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled. Directors are responsible for the governance 
of their companies. The Cadbury Report stressed the responsibility and accountability 
of directors. The recommendations made by the Report are summarized as follO\\"s 
(Cadbury Report, 1992): 
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(a) Complv with the Code o(Best Practice 
All listed companies that are incorporated in UK are required to comply with the 
Code of Best Practice. The companies have to affirm compliance or, alternatively, 
state the reasons for non-compliance in their annual reports. 
(b) Recommendations in relation to the directors 
The intention of the Report was to increase the extent to which the directors are 
accountable to the shareholders. For example, there should be a separation of the 
chief executive and the chairman of the board. The executive directors' service 
contracts should not exceed three years, unless shareholders' approval is obtained. A 
nomination committee should be formed to assist the board in making future 
appointments of directors. Decisions must be made at the full board level at least on 
certain matters, such as investments, capital projects, financial and risk management 
policies. 
The Report also recommended that there should be at least three independent non-
executive directors appointed in each company. Ideally one of them should be the 
chairman. The board as a whole, through a formal selection process, should approve 
their nominations. These independent non-executive directors should be free from 
any business or financial connection with the company. They should not participate 
in any stock options or employee pension schemes. The independent judgement of 
these outside directors should be invaluable to the board, especially in cases of take-
over bids, management buy-outs and the determination of directors' remuneration. 
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To perform their duties, the independent non-executive directors should have full 
access to the financial and management information of the company. They can also 
seek independent professional advice at the expense of the company. The majority of 
the audit committee and the remuneration committee should also be composed of non-
executive directors. 
(d Recommendations in relation to the auditors 
In order to eliminate the confusion about whether it is the responsibility of the 
directors or the external auditors to prepare the financial statements, directors are 
recommended to include a brief description of their responsibilities in preparing the 
accounts in the directors' reports. The audit should also be extended to include 
reporting on the internal control system of the company. 
The Cadbury Report also intended to strengthen the independence of external auditors 
through the introduction of an audit committee. Auditors should have free access to 
the audit committee and to voice any concern about the management of the company 
as appropriate. Through the above means, the auditors' role in reporting to 
shareholders was to be reinforced. 
(d) Recommendations in relation to internal control 
A proper internal control system can provide reasonable assurance against material 
misstatement or loss. It was recommended that directors should state whether there is 
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a satisfactory system of internal control in the company concerned. Directors should 
report details such as the nature and main elements of the system, the process used in 
identifying major risks and the monitoring procedures. 
(e) Other recommendations 
It was recommended that the remuneration of the chairman and the highest paid 
directors should be disclosed. The basis of the remuneration should also be disclosed. 
In addition, it was suggested that formation of shareholder committees is desirable. 
These committees can serve as a direct link between the individual shareholders and 
the board of directors. Shareholders' opinions and concerns can be revealed to the 
directors through the committees. 
2.3.3 The Greenbury Report 
In February 1994 there was a lot of publicity concerning Mr. Cedric Brown, chief 
executive of British Gas, who received a 71.8 percent pay rise and a generous award 
of share options (Sum, 1999). In response to general concerns about the level of 
directors' remuneration, such as that of Mr. Brown, the Greenbury Committee was set 
up with the remit "to identify good practice in determining directors' remuneration 
and prepare a code of such practice". Chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury, the 
Committee published the Greenbury Report on Directors' Remuneration in July 1995. 
With effect from October 1995, all UK listed companies have had to comply with the 
"Greenbury Code" which deals with remuneration policies and remuneration 
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committees. The recommendations made by the Report are summarized as follows 
(Greenbury Report, 1995): 
(a) Directors' service contracts 
Directors' service contracts should be renewed every year. This annual review should 
be performed by a remuneration committee. Contracts should be altered if poor 
performance is discovered. 
(b) Composition and power o(remuneration committee 
The remuneration committee should only consist of non-executive directors. It will 
determine on behalf of the board the remuneration policies. This suggestion was 
different from the approach taken in the Cadbury Report that the remuneration 
committee would make recommendations only and the actual decisions would be left 
with the board. The chairman of the remuneration committee should attend 
shareholders' meetings in order to explain the remuneration policies. 
(c) Disclosure o(directors' remuneration and benefits 
It was suggested that complete and comprehensive information relating to the 
directors' pay and benefits should be made available to the shareholders. Any 
documents which are supplemental to the main service contracts should be made 
available for inspection, provided that they contain ;)fovisions such as bonus, 
incentive and pension schemes that will affect the cost to the company of employing 
the directors concerned. 
) 1-
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(d) Restrictions on share options 
Executive share options should not be issued for at least six months following a 
privatization or at substantial discounts to the market price. They should also be 
taxed as income rather than being treated as a capital gain. 
2.3.4 The Hampel Report 
The Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance was chaired by Sir Ronnie 
Hampel. The principal recommendations made by the Hampel Report in January 
1998 were that directors should receive training when they are first appointed. 
Echoing a recommendation in the Cadbury Report, it suggested that a nomination 
committee should be fonned and should have responsibility for the appointment of 
directors. In addition, at least one-third of the board should be comprised of non-
executive directors. There should also be one senior independent director (other than 
the chainnan) to whom concerns could be conveyed. 
2.3.5 The Combined Code 
The 'Combined Code', formally known as the Principles of Good Governance and 
Code of Best Practice, was published in June 1998. It embraces the works of the 
C Idbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees. Compliance with the Combined Code 
was made a listing requirement by the London Stock Exchange. With effect from 
accounting periods ended on or after 31 December 1998, listed companies are 
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required to disclose in their annual reports how they have applied the principles and 
complied with the Code's provisions. 
2.3.6 The Turnbull Guidance 
Turnbull's final guidance on the implementation of the internal control requirements 
of the Combined Code ("the Turnbull Guidance") was published on 27 September 
1999 by the Internal Control Working Party of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales, which was chaired by Sir Nigel Turnbull. The Turnbull 
Guidance states that boards of listed companies should comply with the following: 
(a) assess how the company has applied the Combined Code ("the Code") 
principle D.2; 
(b) implement the requirements of the Code provisions D.2.1 and D.2.2; and 
(c) report on these matters to shareholders in the annual report and accounts. 
Principle D.2 of the Code states that the board should maintain a sound system of 
internal control to safeguard shareholders' investment and the company's assets. 
Provision D.2.1 of the Code states that the directors should, at least annually, conduct 
a review of the effectiveness of the internal control system and should report to 
shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all aspects of controls, 
including financial, operational and compliance controls, as well as risk management. 
Provision D.2.2 of the Code provides that companies that do not have an internal audit 
function should from time to time review the need for one. 
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The London Stock Exchange has endorsed the Turnbull Guidance and states that 
compliance with the Guidance will constitute compliance with Combined Code 
provisions D.2.1 and D.2.2 and that companies should provide appropriate narrati\'e 
disclosure of how the Code principle D.2 has been applied. 
The Guidance is intended to reflect sound business practice and one important effect 
is that it will require companies to focus on exactly what their business objectives are 
in order to ensure that the internal control system covers all relevant risks. The 
Guidance reinforces companies' continuous need to monitor and review the 
effectiveness of internal control and to have a risk management culture. Although the 
adoption of a sound internal control system does not necessarily mean that fraud can 
be prevented, it should assist in the detection of fraud at a stage before pennanent 
damage has been done (Younghusband, 2000). 
While this section discusses the historical development of the UK corporate 
governance regime, an evaluation and a comparison of it with the Hong Kong's and 
other countries' corporate governance systems are made in section 2.6 of this chapter; 
after discussing the development and features of the corporate governance systems of 
these countries in the two sections follow. 
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2.4 Historical Development of the Corporate Governance 
Regime in Hong Kong 
2.4.1 Background 
During the last two to three decades of the twentieth century, Hong Kong has 
developed into one of the world's major financial centres. The success of Hong Kong 
may be attributed to its free trade policy, its simple tax system and its user-friendly 
laws and regulations. In fact most of the laws and regulations in Hong Kong were 
adapted from the UK. However, the UK is more advanced in terms of the 
development of its codes of practice for corporate governance. The Hong Kong 
authorities only started to realise the importance of corporate governance in the mid-
1990s, although the rate of progress since then has been fairly rapid (Chow, 2000). 
In common with other developed financial markets, Hong Kong listed companies 
have also had their share of scandals. Most have involved related party transactions 
and misappropriations by the dominant shareholders, such as using company funds for 
personal purposes without disclosure in financial statements. This phenomenon is 
related to the so-called "family form" of ownership in Hong Kong. Analysis of the 
effect of the Hong Kong ownership structure on corporate governance is undertaken 
in later chapters of the thesis, while the sections which follow in this chapter analyse 
the development of the corporate governance regime in Hong Kong. 
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The enforcement of corporate governance in Hong Kong mainly rests with two sets of 
regulations. The one with legal effect is the Companies Ordinance, derived from the 
UK Companies Act. Other legislation includes the Securities and Futures Ordinance 
and the Protection of Investors Ordinance. The set of regulation without legal effect 
is the set of Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong ("the Listing Rules"). Although the Listing Rules do not have legal effect and 
rely on self-regulation by corporations, the most severe form of punishment can take 
the form of public censure (Chow, 1996). 
While the Listing Rules form the basis of self-regulation for the directors and 
management, the accountancy professional body, namely the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants ("HKSA"), has been monitoring the development of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. A number of reports have produced in the past few years 
by the HKSA. Other professional groups have also performed studies and surveys on 
the topic. The findings and suggestions of these reports are discussed in this chapter. 
2.4.2 The Listing Rules 
The Listing Rules basically form a contract between the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong' and each of the listed companies in Hong Kong. Despite the fact that it has no 
legal effect, listed companies are expected to comply with the requirements listed in 
J The Financial Secretary in Hong Kong announced in his 1999 Budget Speech that would be a reform 
of the Hong Kong exchanges in order to meet the challenges of the globalised market. Under the 
reform, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited and the 
Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Limited merged under a single holding company, the Hong 
Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx). The merger was completed on 6 March 2000. 
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the document. In particular, companies have to comply with the Code of Best 
Practice attached as Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules. Otherwise, they have to state 
their reasons for non-compliance. The Code of Best Practice is adapted from the one 
in the UK. A copy of the Code of Best Practice is attached as Appendix 2 at the end 
of the thesis. 
In addition to compliance with the Code of Best Practice, the Listing Rules require 
every company to appoint at least two independent non-executive directors. Details 
of the directors' remuneration must be disclosed in the annual reports. Prospectuses 
and company announcements should be in a simple and standard format and in 
readable language. Companies are also required to set up audit committees. 
Regarding financial reporting, listed compames incorporated in Hong Kong are 
required to comply with Appendix 7a of the Listing Rules, while listed companies 
incorporated elsewhere have to comply with Appendix 7b. These are actually the 
Listing Agreements between the listed companies and the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. 
Apart from the above general disclosure requirements, the Listing Rules also provide 
that listed companies should make a number of specific disclosures. For example, 
there should be an improvement in corporate communication to non-registered 
holders of securities. Listed companies should provide better financial reporting, for 
example, on the details of the designated deposit arrangements with financial 
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institutions in the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). Related party transactions 
also require specific disclosure in accordance with Practice Note No.19 issued by the 
Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Each of these specific disclosure requirements is 
discussed below: 
ra) Corporate communication with non-registered holders o{securities 
Many securities holders do not have their securities registered in their own names, 
which means that they will not receive the financial statements and other notices or 
correspondence from their invested companies. A non-registered holder is a person or 
company whose listed securities are held in the Central Clearing and Settlement 
System ("CCASS") and who has notified the company through the Hong Kong 
Securities Clearing Company that he/she/it wishes to receive corporate 
communications. In order to better protect these investors, listed companies are 
required to send, at their own expenses, copies of any corporate communications to 
any non-registered holders whose listed securities are held in the CCASS (Appendix 
7, the Listing Rules). The corporate communications include annual reports, interim 
reports, notices of meetings, circulars and listing documents such as prospectuses. 
rb) Designated deposit arrangements with financial institutions in the PRC 
If listed companies have entered into designated deposit arrangements with financial 
institutions in the PRC, they have to comply with a number of disclosure 
requirements. Designated deposit arrangements are those arrangements where funds 
are placed with PRC financial institutions with instructions, or on the understanding 
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that, the funds will be on-lent to a third party borrower. The financial institution in 
the PRe has no liability to repay the deposit or is only liable for a certain percentage 
of the amount not repaid by the borrower. 
Under such arrangements, the listed companies must classify the bank deposits as 
accounts receivable instead of "normal" bank deposits. An explanatory note should 
be made to set out the detailed description of the deposit arrangements, the nature of 
the deposit and the liabilities of the financial institution and the borrower respectively 
in case of default. An explanatory note in the financial statements is also required 
when the repayment terms of the principal and/or interest have been rescheduled and 
the amounts are material. By making the above disclosures, companies will enable 
investors to appraise the associated risks in their investments. 
(c) Related party transactions 
When a company makes an advance to an entity, or provides financial assistance and 
guarantees to affiliated companies, which exceed 25 percent of the company's net 
assets, disclosure has to be made. This is in accordance with The Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong's Practice Note No. 19, which details the disclosure requirements of 
related party transactions. 
Apart from the above general and specific disclosures, v, hich are currently required, 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has also proposed a number of changes in 
disclosure requirements. For example, more frequent quarterly disclosures are 
,... ')., 
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proposed instead of just having the announcements of interim and final results. It is 
also proposed that if a company plans to commit significant resources to an activity 
which is a non-core business, disclosure should be made. In addition, it is proposed 
that disclosures should be made if there are significant exposures to countries or 
markets that are experiencing financial upheaval. All these proposals are aimed at 
improving corporate transparency and enabling investors to better assess the financial 
position and future potential of their investments. 
2.4.3 The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases 
The Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases ("the Takeovers Code" 
and "the Share Repurchase Code") (collectively "the Codes") are another major set of 
voluntary rules of corporate governance in Hong Kong. The Codes are issued by the 
Securities and Futures Commission ("the SFC"). They are applicable to public 
companies, whether they are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or not. The 
general objective of the Codes is to achieve fair treatment of all the shareholders who 
are affected by takeover and merger transactions and share repurchases. They also 
aim at ensuring the timely disclosure of adequate information to the shareholders 
concerned in the above transactions and events. In such a way, a fair and informed 
market in the shares of the companies affected by the above activities will be ensured. 
The Codes also provide an orderly framework within which takeovers, mergers and 
share repurchases are to be conducted. 
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In common with the Listing Rules, the Codes do not have the force of law. Although 
they are voluntary in nature, the Listing Rules state that non-compliance with the 
Codes may result in suspension of trading of the shares on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong. Other sanctions include private reprimand, and the issuance of a public 
statement, involving criticism and public censure. The case may also be reported to 
the SFC and other regulatory bodies such as the HKSA and the Law Society. A "cold 
shoulder" order may also be issued which requires the dealers and financial or legal 
advisers to stop acting for any person who has failed to comply with the Codes for a 
certain stated period of time. 
The Codes are administered by the Takeovers and Mergers Executive, the Takeovers 
and Mergers Panel and the Takeovers Appeal Committee. The roles and functions of 
each of them are described below: 
ra) The Takeovers and Mergers Executive 
This body consists of executive staff of the Corporate Finance Division of the SFC. 
The executive staff are available for the day-to-day administration of the Codes and 
for consultation. Where the relevant parties and their advisers are doubtful about the 
application of the Codes, the executive staff provide advice and give rulings as 
appropriate. 
rb) The Takeovers and Mergers Panel 
If any party is not satisfied with the ruling made by the Executiye, the Panel wilL at 
the request of the party concerned, review the ruling. The Panel \\'ill also consider 
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important or difficult cases referred to it by the Executive and hear disciplinary 
matters in the first instance. 
(e) The Takeovers Appeal Committee 
This Appeal Committee reviews disciplinary rulings of the Panel. It determines 
whether the sanction imposed by the Panel is unfair or excessive in the circumstances, 
based on the finding of the facts by the Panel. 
Apart from these voluntary Codes, there are also other regulations governing the 
takeover, merger and share repurchases activities of public companies in Hong Kong. 
These include the Protection of Investors Ordinance, the Securities and Futures 
Ordinance and relevant sections and schedules in the Companies Ordinance. Under 
the Common Law system in Hong Kong, a civil claim can also be made under tort of 
negligence or fraud where appropriate. However, it should be reiterated that a good 
corporate governance system and climate depends much on voluntary rather than 
forced compliance. 
The existence of various Ordinances, the Listing Rules and the Codes does not mean 
that everything is perfect and that there is no room for improvement. With the 
continuously changing financial and commercial environment, changes are likely to 
be made. The following sections describe the efforts made by accounting 
professionals in the development and improvement of the corporate gOYernance 
framework in Hong Kong. 
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2.4.4 Reports by the HKSA Corporate Governance Committee 
Although Hong Kong only started to realise the importance of corporate governance 
in the mid-1990s, there has been a speedy development of corporate governance rules 
since then. The corporate governance regime in Hong Kong is actually now widely 
regarded as a fairly good benchmark for the other Asian countries to catch up with or 
to follow (Chow, 2000). Many of the contributions have been made by the Hong 
Kong Society of Accountants ("HKSA"), which has been pro-active in promoting 
corporate governance good practice since 1995. Realising that the profile of 
shareholders and the corporate culture in Hong Kong are different from those in 
Western countries, the HKSA Council saw the need to approach the subject of 
corporate governance from a Hong Kong perspective. A Working Group on 
Corporate Governance was formed in March 1995, comprised of members who 
worked in the public sector, auditors from the Big-6 (now Big-4) accounting firms 
and from academia. Since then, the Working Group (which became the HKSA 
Corporate Governance Committee in 1998) has produced a number of reports. 
The first report was produced in December 1995 and contained nineteen 
recommendations. In January 1997, the second report was published, providing an 
update to the first report and containing further recommendations. In December 1997, 
A Guide for the Formation of An Audit Committee was published and was adopted by 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in May 1998. In November 1998, A Guide for 
Directors' Business Reviell' in the Annual Report was published, providing a checklist 
for the preparers of financial statements. In November 1999, another publication 
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entitled Directors' Remuneration: Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and 
Accountability was produced, aimed principally at improving disclosure of directors' 
remuneration. There were also subsequent publications in 2000 to 2002. The HKSA 
also co-hosted a Roundtable with the OECD, the World Bank, the Securities and 
Futures Commission and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in 2000 in Hong Kong. 
The first and the second reports are discussed in the sections which follow, while the 
other reports and initiatives are discussed in Chapter Three of the thesis. 
ra) First Report of the Working Group on Corporate Governance 
In December 1995, the First Report of the Working Group on Corporate Governance 
("First Report") was published. The Working Group took the view that while rules 
and practices may need to be tightened in certain respects, it is equally important for 
the regulators to actively monitor and enforce compliance with rules and practices that 
have been laid down. On the other hand, it was also regarded as important that a 
balance should be struck between compliance and performance, so that company 
performance would not be stifled by over-regulation. 
Since the Cadbury Report had provided an in-depth study of the financial aspects of 
corporate governance, the Working Group did not see the merit of 're-inventing the 
wheel' in considering the corporate governance requirements for Hong Kong. 
Therefore, the Working Group based its advice on the Cadbury Report and addressed 
the relevance of the recommendations of the Cadbury Report to the Hong Kong 
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situation. The aim was to identify areas which could and should be adopted in Hong 
Kong. 
The Working Group had restricted the study in its First Report to three areas of the 
Cadbury Report. The three areas were the control of the board, financial reporting, 
and perception and effectiveness of the audit. After drawing up a summary of the 
Cadbury Report recommendations in the three areas, detailed discussions were held as 
to their relevance to the Hong Kong context. The Working Group found that a 
number of the recommendations of the Cadbury Report had, in fact, already found 
their way into the Listing Rules or the Code of Best Practice in Hong Kong. 
However, at the same time, given the corporate governance culture in Hong Kong, the 
application of the Cadbury concept of the independence in the board was regarded as 
difficult to achieve and as a long-term objective. Nevertheless, the Working Group's 
view was that ways of increasing board effectiveness should be investigated in Hong 
Kong's "dominant board" environment, which was thought likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future (First Report, 1995). 
The First Report came up with nineteen recommendations. They are as follows: 
1. Members of the same family should not make up more than half of the voting 
members of the board. 
2. There should be mandatory appointment of a Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") 
at board level. The CFO should have designated responsibility for the finance 
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function of the company and should be a signatory to the accounts on behalf of 
the board. The CFO should also have the right of access to the Audit 
Committee, where there is one. 
3. There should be at least four board meetings per year, with six prescribed as 
good practice. 
4. Directors' servIce contracts should not exceed three years without 
shareholders' approval. 
5. Declaration of independence by the independent non-executive directors upon 
appointment and annually. 
6. Noting that some compames may have difficulties in recruiting truly 
independent non-executive directors, the Working Group proposed that 
disclosure of a past relationship, where one existed, may be acceptable, rather 
than to rule out such persons from recognition as an independent director. 
There should be a time scale (of say, one to two years) for the restriction on 
past relationship or transactions. 
7. The independence criteria of the independent non-executive directors should 
be actively monitored by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. 
8. The Code of Best Practice should be strengthened and refined in a number of 
aspects: 
1. The board should have a formal schedule of which matters can be 
delegated to the executives and which are required to be put forward to 
the board. 
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II. There should be more direction to the director as to his right to 
information, and the company secretary as to his duty to provide 
information. 
lll. Non-executive directors should be provided with regular information 
they need to ensure compliance, to enhance performance. and to set 
strategies and direction. This includes information on directors' duties, 
board procedures, recent issues of concern, the business of the 
company, its financial performance, etc. 
IV. The board should be encouraged to draw up a code of ethics or 
statement of business practice so that all directors and employees know 
the standard of conduct expected of them. 
v. Companies should be encouraged to provide internal and external 
training courses for directors, and induction courses to all newly 
appointed board members. 
VI. The notification to the Stock Exchange of the resignation or removal of 
an independent non-executive director should be extended to all 
directors. 
VII. The right of the independent non-executive directors to have access to 
separate professional advice at the expense of the company should be 
qualified. The board should be fully aware of such advice being 
sought and should be able to refuse such requests on reasonable 
grounds. 
9. Directors should sign a statement of responsibility for preparing the accounts. 
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10. The annual report should contain a general statement on corporate governance. 
11. The number of and attendance at board meetings should be disclosed in the 
annual report. 
12. In addition to the audit fee, other fees paid to the auditors should be disclosed 
in the accounts. This can increase the transparency of the auditors' 
independence. 
13. Auditors should be gIven the right to reVIew other financial reports or 
information issued together with the audited financial statements. They can 
also report any misleading information contained therein or where it is 
inconsistent with the audited financial statements. 
14. There can be an inclusion in the annual report of a statement of going concern 
by directors, reported on by auditors. 
15. An inclusion can be made in the annual report of a statement on internal 
control by directors, reported on by auditors if material weaknesses were noted 
during the course of their audit. 
16. There is a requirement of an Audit Committee with defined functions. 
17. There is a requirement of an internal audit function. 
18. The interim report should include a balance sheet and cash flow information, 
and be reviewed and reported on by auditors. 
19. Members should be provided with ethical guidance on the interface between 
the board and senior management, and in particular, the role of the group 
finance director or the CFO in a family dominated board. 
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In the First Report, the Working Group considered that the Nomination Committee 
and Remuneration Committee were impractical or incompatible with the corporate 
governance environment in Hong Kong at that time. Due to the existence of 
dominant shareholders, it was believed that a Nomination Committee would not serve 
an effective purpose in Hong Kong. Regarding the Remuneration Committee, the 
Working Group felt that "a breathing space" of at least two years should be given 
before revisiting the subject, since Hong Kong was still in a catching-up phase in 
terms of disclosure of directors' emoluments. 
(b) Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group 
After the release of the First Report and upon receiving the comments from various 
interested parties, the Working Group decided that it would be useful to conduct a 
statistical survey of all the 553 listed companies in Hong Kong. This would provide a 
factual basis for further development and implementation of the proposals suggested 
in the First Report. 
The statistical survey mainly covered the extent to which Audit Committees existed 
among the listed companies in Hong Kong, the extent of information disclosed on 
directors and substantial shareholders and whether the annual reports disclosed a 
designated finance director or a chief financial officer. In addition, since there were 
reservations and concerns over whether it would be practicable to limit the family 
members to not more than 50 percent of the board as suggested in the First Report the 
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survey also covered the extent of connections between directors and major 
shareholders in Hong Kong listed companies. 
The research findings are summarised as follows: 
1. Shareholding Control: 
1. More than half (53 percent) of all listed compames had one 
shareholder or one family group of shareholders owning 50 percent or 
more of their entire issued capital. 
11. More than three quarters (77 percent) of all listed companies had one 
shareholder or one family group of shareholders owning 35 percent or 
more of their entire issued capital. 
lll. Almost nine out of ten (88 percent) of all listed companies had one 
shareholder or one family group of shareholders owning 25 percent or 
more of their entire issued capital. 
The above observations confirmed the widespread view that the extent of 
control by one shareholder or one family group of shareholders was significant 
in Hong Kong listed companies. 
2. Control of the Board by the Major Shareholder and his Family: 
1. Only around 9 percent of all listed companies had boards where 50 
percent or more of the directors were themselves the major 
shareholders or related family members. 
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ii. However, in almost all (96 percent) such cases, the shareholder(s) in 
question held 35 percent or more of the company's issued capital. 
These observations indicated that despite the common existence of a dominant 
shareholder, the overwhelming majority of listed companies in Hong Kong 
had a balance between family and non-family directors on their boards. 
However, where members of the same family had majority representation on 
the board, the same family also tended to have effective control of the 
shareholding of the listed company. 
3. Control at the Executive Director Level: 
It was found that 30 percent of all listed companies had boards where 
50 percent or more of the executive directors were themselves related 
to the family members or major shareholders. 
ii In addition, in 84 percent of such cases the shareholder(s) in question 
held 35 percent or more of the company's issued capital. 
These findings indicated that controlling shareholders tended to appoint 
members of their family as executive directors to manage the companies on a 
full-time basis. 
4. Audit Committee: 
Approximately 2 percent of all listed companies disclosed that they had an 
Audit Committee. 
') 3-
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5. Finance Director/Chief Financial Officer 
It was found that nearly one-third of all listed companies had a designated 
Finance Director at the board level and nearly half of them were members of 
the HKSA. 
Based on the above findings, the Working Group came to the following conclusions 
and made the following recommendations in their Second Report: 
1. Overview 
The findings confirmed the generally held view that most listed companies in 
Hong Kong were subject to family or individual control by majority 
shareholders. However, the composition of the board indicated that they were 
not dominated by the major shareholders. The dominance of major 
shareholders was more significant at the Executive Director, that is, the top 
management level. 
The Working Group recognised that with the mandatory introduction, via the 
Listing Rules, of the requirement that there must be at least two independent 
non-executive directors, significant progress had been made in improving 
transparency and achieving more balance in the board. However, at the same 
time, the Working Group also believed that, given the predominance and 
continuing existence of the controlling shareholder in Hong Kong's corporate 
environment in the foreseeable future, there was an ongoing need for effective 
forms of minority protection. 
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2. Recommendations 
The Working Group reconfirmed the following recommendations that were 
made in its First Report: 
i. Maintenance of at least 50 percent Non-family Directors on the Board 
The Working Group continued to recommend, as self-regulatory good 
practice, that listed companies should try not to have more than half of 
the members on the board coming from the same family. 
ll. Audit Committees 
The Working Group supported the establishment of Audit Committees 
by listed companies. 
Ill. Finance Director/Chief Financial Officer ("CFO ") 
The Working Group suggested that where the CFO did not possess the 
necessary skills and experience, he should be supported by a Chief 
Accounting Officer ("CAO"). This person should have a right of 
access to the Audit Committee. It would be appropriate for either the 
CFO or the CAO to be a professionally qualified accountant. Such 
qualification should also be disclosed in the annual report of the 
company. 
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IV. Other Observations and Recommendations related to Disclosures on 
Directors and Substantial Shareholders 
The Working Group believed that further disclosures should be made 
mandatory by making relevant amendments to the Listing Rules. For 
example, family relationship(s) between directors and substantial 
shareholders not being directors should be disclosed. Executive 
directors, non-executive directors and independent non-executive 
directors should be clearly identified and disclosed respectively. The 
Working Group also suggested that the disclosure requirements of the 
substantial shareholders should be simplified, as the statutory 
provisions in this aspect were not reader-friendly. Guidance notes, 
with examples of disclosures, could be prepared by the regulators for 
reference by the substantial shareholders. 
2.4.5 Other Corporate Governance Surveys 
Apart from the HKSA, there are other organisations that are interested in the nature of 
corporate governance in Hong Kong and in enhancing its effectiveness. Among them, 
back III the early 1990s, the then Price Waterhouse (currently 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers) conducted a survey, the results of which were published in 
January 1995. Although the sample was only comprised of 100 Hong Kong listed 
companies, it demonstrated that accounting practices in Hong Kong had come to 
recognise the importance of corporate governance. In addition, the findings and 
recommendations made in the report highlight some of the corporate governance 
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characteristics of Hong Kong listed companies. These also provide some insights for 
structural improvements of the corporate governance system in Hong Kong. Some of 
the major findings and recommendations made in the report are summarised below: 
ra) Findings 
1. Full board meetings occurred typically every two months. 
2. Almost half of the sampled companies separated the roles of the chainnan and 
the chief executive. 
3. 62 percent of the companies appointed more than two non-executive directors 
while 13 percent failed to meet the requirement. 
4. One in three companies had formal policies on corporate governance and 
business ethics. 
5. 20 percent of companies had remuneration committees. Some of them 
included non-executive directors. 
6. 24 percent of the companies had audit committees. 
7. Over 50 percent of the companies had an internal audit department. 
8. Slightly less than half of the companies had fonnal policies for the release of 
price sensitive information. 
9. 30 percent of companies did not maintain procedure manuals to help control 
the finance function and assist in asset protection. 
It can be deduced from the above findings that the sample taken by Price Waterhouse 
is likely to have been comprised of those companies more prone to engage in self-
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regulation or to have greater resources. The reason for making this deduction is that 
some of the Price Waterhouse findings conflict with the findings of the Second Report 
of the Corporate Governance Working Group, published in 1997. For example, on 
the issue of the existence of Audit Committees, the report by Price Waterhouse stated 
that 24 percent of the 100 companies surveyed had an Audit Committee, whereas the 
Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group reported that only 2 
percent of listed companies had set up audit committees out of the full population of 
553 listed companies (about 10 companies). 
However, whether the above findings are highly reliable is not of the utmost 
importance. What is important is that in general the findings showed that at least 
some of the sampled companies were aware of the importance of corporate 
governance back in the mid 1990s. For example, the roles of the chairman and the 
chief executive were separated in some companies. In addition, some companies had 
started to form remuneration committees and some had formulated formal policies on 
corporate governance and business ethics. However, at the same time, the findings of 
the report demonstrate that there were a number of areas in need of substantial 
improvements, such as the disclosure of price sensitive information. 
(b) Recommendations 
1. Independent Non-executive Directors 
The report recommended that the independent non-executive directors should 
be present in board meetings \vhen discussions take place on issues where 
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conflicts of interests by the directors might arise. For example, when matters 
such as directors' remuneration, loans to directors and connected transactions 
were discussed in the board meetings. 
2. Remuneration Committee 
The report recommended that a Remuneration Committee should be formed to 
fix the remuneration of the directors. The total remuneration of each director 
and the basis of the calculation should be disclosed. 
3. Audit Committee 
It was recommended that an Audit Committee should be formed in every 
listed company. The Committee should be composed of three to five non-
executive directors. At least two meetings should be held annually. The main 
functions would include reviewing the financial statements and monitoring the 
finance directors and the external and internal auditors. A climate of 
discipline and internal control should be created to reduce the opportunity for 
fraud. 
4. Other recommendations 
The report also made other recommendations, including the improvement of 
internal control measures to minimise and avoid fraud. It also suggested that 
more education should be provided for directors. The effectiveness of the 
annual general meeting as a means of communication between the board and 
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the shareholders was deemed to need further improvement. More timely 
disclosure of information was also encouraged in the report. 
Some of the above recommendations made by the HKSA and Price Waterhouse have 
been effected in recent years. For example, a listed company was required to have an 
Audit Committee with effect from 1 January 1999. Some of the issues raised have 
also been put forward for further discussion by the HKSA, such as the Remuneration 
Committee. Further evaluation of the corporate governance system and areas for 
improvements are discussed in sections 2.6 and 2.7 of this chapter respectively. 
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2.5 Other Corporate Governance Regimes 
This section highlights the major features of the corporate governance systems in a 
number of countries. The countries include the US, Germany, France, Japan, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The results of 
the comparisons of these systems with that in the UK and Hong Kong are presented in 
section 2.6. 
2.5.1 The United States 
The US is similar to the UK in that it is also perceived as having a well-developed 
corporate governance system, despite the problems highlighted by the collapse of 
Enron in 2001. The major characteristics of the US corporate governance system are 
as follows: 
The directors must be elected by the shareholders, while the executive officers, 
including the chief executive officer, are elected by the board. Every listed company 
must have an audit committee and it is required by the New York Stock Exchange 
that the audit committee should be composed solely of independent directors. The 
board can delegate the business to various committees, such as the audit committee, 
nomination committee and compensation committee. 
The auditors, though in practice selected by the board, must have their appointment 
approved by the audit committee or ratified by the shareholders. In addition, the audit 
committee is responsible for reviewing the proposed remuneration of the auditors. In 
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some cases, the auditors' remuneration has to be fonnally approved by the audit 
committee. 
Despite the well-developed set of corporate governance practices in the US, there 
have been a series of corporate frauds detected since the Enron case in 2001. These 
have prompted the US Government, regulators, professionals and academics to 
address the importance of ethics and the integrity of CEOs, directors and auditors. In 
response to the corporate scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was promulgated in 2002 
with the aim of better protecting the US investors. 
2.5.2 Germany 
The main characteristic of Germany's corporate governance system is the "two-tier 
board" structure. The two-tier board comprises of the Supervisory Board and the 
Management Board. The Supervisory Board's functions include supervising and 
guiding the management in the best long-tenn interests of the company. It has the 
legal duty to appoint and to monitor the competence of the Management Board. It 
also has the power to approve annual accounts and propose the level of dividend for 
consideration in the shareholders' meeting. Appointment of auditors is made by it on 
the recommendation of the Management Board. 
In larger corporations, about one-third to one-half of the representatives on the 
Supervisory Board are appointed by employees. The balance of power on the 
Supervisory Board is comprised of shareholders' representatives. In smaller 
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corporations, all representatives on the Supervisory Board are appointed by the 
shareholders. Very often, shareholders' representatives are nominated by the major 
banks, which usually are the majority shareholders in corporations. 
The Management Board is responsible for developing the strategy of the company. 
Although it is not bound to accept instructions from the Supervisory Board, it must 
report at least quarterly to the Supervisory Board on its planned activities and the 
profitability and progress of the company. 
The standard of corporate governance in Germany IS relatively high among the 
European countries (see section 2.6 of this chapter). In January 2000, the German 
Panel on Corporate Governance published the Corporate Governance Rules for 
Quoted German Companies. The rules of this Code serve as general guidelines of 
corporate governance for quoted companies in Germany. The essential points of the 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of May 1999 were covered in the Code. 
Also, recognizing that the Supervisory Board and the Management Board of German 
companies have the decisive functions for corporate governance, the Code defines 
clearly the responsibilities and duties of the two boards. It also sets out other 
guidelines such as information and disclosure requirements, remuneration policy and 
the rules governing conflicts of interest. Corporations have to communicate in their 
annual report their acceptance and implementation of the rules in the Code 
(Corporate Governance Rules. 2000). 
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2.5.3 France 
In contrast to the German system, French companies can choose to have a unitary or a 
two-tier board. Most listed companies in France adopt the unitary board system. 
Under the unitary board system, the president possesses the widest powers to 
represent and manage the company. The board takes a passive role. Yet, the board 
has the power to hire and remove the president. The board is also responsible for 
carrying out specific functions like finalising annual accounts, approving major 
decisions and authorising guarantees. 
Under the two-tier system, the situation in France is similar to that in Germany. The 
Management Board possesses the full executive authority while the Supervisory 
Board takes the monitoring role. The Management Board also needs to report 
quarterly to the Supervisory Board on the activities of the company. 
The French standard of corporate governance is also fairly high among the European 
countries (see section 2.6 of this chapter). In July 1999, a document entitled 
Recommendations of the Committee on Corporate Governance was published, 
referred to as the "second Vienot Report", after the committee chairman Mr. Marc 
Vienot. It followed on from the first Vienot Report, published in July 1995. 
The second Vienot Report in 1999 clarified certain recommendations made in the 
1995 report and put forward further recommendations, for example, concerning 
aspects of the operations of board of directors, committees and financial disclosure. 
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The Report Committee recommended that listed companies specify clearly in their 
annual reports whether they comply with the recommendations in both the 1995 and 
1999 reports, and that they should explain, if applicable, their reasons of non-
compliance (Vienot Report, 1999). 
2.5.4 Japan 
The concepts of "family", "obligation" and "consensus" have much affected the 
Japanese attitude towards corporate governance. The loyalty and trust that exists in 
business relationships has produced a unique corporate governance culture in Japan, 
which is based on long-term rather than on short-term considerations. 
Financial institutions and business corporations hold most of the shares in Japanese 
companies, over 70 percent of which are not available for trading (Sum, 2000). The 
Japanese management board tends to be large in size, typically comprising 30 to 40 
members, most of whom are full-time employees. Non-executive directors are 
usually seconded from other companies in the same corporate group and are 
themselves employees of the company. The president makes decisions about the 
promotion of senior employees and the appointment of auditors and, on retirement, 
nominates his successor. In addition, the president usually becomes the chairman, 
which is a more ceremonial position. 
The Japan Federation of Economic Organizations CKeidanren") has a committee on 
corporate governance. In September 1997, it published a report entitled Urgent 
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Recommendations Concerning Corporate Governance, which set out a number of 
recommendations, taking into account the framework of the Commercial Law in 
Japan at that time. The recommendations included strengthening the auditors' 
function, for example imposing stricter requirements on the appointment of outside 
auditors. It was recommended that anyone who had ever been a director, manager, or 
employee of a corporation, or a subsidiary thereof, could not act as an outside auditor 
of the corporation. In addition, it was stipulated that if any auditor resigned before the 
end of their term of office, the board of directors should be required to give an 
explanation directly to the shareholders at the meeting of shareholders. Auditors 
should also be permitted to attend major management or executive meetings when 
they requested to do so. The report also suggested that corporations should fonnulate 
their own guidelines for corporate behaviour and strive to achieve full compliance 
with them. 
Japan's first code of practice was launched by the Corporate Governance Forum in 
1998. Before issuing this code of practice, a report entitled Corporate Governance 
Principles - A Japanese View (Interim Report) was published in October 1997 by the 
Corporate Governance Committee of the Corporate Governance Forum. This report 
identified the problems to be solved in the Japanese corporate governance system. It 
set out the recommended principles to be adopted in the shorter tenn (five years' 
tirr e), along with necessary legal refonns, and the principles to be achieved in the 
early twenty-first century. The principles were mainly related to the corporate 
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governance structure, and to the accountability and disclosure requirements of 
corporations (Interim Report, 1997). 
Although the impact of the code of practice and the Interim Report was limited, some 
well-known companies in Japan such as Sony, Orix, Fuji and Xerox have reformed 
their governance structures by reducing their board sizes, appointing independent 
directors and forming nomination and compensation committees (Allen, 2000). The 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, also recognized the importance of corporate governance in 
publishing a policy paper entitled The Future of the Tokyo Stock Exchange: The Way 
Forward in February 1999. 
2.5.5 Singapore 
In addition to the above countries it is also worth examining the characteristics of the 
corporate governance system in Singapore. As one of the "Four Little Dragons", 
Singapore is a major competitor of Hong Kong (the other three Little Dragons are 
Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan). The corporate governance system in Singapore is 
exemplary in a number of aspects. For example, every listed company must have an 
audit committee. The majority of the members of the audit committee must be non-
executive directors. The same auditor must be appointed for auditing all the 
companies within a group, allowing the auditor concerned to have a full picture of the 
affairs of the whole group and to be able to prevent frauds by directors and managers. 
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Although Singapore has the distinction of being the first East-Asian country to require 
audit committees (in 1989), it reviewed the effectiveness of its regulatory and 
financial framework following the East-Asian crisis. In July 1999, the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore announced that banks must form nomination and 
compensation committees. In December 1999, the government set up three private 
sector-led committees to perform a comprehensive review of issues relating to 
disclosure and governance. The committees will examine best practices 
internationally and assess the extent to which they are applicable to Singapore. 
2.5.6 Taiwan 
Mostly due to the government's strongly interventionist economic policies, Taiwan 
has not taken to modern notions of corporate governance with any alacrity. The 
dominant state-owned companies are usually favoured at the expense of other 
shareholders. Nevertheless, the Securities and Futures Commission and the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange, as well as certain academic and professional bodies, support a more 
open, market-based economic system. This suggests that there will be some degree of 
reform to the corporate governance practices in Taiwan. The Institute of Internal 
Auditors of Taipei is planning to become closely involved in corporate governance 
matters (Allen, 2000). 
2.5.7 Korea 
Korea has moved forward aggressively on corporate governance reform after the 
East-Asian financial crisis. In early 1998, the Korean Stock Exchange ruled that 
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listed companies must allocate 25 percent of their board seats to independents. Since 
1999, the top 30 chaebol (i.e. conglomerates) have been required to form audit 
committees in their listed subsidiaries. The government also intends to strengthen the 
rights of institutional investors so that they can act more effectively as supervisors of 
the management. 
In September 1999, Korea published its Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance. It is a lengthy document and is very comprehensive. The intention was 
to push forward with economic reform and improve corporate governance. However, 
the pace of reform over the past few years has not been as fast as what was expected 
when the reform process first began (PERC, 1999a). 
2.5.8 The People's Republic of China 
The People's Republic of China ("PRC") started opening its doors to foreign investors 
in 1979. Since then, the Chinese economy has become more open and market-
oriented. The PRC government recognizes the importance of a formal business 
environment, and that accountability and transparency are important factors in 
attracting foreign investments. In 1993, the PRC government began to establish a 
corporate governance system based on the American model. The PRC Company Law 
was promulgated in 1994, and was followed by a series of reforms. However, 
historical factors and cultural characteristics in the PRC have influenced much of the 
actual corporate practices and business ethics. As a result, the corporate governance 
system in the PRe is still in the developing stage. 
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2.6 Findings of the Comparative Study of the Corporate 
Governance Regimes in Different Jurisdictions 
2.6.1 Comparison of the Corporate Governance Regimes In the 
United Kingdom and Hong Kong 
The United Kingdom is recognized over the world as having a well-developed set of 
guidelines for corporate governance. All UK listed companies are required to comply 
with the Code of Best Practice, which encourages voluntary disclosure rather than 
regulatory enforcement. Hong Kong has been developing its corporate governance 
system since the mid 1990s and it is now regarded as a fairly good benchmark for the 
East-Asian region. However, there is still much room for further improvement. 
The corporate governance rules in Hong Kong are, in fact, based on those in the UK. 
However, because Hong Kong is a Chinese-oriented city and its companies are mostly 
family-owned, different practices exist in various aspects of corporate governance in 
comparison to the UK. These discrepancies are inevitable given the different cultural 
background, political environment and level of business development in the two 
economIes. 
I have summarized in Table 2.1 the differences between the corporate governance 
systems in the UK and Hong Kong in a number of respects, including board structure 
and composition, and the audit and nomination committees. The differences in 
ownership structure and shareholders' rights are also highlighted. 
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Table 2.1 Comparison of Corporate Governance Systems In UK 
and Hong Kong 
~;s ~l: ~'t H 
~JThe United KinJidom 
Shareholders 
Ownership structure: Institutional Investors 
Majority shareholders 
Encourage shareholders to The Combined Code 
make use of their voting rights 
Board Structure and Composition 
Board meetings hold regularly 
Number of non-executive at least 1/3 of the board 
directors in the board of 
directors 
Explanation for combined post Yes 
of Chairman and CEO 
Guidelines in assessing the Yes 
independence of non-executive 
directors 
Newly appointed board Yes 
members should receive 
appropriate training 
Company Secretary 
Required to have company 
secretary in listed companies 
Nomination Committee 
Yes 
Required to set up nomination Yes 
committee in listed companies 
Family owned 
Not mentioned 
at least twice a year 
at least 2 
independent non-
executive directors 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
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., , 
The United Kin2dom Hong Kong 
Remuneration Committee 
Required to set up remuneration Yes No 
committee in listed companies 
Audit Committee 
Required to set up audit Yes Yes 
committee in listed companies 
Commencement date to report Year ended after Year commencing 
compliance/non-compliance in 30 June 1993 1 January 1999 
annual reports 
Number of non-executive At least 3 members with At least 2 members 
directors in the committee the majority independent with the majority 
independent 
Audit committee should be Yes Yes 
given written terms of reference 
which deal with membership, 
authority and duties 
Disclosure requirement in Committee membership The composition, 
annual reports work and number 
of times met 
Minimum number of meetings Twice a year No 
required 
It can be seen from Table 2.1 that while Hong Kong's corporate governance system is 
similar to that of the UK, there are differences and Hong Kong's standard does not 
appear to be as high as that of the UK' s. F or example, while board meetings are 
required to be held regularly in the UK, the number of board meetings required in 
Hong Kong is only t\\O per year. The minimum number of independent non-
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executive directors required in Hong Kong is only two, while the UK requires these 
directors to comprise at least one-third of the board. Part of the reason for this 
phenomenon is that Hong Kong only started to "catch up" with corporate governance 
since the mid 1990s. The other principal reason for the differences is that the 
ownership structure and the culture in Hong Kong is very much different from that in 
the UK. Further discussions of the ownership structure and culture in Hong Kong are 
made in Chapter Four. 
In the UK, institutional shareholders are the dominant shareholders among listed 
compames. Section 2E of the Combined Code suggests that institutional investors 
should make use of their voting rights in annual general meetings and to have 
dialogue with the management of the company concerned. However, in Hong Kong 
most listed companies are controlled by family members. As a result there exists a 
significant convergence between ownership and management. This helps to explain 
why there are discrepancies between the two corporate governance systems. For 
example, while the UK requires the setting up of nomination and remuneration 
committees, Hong Kong is still considering these matters at the moment. 
Although Hong Kong has required the formation of audit committees starting from 1 
January 1999. it can be noted from Table 2.1 that the standard required in Hong Kong 
is not as high as that in UK. A more detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of audit 
committees in Hong Kong is undertaken in Chapter Three of the thesis. 
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Notwithstanding that there is scope for improvement in the corporate governance 
regime in Hong Kong, it has been catching up fairly rapidly. Chapter Three discusses 
and evaluates contemporary initiatives and efforts to develop corporate governance 
practices in Hong Kong, and also internationally. 
2.6.2 Comparison of the Corporate Governance Regimes among 
Five Developed Nations 
Since 1996, Davis Global Advisors, Inc. C'DGA") has been publishing its Leading 
Corporate Governance Indicators survey. DGA is an independent, privately owned 
US-based consulting firm specializing in global corporate governance. The survey is 
designed to measure international corporate governance developments by determining 
the standing of five major developed nations - France, Germany, Japan, the UK and 
the US. DGA developed an index of 10 "Leading Corporate Governance Indicators" 
grouped under four categories, namely: board structure, voting rights, disclosure and 
takeover defenses. The indicators and the components that make up the indicators 
reflect concerns prevailing in the international investment community as manifested 
through national voluntary codes and investor guidelines. Markets are scored using a 
10-point scale, with zero being the least and ten being the most favourable outcome. 
In 1999, DGA updated and revised some of the components in the indicators to reflect 
developments and investor preferences. As such, the scores are not wholly 
comparable between years. Neyertheless, the survey results show that throughout the 
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four years, the UK maintains its first place in corporate governance standards among 
the world's top five developed nations. Among the non-Anglo-Saxon countries, 
France ranks as the market with the most corporate governance features appealing to 
international investors. The results of the surveys are summarized in Tables 2.2 to 2.4: 
Table 2.2 Leading Corporate Governance Indicators -
Market Score Comparisons 1999 
Indicator France Germanv Japan U.K. 
Best Practice Codes 8 0 2 7 
Non-executive Directors 10 5 1 6 
Board Independence 3 2 0 3 
Split Chairman/CEO 2 10 10 9 
Board Committees 8 4 3 10 
Voting Rights 1 9 10 10 
Voting Issues 10 9 4 9 
Accounting Standards 4 6 1 9 
Executive Pay 3 2 3 10 
Takeover Barriers 4 4 1 10 
Overall Score 5.3 5.1 3.5 8.3 
U.S. 
9 
8 
6 
1 
10 
8 
1 
10 
10 
7 
7.0 
Source: Davis Global Advisors, Inc. 
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Table 2.3 Leading Corporate Governance Indicators 
Market Score Comparisons 1996-1998 
Indicator France Germany Japan U.K. 
98 97 96 98 97 96 98 9796 98 97 96 
Best Practice Codes 10 10 10 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 10 10 
Non-executive Directors 10 9 9 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 5 5 
Split Chairman/CEO 1 2 1 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 8 
Board Committees 6 6 5 1 0 0 3 3 3 \0 10 8 
Voting Procedures 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 9 9 9 
Voting Rights 1 1 1 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 8 
Voting Issues 10 10 10 9 8 8 4 3 3 9 9 9 
Accounting Standards 4 4 4 2 1 1 1 1 1 9 9 9 
Executive Pay 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 10 10 10 
Takeover Barriers 4 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 1 10 10 10 
Overall Score 5.5 5.5 5.3 4.6 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.7 3.6 9.1 9.1 8.6 
U.S. 
98 97 
10 5 
8 8 
1 1 
10 10 
10 10 
8 8 
1 1 
10 10 
10 10 
7 7 
7.5 7.0 
Source: Davis Global Advisors, Inc. 
Table 2.4 Leading Corporate Governance Indicators -
Overall Ranking 1996 - 1999 
Rank Market Score 
99 98 97 96 99 98 97 
1 1 1 1 United Kingdom 8.3 9.1 9.1 
2 2 2 2 United States 7.0 7.5 7.0 
3 3 3 3 France 5.3 5.5 5.5 
4 4 4 4 Germany 5.1 4.6 4.3 
5 5 5 5 Japan 3.5 4.3 3.7 
96 
8.7 
7.0 
5.3 
4.3 
3.6 
Source: Davis Global Advisors, Inc. 
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2.6.3 Comparison of the Corporate Governance Regimes among 
European Countries 
Apart from the US-based DGA, another private entity which specialises in 
investigating companies' corporate governance profiles is the Belgium-based 
consultancy firm Deminor. In 1999 it launched a corporate governance rating service 
enabling institutional investors to gauge the corporate governance standards and 
practices of the European listed companies held in their portfolios. The service now 
covers 300 companies from 17 European countries and all companies in the EURO-
FTSE 300 index are included. The ratings are the product of extensive analysis 
combining over 300 corporate governance indicators. The indicators are classified 
into four main categories, as follows: 
1. Rights and duties of shareholders: criteria concerning voting right restrictions, 
voting issues, shareholder proposals and voting procedures. 
2. Range of takeover defences: the presence and strength of anti-takeover devices 
such as core-shareholder control, board insulation, extensive cross-
shareholdings, share repurchases. 
3. Disclosure: the transparency of a corporation as measured by the quantity and 
quality of the publicly available information on its governance structure. 
4. Board structure and functioning: all issues relating to the governance of a 
company, such as the board's election and composition, the presence of 
independent directors, the separation of chairman and chief executive 
functions, executive remuneration, the duties and workings of board 
committees, etc. 
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Each company is gIven a rating In each of the four categories. Each rating IS 
measured on a scale from "5 Deminor" to "1 Deminor" with "5 Deminor" , 
representing the best practice and "1 Deminor" the most questionable standard. Table 
2.5 shows a summary of the country ratings that Deminor compiled for the year 2000. 
The research was based on 1999 annual reports, information from company articles of 
association, annual general meetings in 2000 and other publicly available information 
disclosed by 15 September 2000. 
Table 2.5 Country Ratings 2000 
Rights & Duties Takeover Disclosure Board 
of Shareholders Defences Structure 
UK 4 4 5 5 
Germany 4 3 2 1 
France 3 1 3 3 
Switzerland 2 1 1 1 
The Netherlands 1 1 3 2 
Italy 4 1 3 2 
Spain 2 1 2 2 
Sweden 2 3 2 2 
Belgium 3 1 3 3 
Source: Deminor 
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It can be noted from Table 2.5 that the findings of Deminor are consistent with 
DGA's findings in that the UK is found to have the highest corporate governance 
standard when compared with other European countries. It ranks high in all of the 
four rating categories. France and Germany also rank fairly high in some of the 
categories and are of a comparable overall standard. 
2.6.4 Comparison of the Corporate Governance Regimes among 
Asian Countries 
As far as Asian countries are concerned, the Asian Corporate Governance Association 
("ACGA") published in January 2000 a report called Building Stronger Boards and 
Companies in Asia: A Concise Report on Corporate Governance Policies and 
Practices. The ACGA was launched in Hong Kong in August 1999 by a group of 
business leaders from seven Asian countries. It aims to promote sound corporate 
governance practices and to provide assistance and advice to Asian compames 
wishing to implement corporate governance practices within their firms. The report 
covered 11 countries in the Asian region. Extracted below are the comparisons 
between Hong Kong and the five Asian countries discussed in section 2.5 above -
Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and China (the PRC). 
The ACGA suggested that although Asian countries are not moving towards identical 
systems of corporate governance, there is a striking agreement among the proponents 
of reform in each country on the centrality of certain principles. The ACGA put 
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forward in its report an appendix termed as "Points of Convergence". An extract of 
the appendix is shown in Table 2.6 below: 
Table 2.6 Points of Convergence 
Enhancement Independent Higher Independent Codes of Importance 
of shareholder directors levels of board best of 
value financial committees practice institutional 
disclosure investors 
Hong Kong y y y y y y 
Japan y y y y y y 
Singapore y y y y y y 
Taiwan y y 
Korea Y y Y Y Y Y 
China Note 1 Note 1 Y Note 1 Y 
(Y = Yes, Blank = No) 
Test: Does the country subscribe to the principle and apply it to domestically listed firms, 
or does it have plans to do so? 
"Country" refers mainly to official bodies, but also includes business or professional 
associations involved in corporate governance standard setting. 
Note 1: These principles have been recognised as important by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission. 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association 
Table 2.6 shows that the governance standards in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and 
Korea are in general higher than those in Taiwan and the PRC. However, despite the 
fact that there has been convergence in governance policy direction among the 
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countries, and that this convergence has grown over time, there are limits to this 
convergence. The ACGA proposed that there are also "Points of Divergence". The 
following table is extracted from an appendix of the ACGA's report: 
Table 2.7 Points of Diven:;ence 
Stakeholder Single- Two-tier Size of best uractice code ScoUe of code 
focus tier board board Small Medium Large Limited Comprehensive 
Hong Kong y y y 
Japan y y y y 
Singapore Note 1 Y Y Y Note 2 
Taiwan y 
Korea y y y y 
China y y 
(Y = Yes, Blank = No) 
Note 1: Singapore has a stakeholder concept (i.e. corporations playa social role), but it protects 
workers through legislation, not through its corporate governance regime. 
Note 2: Singapore's current code focuses solely on audit committees, but it is working on a more 
comprehensive code. 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association 
It can be noted from Table 2.7 that while Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea have 
single-tier boards, the size of the best practice code n Korea is large and 
comprehensive. Although Singapore has a small best practice code with limited 
scope, it is nevertheless \'ery comprehensiye in its guidance concerning audit 
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committees; and a more comprehensive code is currently being developed. According 
to the study by the ACGA above, it appears that Hong Kong can further improve its 
corporate governance system by increasing the comprehensiveness of its code of best 
practice. 
Table 2.7 also suggests that Japan cares about corporate governance. It has a medium 
sized code of best practice and its scope is comprehensive. Taiwan and the PRC are 
lacking any codes of best practice. The two countries are strongly affected by cultural 
factors which have hindered and delayed the development of corporate governance 
systems. The regulatory authority in the PRC, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, has begun to recognize the importance of corporate governance. In 
Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Commission and the Taiwan Stock Exchange, as 
well as certain academic and professional bodies, have also started to address the 
importance of corporate governance practices. 
Another survey was conducted by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
Limited ("PERC") from 1997 to 1999 on transparency in the business environment of 
various Asian countries. PERC is a consulting firm specialising in strategic business 
information and analysis for companies doing business in the East and Southeast 
Asian countries. The survey involved asking more than 1,200 expatriates to rate, on a 
scale of zero to ten, the level of transparency of the business environment in the 
country in which they worked. A grade of zero (0) represents the best case or a very 
transparent environment and a grade of ten (10) represents the worst case. Although 
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there are some deficiencies in the survey itself, for example PERC did not define 
clearly the meaning of ·'transparency", the results do provide some indications of the 
level of "transparency" in the surveyed countries. From the results, an idea of the 
level of corporate governance in the countries can be inferred. Extracted below are 
the results of the surveys for the years 1998 and 1999: 
Table 2.8 Transparency of the Business Environment 
1998 1999 
Hong Kong 2.82 3.58 
Singapore 3.61 4.55 
Taiwan 3.94 6.55 
Japan 5.78 7.13 
South Korea 6.58 8.50 
China 6.94 8.63 
Source: PERC 
It can be noted from the above survey results that Hong Kong was rated the highest 
among the economies in terms of transparency in its business environment. 
Singapore was also ranked fairly high by the expatriates in the Asian region. The 
scores of China are not surprising given the "weak legal framework" of the country 
(PERC, 1999b). 
PERC pointed out that in Taiwan. there is a perceived lack of credibility in 
government to solve problems in its finance sector and that there are close ties 
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between the State and many local companies which support the State' s ambitions. 
The deterioration of the grade of Korea was especially pronounced. In 1997 when the 
East-Asian financial crisis first began, the Government did not know about the 
country's short-term foreign debt. Then, it tried to hide what it did know. Even two 
years after the supervision of the International Monetary Fund and a push for banking 
and economic reform by the new government, expatriates still perceive that the 
Korean government either does not know the full scale of certain problems or that it is 
trying to make them appear less than it is actually the case (PERC, 1999b). Although 
Korea has tried to push forward with economic reform and improvements in corporate 
governance, from the PERC survey results it appears that the pace of reform and 
improvement is not as fast as what was anticipated when the reform process first 
began (PERC, 1999a). 
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2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
Following the downfall of a number of large corporations in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the importance of corporate governance became widely recognized by 
investors, corporations, professional bodies, governments and international 
organizations. There have been increasing demands for market transparency and 
accountability. The Cadbury Report can be regarded as a milestone in the 
development of corporate governance in the UK. The publications of the Greenbury 
Report, the Hampel Report, the Combined Code and the Turnbull Guidance further 
enhanced the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee in developing an effective 
corporate governance system in the UK. All of these efforts have been perceived as 
being successful, as evidenced by the results of various surveys and analyses 
conducted by specialists and research consultants in corporate governance. For 
example, the UK is ranked at the top of the list of countries by both the US-based 
DGA and Belgium-based Deminor in their studies of the five developed nations and 
seventeen European countries respectively. 
As Hong Kong was a colony of the UK for one and a half a centuries its legal system 
was greatly influenced by the UK law. However, since Hong Kong is a Chinese 
oriented city and since most of its corporations originate from family businesses, its 
corporate governance system is not an exact copy of that in the UK. It has only partly 
adopted and followed the UK system. Hong Kong has developed its own corporate 
governance system in such a way as to cope with its Chinese cultural background and 
family ownership structure. For example, the comparison study shows that while the 
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UK has nomination and remuneration committees in its corporations, Hong Kong is 
still only considering the possibility of introducing such committees. In addition, 
while the UK requires that at least one-third of the board is comprised of non-
executive directors, Hong Kong does not have such a requirement and it only requires 
at least two independent executive directors to be on the board. 
In analyzing the reasons behind the East-Asian financial crisis and corporate failures, 
apart from the financial attacks of speculators, the other major reason can be said to 
be a deficiency in corporate governance systems. Given that Hong Kong has 
followed some of the UK corporate governance principles and practices, the corporate 
governance standard in Hong Kong is in general more advanced than a number of 
other countries in the East-Asian region. Therefore, despite the financial crisis in late 
1997 has brought about many corporate collapses, in the eyes of many investors and 
expatriates, Hong Kong is still regarded as one of the major financial centres in the 
world and it is a place with reasonable transparency for business and investment, as 
evidenced by the survey results of PERC in 1999. This explains why Hong Kong 
suffered lesser after the financial crisis when compared with those countries having 
weaker corporate governance systems. 
However, it is evident from the comparative study in this chapter that there are still a 
number of areas in which Hong Kong can develop further. For example, the code of 
best practice in Hong Kong is not comprehensive enough, according to the analysis of 
ACGA. 
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As pointed out by Mr. Magdi Iskander, Director of the Private Sector Development 
Department of The World Bank, there are many different corporate forms and 
consequently many different approaches to corporate governance reform. There is no 
single best model of corporate governance anywhere in the world. Each country must 
find a model that can best fit its own culture and history and its government's capacity 
to regulate (Company Secretary, 2000). It can be argued that Hong Kong has been on 
the right track in deriving good corporate governance principles from the UK while at 
the same time remaining "conservative" in certain aspects due to its cultural 
background. Nevertheless, there are certain areas that can be improved. For example, 
as revealed in the comparative study in this chapter, the areas for improvements 
include the setting up of nomination and remuneration committees, increasing the 
number of independent non-executive directors on the board and improving the 
comprehensiveness of its Code of Best Practice. Further recommendations for 
improvements are made in Chapter Seven of the thesis. If Hong Kong can further 
develop and improve its corporate governance system, investors' confidence can be 
further enhanced, which will benefit Hong Kong's economic recovery and 
development. 
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3.1 Chapter Objectives 
The qualitative analyses in Chapter Two conclude that, despite Hong Kong's history 
as a colony of the UK, and most of its rules and regulations therefore being adapted 
from those in the UK, the corporate governance practices in Hong Kong are not 
exactly a copy of those in the UK. There are some weaknesses in the corporate 
governance regime in Hong Kong, which therefore has room for further improvement. 
The outbreak of the East-Asian financial crisis in late 1997 alerted various 
organizations, not only in Hong Kong but also in other East-Asian countries, to the 
importance of enhancing corporate governance as a means of hastening corporate 
recovery. 
In fact, corporate governance has been a subject of continuous public debate for more 
than two decades before the East-Asian financial crisis. In particular, the October 
1987 stock market crash and the collapse of BCCI triggered a great deal of academic 
and professional concern over the subject. It appears that every time the corporate 
environment is turbulent, commentators pay attention to the subject of corporate 
governance. The East-Asian financial crisis first broke out when the Thai 
Government decided to float the Thai baht on 2 July 1997. Thereafter, most countries 
in the East-Asian region experienced financial and economic turmoil (Chow, 1999). 
Again, part of the response to the East-Asian financial crisis from Governments, 
professionals and academics has been to suggest that better corporate governance may 
help to sustain the recovery of the economies in the region. 
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This chapter assesses different suggestions from \'arious international organizations 
and professional bodies about how corporate governance standards may be enhanced 
in the aftermath of the East-Asian financial crisis. Although it is generally recognised 
that there is no single best model of corporate governance that can be applied 
universally, the principal objective of this chapter is to summarise and then draw 
conclusions from the various suggestions of the international and professional 
organizations in order to identify the areas for structural improvement in the corporate 
governance system in Hong Kong. 
Apart from analyzing the various initiatives and suggestions of the international and 
professional organizations, this chapter also offers an assessment of the effectiveness 
of the audit committee in enhancing corporate governance standards. This is 
necessary because the audit committee is an important mechanism for enhancing 
corporate governance. However, it was not a requirement for Hong Kong listed 
companies to have an audit committee until 1 January 1999. Hence, an analysis is 
undertaken in this chapter to assess its attributes and whether it is likely to be 
effective in enhancing corporate governance in Hong Kong. 
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3.2 Efforts of International Organisations 
3.2.1 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") plays an 
important and pro-active role in analysing various economic issues for the benefit of 
member nations and making suggestions for improvements. In April 1998, the OECD 
ministers gave the OECD a mandate to develop a set of principles on corporate 
governance. The draft guidelines on corporate governance were released in 
December 1998. In May 1999, ministers representing the twenty-nine governments 
that comprise the OECD voted unanimously to endorse the DECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance ("OECD Principles"). The OECD Principles were also 
welcomed by the 07 leaders at the Cologne summit in June 1999. 
The OECD Principles serve as reference points for efforts to evaluate and improve 
each OECD member country's regulatory framework on corporate governance. They 
also provide guidance to stock exchanges and corporations all over the world to assist 
them to improve their local corporate governance standards and disclosure 
requirements. The OECD Principles cover five broad headings of concern, which are 
identified below: 
(a) The rights o(shareholders 
This concerns the protection of shareholders' rights and the ability of shareholders to 
influence the behaviour of a corporation. 
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(b) The equitable treatment ofsharellOlders 
This principle emphasizes that all shareholders, including minority and foreign 
shareholders, should be treated fairly by controlling shareholders, boards and 
management. 
(c) The role ofstakellOlders in corporate governance 
This principle recognises that the competitiveness and ultimate success of a company 
is the result of teamwork and that companies benefit from the contribution of a range 
of different resource providers, including employees, suppliers, creditors and the 
communities in which companies operate. The corporate governance framework 
should recognise the rights of stakeholders as established by law and encourage active 
co-operation between corporations and stakeholders. 
(d) Disclosure and transparency 
This principle recommends that all material matters regarding the corporation, 
including the financial situation, performance, ownership and governance of the 
corporation be disclosed in a timely and accurate fashion. 
(e) The responsibilities of the board 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
c( lmpany by the board, the effective monitoring of management by the board and the 
board's accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
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As stated in the preamble of the OECD Principles, there is no single model of good 
corporate governance. The Principles are non-binding. Their purpose is to serve as a 
reference point. They can be used by policy makers as they examine and develop 
legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance that reflect their own 
economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances, and by market participants as they 
develop their own practices. 
The preamble of the OECD Principles further states that "the Principles are 
evolutionary in nature and should be reviewed in light of significant changes in 
circumstances. To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must 
innovate and adapt their corporate governance practices so that they can meet new 
demands and grasp new opportunities. Similarly, governments have an important 
responsibility for shaping an effective regulatory framework that provides for 
sufficient flexibility to allow markets to function effectively and to respond to 
expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders. It is up to governments and 
participants to decide how to apply these Principles in developing their own 
frameworks for corporate governance, taking into account the costs and benefits of 
regulatiOn. " 
The OECD Principles are regarded as "signposts" for activity in the area of corporate 
governance by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations 
and various other international organisations (ICGN, 1999b).1 
1 The full text of the OECD Principles can be found at the website of OECD at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/govemance/principles.htm. 
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3.2.2 International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
Statement 
The International Corporate Oovernance Network ("ICON") was founded in 1995 at 
the instigation of major institutional investors, academics and other parties interested 
in the development of global corporate governance practices. The ICON's objective 
is to facilitate international dialogue on issues concerned with corporate governance 
such that economies can best prosper and companies can compete more effectively. 
The charter of the ICON empowers it to adopt guidelines when it feels that they can 
contribute to achieving this objective. 
Following the announcement of the OECD Principles in May 1999, the ICON 
applauded the OECD Principles as a declaration of minimum acceptable standards for 
companies and investors around the world. The ICON welcomed the OECD 
Principles as "a remarkable convergence on corporate governance issues among 
diverse interests, practices and cultures" (ICON, 1999a). However, it also stated that 
amplifications were required to give the OECD Principles sufficient force. Its view is 
that companies around the world require clearer and more concrete guidance on how 
the OECD Principles can best be implemented. At its annual conference in Frankfurt, 
the ICON adopted its Statement on Global Corporate Governance Principles on 9 
July 1999 ("ICON Statement,,).2 
1 A copy of the ICGN Statement (ICGN, 1999a) can be found at the website of ICGN at 
http://www.icgn.org/documents/globalcorpgov.htm. 
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The ICGN Statement advocates that companies adopt the OECD Principles as 
amplified in the two documents appended in the ICGN statement. The documents are 
entitled ICGN Approach to the DECD Principles: A 'Working Kit' Statement of 
Corporate Governance Criteria and DECD Principles as Amplified. The ICGN 
believes that it is in the best interests of companies to adhere to these 
recommendations even in the absence of any domestic legal requirements for 
implementation. 
The 'Working Kit' of the ICGN Statement offers more concrete and conCIse 
guidance, while at the same time amplifying and interpreting the OECD Principles. 
The ICGN Statement concurs with the OECD Principles that "along with the 
traditional financial criteria, the governance profile of a corporation is now an 
essential factor that investors take into consideration when deciding how to allocate 
their investing capital" (ICGN, 1999a). 
3.2.3 Global Corporate Governance Forum 
The World Bank is another entity involved in the global corporate governance reform 
drive. In September 1999 the World Bank, together with the OECD, initiated the 
Global Corporate Governance Forum ("GCGF"). The GCGF aims to establish itself 
as a focal point for a broader dialogue on corporate governance issues and has made 
clear that it is not in the business of promoting any particular corporate governance 
model. As stated by the Head of the GCGF Secretariat, Ms. Nadereh Chamlou: "our 
main objective is to broaden the debate by bringing the perspective of developing 
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countries to it, and to respond to the growing need for formulating and implementing 
reform. Much of the debate has been generated and has been focused on developed 
countries ...... but the concern is broadening and it is important that developing and 
transition economies take an active role in the debate" (Company Secretary, 2000). 
Ms. Chamlou has also pointed that much of the corporate governance debate has 
focused on listed companies and the equity-based corporate governance systems. In 
Asia there are different circumstances arising from the prevalence of family-owned 
companies and state-owned enterprises. These are the matters that need to be 
addressed also. 
Since the publication of the OECD Principles, there has been more attention paid to 
the variety of corporate forms and governance systems around the world. As stated 
by Mr. Magdi Iskander, another key figure in the GCGF: "from what is being talked 
about in the GECD, we can enlarge the discussion to involve other countries in the 
process of dialogue, and to assist countries in adopting those principles and other 
best practices to their requirements ...... it's only in times of crisis that people really 
begin to focus on structural issues such as corporate governance." (Company 
Secretary, 2000). 
Mr. Iskander further pointed out that, even in the Western countries, there are many 
different corporate forms and therefore different approaches to corporate governance 
reform. The goal of the GCGF is not to impose any model of corporate governance. 
He stressed that there is no single model of corporate governance anywhere in the 
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world. "It differs from country to country, irom sector to sector, and from country to 
country in the same sector, and even for the same company over time. " (Company 
Secretary, 2000). 
The role of the GCGF is to act as facilitator and to adapt basic standards and apply 
them in the way that can best fit a country's culture and history, and its government's 
capacity to regulate. Another GCGF figure, Mr. Pang Chung Min, has commented 
that corporate governance guidelines, such as the OECD Principles, are a good 
starting point. He also pointed out that as the preamble of the OECD Principles states 
that the Principles are not binding, they can always be changed or adjusted as 
appropriate, taking into consideration the problems facing emerging markets. 
The GCGF facilitates the exchange of knowledge, the distillation from that 
knowledge of what the key issues are, and the determination of where resources 
should be deployed (Company Secretary, 2000).3 The Forum is also involved in 
training programmes for directors and company secretaries. It regards its mission as 
taking the corporate governance movement from "reports, guidelines and principles" 
to its next phase, namely, "implementation". 
3 In order to encourage wide participation, all interested parties are encouraged to submit their view to 
the GCGF Secretariat via the Internet at cqsecretariat@worldbank.org. When the Secretariat wants 
feedback on a specific issue, the subject matter will be posted on the Forum's website at 
www.gcgf.org. Readers are then invited to submit their opinions. In this way, there will be close 
cooperation concerning corporate governance activities around the world. 
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3.2.4 Corporate Governance Roundtables in Asia 
Much of the credit for placing corporate governance firmly on investors' agendas 
must go to the OEeD and the World Bank. Recognising that its Principles may act 
as a benchmark rather than as a set of absolute rules, the OEeD and the World Bank 
organise regional roundtables to provide key decision-makers from the private and 
public sectors with the opportunity to discuss how best to implement the Principles 
within their own environments (Prospective Accountant, 2000). 
The OEeD/World Bank roundtables are organised on a 'regional' basis: Asia, Latin 
America and Russia. Four roundtables have been held so far for the Asian region.~ 
The specific objectives are as follows: 
~ Promote better governance in the Asian region . 
.,. Improve the understanding of corporate governance and assist in developing 
policy responses. 
~ Promote an ongoing dialogue between the private and public sectors. 
~ Monitor and evaluate developments in the region. 
~ Identify needs for technical assistance. 
~ Inform the international community about national and regional reform 
initiatives. 
White Papers are issued after each Roundtable to improve the corporate governance 
framework in the region (OEeD, 2001a) . 
.j The first Asian roundtable was held in Korea in March 1999, the second in Hong Kong in May/June 
2000, the third in Singapore in April 2001 and the fourth in November 2002 in India. 
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(a) The First Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
The First Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable was held in Seoul in March 1999 
on the theme of "Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective ".5 The 
meeting brought together a group of high level officials, private sector decision 
makers and academic experts from several Asian non-member countries6 with their 
OECD counterparts in an exchange of views on the issue of corporate governance. 
It was underlined by all participants of the roundtable that corporate governance was 
one of the main factors in the East-Asian financial crisis and an area that required 
major policy reform. Most of the countries declared their readiness to use the OECD 
Principles as a main benchmark. The main conclusions of the roundtable are 
summarised as follows (OECD, 1999a): 
1. Corporate governance has gained increased visibility among policy makers 
during the last few years and there is a trend towards global convergence of 
corporate governance norms. 
2. One of the fundamental causes of the Asian financial crisis was the lack of 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. 
3. Corporate Asia has been plagued by over-investment, exceSSIve 
conglomeration and over indebtedness. These tendencies have been, to a large 
extent, a result of poor corporate governance. 
5 In addition to the OECD, this roundtable was co-hosted by the Korean Development Institute ("KDI") 
and the Korean government, while the Japanese government and the World Bank provided additional 
sponsorship. 
6 Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong China, India, Indonesia. Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
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4. Protection of shareholder rights is important. 
5. The disclosure regime in most Asian economies was defective. Disclosure 
and transparency issues need to be addressed. 
6. Insolvency legislation and corporate restructuring rules need to be reformed 
and well set. 
7. The adoption of corporate governance rules in themselves might not be 
enough to improve corporate performance in the region. There was perceived 
to be a need to improve the "infrastructure" in order to ensure effective 
implementation of corporate governance rules. For example, improving the 
capacity for the judiciary and the regulatory authorities, and providing 
continuing education for directors, without which reforms may never become 
effective. 
The roundtable provided policy makers from both the public and private sectors with 
valuable insights into their neighbours' problems and solutions. Further areas of 
corporate governance related work were also suggested by the participants, for 
example in the areas of market exit, smaller enterprises and the social responsibility of 
corporations (OECD, 1999a). 
(b) The Second Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
T le Second Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable was held in Hong Kong in May 
and June 2000 on the following theme: "The Role of Disclosure in Strengthening 
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Corporate Governance and Accountability". 7 There were some 150 high-level 
participants in the roundtable, from Asian securities exchange commissions, stock 
exchanges, government, academia, trade unions, international organisations, and 
business and investment institutions. 
The purpose of this roundtable was to explore the role of disclosure in corporate 
governance, with the focus on three broad aspects of disclosure: the role of the board 
of directors in overseeing disclosure, accounting and audit standards and their 
implementation, and non-financial disclosure. There was also a session on 
international initiatives to improve the quality of global disclosure and to develop 
international benchmarks for disclosure. 
The conclusions arrived at In the roundtable are summarised as follows (OEeD, 
2000): 
1. Disclosure is a key mechanism for encouraging better corporate governance. 
2. Weak disclosure regimes played an important role in the Asian crisis. 
3. Much has been achieved since the Asian crisis. 
4. Despite these positive developments, it was felt that the rapid recovery of 
Asian economies after the crisis could lead to dangerous complacency. 
5. The existence of adequate rules and standards are insufficient to protect 
investors. 
7 Apart from the OECD, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"), the I~~g-term 
partners in the Asian roundtables, this roundtable was co-hosted by the Hong Kong SecurltI.es and 
Futures Commission ("SFC"). the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong SOCIety of 
Accountants ("HKSA"). Additional sponsorship was provided by the Japanese government. 
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6. There was broad consensus on the need for high quality internationally 
comparable standards for accounting that allow for comparison of financial 
statements. 
7. It is difficult to form a clear picture of a company in the absence of good non-
financial disclosure. 
8. Scepticism with respect to transparency and disclosure are deeply rooted in the 
business culture of the region. 
9. Despite its importance, disclosure is not a panacea. 
10. Corporate governance and public sector governance go hand in hand. 
11. A number of significant international initiatives are underway. 
In addition to reaching the above conclusions, the participants broadly endorsed the 
future GCGF work plan outlined by the Secretariat. However, it was generally felt by 
the participants that more of the roundtable's time should have been devoted to 
discussion of implementation issues. 
(c) The Third Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
The Third Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable was held in Singapore in April 
2001 on "The Role of Boards of Directors and Stakeholders in Corporate 
Governance". 8 This roundtable concentrated on the roles of boards and of 
stakeholders in corporate governance. 
8 This roundtable was organised by the OEeD, the World Bank and the ADB and it was co-hosted by 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Singapore Institute of Directors and the Singapore Exchange. 
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Boards of directors exercise three key functions for companies, namely: monitoring 
management, ensuring accountability and shaping company strategies. However, 
very often the problem in Asia is that the board is little more than a formality. The 
roundtable pointed out that, by treating the boards in this way, Asian companies are 
foregoing the benefits of effective boards. The stated goal of the roundtable is: "to 
turn Asian boards into dynamic drivers of corporate governance and guarantors of 
investor confidence" (Kondo, 2001). 
The role of stakeholders in corporate governance was the second topic of discussion 
in the roundtable. It was concluded that corporations need to view stakeholder 
concerns as an opportunity to enhance their companies' long-term value. For 
example, active employee participation in companies' affairs should be encouraged. 
It was stated that access to capital should also be improved, particularly to attract 
investments from key institutional capital providers such as public pension funds. 
These improvements can contribute to the long-term stability and value of companies. 
During the meeting, participants also discussed the first draft of the Asian Corporate 
Governance White Paper, which contains region-specific guidance to assist 
policymakers, regulators, stock exchanges and other standard setting bodies in the 
Asian region to evaluate and improve their corporate governance frameworks (OECD, 
2001 b). It is envisaged that, upon completion of the Asian Roundtables series, the 
White Paper will be finalised and approved. Stock exchanges, institutes of directors 
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and individual companies are to be encouraged to use the White Paper as a tool to 
assess and articulate their own strategies (Kondo, 2001). 
(d) The Fourth Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable 
The Fourth Asian Corporate Governance Roundtable was held in India in November 
2002 on "Shareholder Rights and the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders". 9 There 
were three main themes for discussion in this roundtable: promoting shareholder 
participation, preventing insider abuse and enforcing shareholders' rights. 
Discussions were also made on the regional developments of corporate governance 
systems (OECD, 2002). 
3.2.5 Reports of Various Organisations 
Apart from the OECD and the World Bank, there are also a number of international 
organisations that have taken active roles in promoting corporate governance reform 
and undertaking studies of corporate governance. Examples include private entities 
such as the US-based Davis Global Advisors and the Belgium-based consultancy firm 
Deminor. The work of these two bodies is discussed in section 2.6 of Chapter Two. 
This section provides a summary of studies of corporate governance systems 
undertaken by other organisations in the Asian region after the financial cnSIS m 
1997-98. 
9 This roundtable was organised by the OECD in partnership with the Government of Japan and the 
Global Corporate Governance Forum. 
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(a) The Asian Development Bank 
The Asian Development Bank C'ADB") conducted a study of five countries in the 
East Asian region and published its findings in its report, A Consolidated Report on 
Corporate Governance and Financing in East Asia, in November 1999. The study 
covered the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
These five countries were the worst hit by the financial crisis. 
It was suggested by the ADB study that, in most of the above countries, the legal 
framework for transparency appears to have been adequate. Their respective Stock 
Exchanges, Securities Commissions and company laws have, in general, the 
necessary provisions requiring disclosure of information to protect investors. 
However, the problem was identified as one of enforcement and of how to strengthen 
regulations to facilitate enforcement. It was concluded that these countries' 
governance structures are not too different from those of the UK or the US. The key 
difference is that East Asian countries are weak in terms of possessing the human 
capital and the institutional arrangements needed to enforce their corporate 
governance rules. The countries have the rules in place, but they do not always have 
the capacity to enforce them (Company Secretary, 2000). 
(b) The Asian Corporate Governance Association 
The Asian Corporate Governance Association ("ACGA") was launched in Hong 
Kong in August 1999 by a group of business leaders from seven Asian countries. It 
aims to promote sound corporate governance practices and to provide assistance and 
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advice to Asian compames wishing to implement corporate governance practices 
within their firms. In January 2000 it published a report called Building Stronger 
Boards and Companies in Asia: A Concise Report on Corporate Governance Policies 
and Practices. The report covered 11 countries in the Asian region. 
The ACGA suggested that, although Asian countries are not moving towards identical 
systems of corporate governance, there is a striking agreement among the proponents 
of reform in each country on the centrality of certain principles. The study found that 
the governance standards in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore and Korea are in general 
higher than those in Taiwan and the PRC. However, despite the fact that there has 
been convergence in governance policy direction among the countries, and that this 
convergence has grown over time, there are limits to this convergence. A detailed 
analysis and discussion of the main findings of the report is included in section 2.6.4 
of Chapter Two of the thesis (ACGA, 2000). 
(c) The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited 
The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited ("PERC") is a consulting firm 
specialising in strategic business information and analysis for companies doing 
business in the East and Southeast Asian countries. From 1997 to 1999 it conducted a 
survey of the views of expatriates in the Asian region concerning the transparency of 
the business environment in various Asian countries. Hong Kong was rated the 
highest among Asian countries in terms of the transparency in its business 
environment. Singapore was also ranked fairly high, whereas a low score for China 
was not surprising given the "weak legal framework" of the country (PERC, 1999). A 
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detailed analysis of the findings of the survey is contained in section 2.6.4 of Chapter 
Two. 
We can observe from the above sections that various international organisations have 
been engaged in continuing efforts to enhance international corporate governance 
standards. The next section discusses the efforts made by the relevant organisations 
and professional bodies after the East-Asian financial crisis to improve the corporate 
governance standards in Hong Kong. 
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3.3 Contemporary Corporate Governance Developments 
and Initiatives in Hong Kong 
The Hong Kong Society of Accountants ("HKSA") has been pro-active in promoting 
good corporate governance practice since 1995 and is playing an important role in 
monitoring the development of corporate governance in Hong Kong. Conscious of 
the fact that the profile of shareholders and the corporate culture in Hong Kong are 
different from those in the Western countries, the HKSA Council saw the need to 
approach the subject of corporate governance from a distinctly Hong Kong 
perspective. The Working Group on Corporate Governance, which became the 
HKSA Corporate Governance Committee in 1998, has produced a number of reports 
over the past few years. The findings and recommendations made in the first and 
second reports of the Working Group are discussed in section 2.4.4 of Chapter Two. 
The sections that follow provide a discussion of the work of the HKSA Corporate 
Governance Committee in the aftermath of the East-Asian financial crisis. 
Apart from the HKSA, there are also other professional bodies and academic 
institutions active in enhancing corporate governance practices and standards in Hong 
Kong. Their work and contributions are also discussed in the sections that follow. 
3.3.1 Audit Committee 
The Working Group on Corporate Governance recommended and supported the 
establishment of audit committees by listed companies in its first and second reports. 
According to the findings in the second report by the Working Group, only 
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approximately 2 percent of all the 553 listed companies In Hong Kong in 1996 
disclosed that they had an audit committee. In the US, it has been a listing 
requirement of the New York Stock Exchange since the late 1970s. In Canada and 
Australia, listed companies are required by law to have audit committees. In the UK, 
a great majority of listed companies have audit committees. Hong Kong was certainly 
lagging behind the other major international financial centres in this important aspect 
of corporate governance. 
In December 1997, A Guide for the Formation of An Audit Committee was published 
by the HKSA Corporate Governance Committee and was adopted by the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong in May 1998. Since then, the Stock Exchange amended its 
Code of Best Practice to require every listed company to establish an audit committee 
for accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 1999. 
The Code of Best Practice provides that the audit committee should have written 
terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority and duties. In addition, the 
audit committee should have a minimum of two members. The members should be 
appointed from amongst the non-executive directors and a majority of the non-
executive directors should be independent. The Code of Best Practice provides that, 
for further guidance on establishing an audit committee, listed companies may refer to 
the publication of the HKSA. 
For companies which fail to establish an audit committee, reasons must be gi\'en in 
the annual report for their non-compliance with the Code of Best Practice. Hence, it 
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will become transparent which listed compames have not established an audit 
committee. 
Recognising the importance of an effective audit committee, the HKSA further issued 
A Guide For Effective Audit Committee in February 2002, which focuses on how to 
ensure that an audit committee can operate effectively. 10 It also addresses issues such 
as the committee's composition and procedures and practices that can help to 
strengthen the role and operation of an audit committee within a company's 
organisational structure. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that, with the establishment of an audit 
committee, the quality and transparency of financial reporting and the internal control 
system of a listed company will be improved. Nevertheless, since the introduction of 
audit committees is an important corporate governance initiative that brings Hong 
Kong into line with other major international financial centers, where audit 
committees are already a common practice, a further discussion of the attributes and 
functions of an effective audit committee follows in section 3.4 of this chapter. An 
assessment of the benefits and effectiveness of audit committees in the Hong Kong 
environment will also be made in this section. 
10 A full copy of the Guide can be accessed at the HKSA's website at 
http://www.hksa.org.hklpublications. 
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3.3.2 Directors' Business Review in the Annual Report 
With the aim of improving the quality of disclosure in annual reports, the HKSA 
Corporate Governance Committee published its fourth report in November 1998. The 
report was entitled A Guide for Directors' Business Review in the Annual Report ("the 
Guide"). The Guide took into consideration Hong Kong's unique business 
environment and it provided directors with a summary of best practice as regards their 
duties for management discussion and analysis in the annual report. The Guide was 
developed following a review of similar guidelines and standards developed in other 
parts of the world. Particular reference was made to the Guide on Operating and 
Financial Reviews issued by the UK Accounting Standards Board. While the Guide 
was designed as a formulation and development of best practice, it is intended to have 
persuasive rather than mandatory force. 
The HKSA recommends the use by directors of this Guide as a benchmark in 
preparing annual reports. Given the continuing international call for increased 
transparency and disclosure in annual reports, directors and their advisers should find 
the Guide particularly useful given the absence of guidelines in this area in the 
Companies Ordinance and Listing Rules in Hong Kong. 
The Guide provides guidance to directors on how to prepare the Business Review 
section of their annual report. It states that the section should provide an objective 
discussion that analyses and explains the main features underlying the results and 
Chapter Three - Contemporary Corporate Governance Initiati"res 
financial position of the company concerned. The Guide provides practical guidance 
for drafting the Business Review section of annual reports. 
According to the Guide, the Business Review can be divided into two sections: the 
Operating Review and the Financial Review. Regarding the Operating Review 
section, the following should be included: 
;,.. Operating results for the period 
y Dynamics of the business 
;,.. Prospects and plans for the future 
~ Post balance sheet date events 
Regarding the Financial Review section, the following should be included: 
~ Attributable return to shareholders 
" Accounting policies/changes in accounting policies 
~ Capital structure and treasury policy 
~ Taxation 
~ Sources of funds 
~ Liquidity 
~ Going concern 
~ Off-balance sheet items 
It is recommended that the Business Review section should discuss the nature of 
business activities in each of the above areas, with particular emphasis on changes in 
the level of activity and management policies, and should refer to the benefits 
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expected from such activities. However, the Guide states that the above should not be 
regarded as a comprehensive list of all matters that are relevant. The Business 
Review should also focus on other matters that are considered as significant to the 
business concerned. 
3.3.3 Report on Directors' Remuneration 
In November 1999 another report, entitled Directors' Remuneration: 
Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and Accountability ("the Report"), 
was produced by the HKSA Corporate Governance Committee, with the aim of 
improving disclosures of directors' remuneration. The Report was prepared with 
reference to those parts of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles related to 
directors' remuneration, and was also informed by the findings of a comparative study 
of disclosures of directors' remuneration in major financial markets conducted by the 
HKSA Corporate Governance Committee. The key findings of the comparative study 
were as follows: 
(a) Disclosure of individual directors' remuneration 
In Hong Kong, the rules do not require disclosure of the remuneration of the 
individual highest paid directors, as required in the UK and the US. Indeed, the UK 
requires disclosure of each element of the remuneration package for each individual 
director. not just the highest paid directors. Disclosure requirements in Australia and 
Singapore are in common with Hong Kong in that they do not require disclosure of 
the remuneration of directors on an individual basis. 
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The current Listing Rules in Hong Kong reqUire the disclosure of directors' 
emoluments in bandings: HK$Nil to HK$l million and thereafter at bandings of 
HK$500,OOO. The bandings, however, do not provide disclosure of the emoluments 
of individual directors by name and do not provide any analysis of the constituent 
elements of the remuneration. There are also no precise disclosures below the level of 
HK$l million or thereafter within the HK$500,OOO bands. 
(b) All other compensation 
The Hong Kong Listing Rules require the disclosure of the aggregate of directors' 
basic salaries, housing allowances, other allowances and benefits in kind. The US is 
highly prescriptive as to the constituent parts of directors' remuneration which should 
be disclosed. The UK also requires disclosure of "each element" of directors' 
remuneration. 
(d Share options 
In the UK and the US, disclosure is required of the aggregate value realised by 
directors on the exercise of options, unexercised options at the end of the fiscal year, 
and the aggregate gains by the directors on the exercise of share options. 
(d) General policy on directors' remuneration 
In the UK, companies are required to make a statement regarding their policy on 
executive directors' remuneration. In the US, companies have to provide a 
description of their arrangements with regard to directors' remuneration, 
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(e) Description of contracts and terms of remuneration 
In the UK and the US, there are disclosure requirements regarding employment 
contracts, termination of employment and change-in-control arrangements. 
m Remuneration Committee 
In the UK and the US, remuneration committees are widely used. Both the London 
Stock Exchange and the US Securities and Exchange Commission prescribe the 
functions of the remuneration committee. However, the concept has not been taken 
aboard in Hong Kong, where executive remuneration is generally determined by the 
board based on the recommendation of the executive directors. 
The overall conclusion of the Report was that while the basic level of disclosure 
requirements on directors' remuneration in Hong Kong is comparable to other 
principal financial markets, transparency and accountability can be better achieved by 
the adoption of several further measures. The specific recommendations made in the 
Report are as follows: 
(a) Enhanced Disclosures 
1. A statement regarding the company's policy on executive directors' 
remuneration and share options should be given in the company's annual 
report. 
2. The statement should also state how, and by whom. the fees and other benefits 
of the non-executive directors are determined. 
3. A separate disclosure of directors' remuneration into "non-performance 
based" and "performance based" should be introduced. This can enhance the 
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comparability and transparency of the way directors are compensated and, in 
particular, the extent to which compensation is linked to firm performance. 
4. In addition to standard remuneration, there should also be disclosure of all 
other compensation in appropriate components. 
5. The disclosure of directors' share options should be expanded to include 
disclosure of the aggregate value realised by directors on the exercise of 
options, unexercised options at the end of the fiscal year, and the aggregate 
gains made by the directors on the exercise of their options. 
6. The HKSA should develop specific recommendations on pro forma disclosure 
when regulators, or the Listing Rules, adopt the above recommendations. 
(b) Enhanced Accountability 
1. While transparency in disclosure IS an important element to enable 
shareholders to perform their role of influencing directors' pay, disclosure 
cannot be an end in itself. Shareholders should have greater means of holding 
the board accountable. The Report proposes that remuneration committees 
should be appointed. The committees should be composed, either wholly or 
mainly, of non-executive directors, and should recommend to the board the 
remuneration of the executive directors. 
2. The Report also reiterates a proposal made in the First Report in 1995 that, in 
order to strengthen shareholders' control over the level of compensation for 
loss of office, directors' service contract should not exceed 3 years without 
shareholders' approvaL and directors' termination arrangements should be 
disclosed. 
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It is believed by the HKSA Corporate Governance Committee that the practice of 
sound corporate governance, enhanced disclosures and enhanced accountability 
should be self-initiated decisions of individual boards rather than matters for 
compliance with company or securities law, Listing Rules and the Code of Best 
Practice. Nevertheless, where companies fall short of public expectations, the 
regulators and government would have to ensure that appropriate requirements are 
included in the Listing Rules and company law. The HKSA recommended that its 
members, listed companies, public companies and the regulators adopt the 
recommendations made in the Report. 
3.3.4 Disclosure of Corporate Governance in the Annual Report 
In March 2001, the HKSA Corporate Governance Committee published another 
report, entitled Corporate Governance Disclosure in Annual Reports - A Guide to 
Current Requirements and Recommendations for Enhancement ("the CG Guide"). 
The aim of the CG Guide is to contribute towards the promotion of high standards of 
corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports of Hong Kong companies. This 
can be achieved by (CG Guide, 2001): 
>- Assisting those with responsibilities for preparing financial statements, 
such as directors and chief accounting officers, to better understand the 
scope and benefits of good corporate governance disclosures; and 
Making further recommendations for the enhancement of corporate 
governance disclosure. 
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In the CG Guide, a number of recommendations were made for the enhancement of 
corporate governance disclosure: 
1. Listed companies and public corporations should be encouraged to include in 
their annual report a statement on corporate governance. This communicates 
to shareholders the strength of their corporate governance structures, policies 
and practices. This statement should be presented separately in the annual 
report with the same prominence as, for example, the directors' report. A 
skeleton of the statement is set out in Table 1 of the CG Guide (the content of 
Table 1 of the CG Guide is produced as Appendix 3 at the end of the thesis). 
2. The CG Guide also repeats the HKSA's recommendations that boards should 
appoint remuneration committees composed of wholly or mainly non-
executive directors to make recommendations to the board regarding the 
remuneration of executive directors. 
3. To enhance comparability and transparency of the way directors are 
compensated, and the extent to which directors' remuneration is linked to the 
company's performance, the remuneration should be analysed between 
"performance based" and "non-performance based" compensation. 
4. Disclosure should also be made of the remuneration of individual directors by 
name. This can allow more transparency and informed judgements to be made 
on the fairness and reasonableness of the remuneration in the light of the 
performance of the company concerned. Nevertheless, approval of the board 
and consent of the individual directors should be obtained before publishing 
the details of the remuneration of individual directors. 
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5. Provision should be made for analysis of directors' standard remuneration 
among basic salaries, benefits in kind, housing and other allowances. 
6. Regarding directors' share options, disclosures should be extended to include 
disclosure by individual directors of the aggregate value realised on the 
exercise of options during the year. 
7. Directors should set out in a separate statement their responsibilities III 
connection with the preparation of the financial statements. 
8. Disclosure should also be made of non-audit fees paid to auditors in order to 
increase transparency regarding the auditors' independence. 
Apart from making the above recommendations for the enhancement of corporate 
governance disclosure in Hong Kong, the CG Guide also set out an overview of the 
corporate governance disclosure in annual reports in Hong Kong. The CG Guide also 
contains four appendices, which provide the following statements and checklists: 
1. Illustrative statement on corporate governance 
2. Illustrative disclosure in respect of directors' remuneration, directors' share 
options and directors' shareholdings 
3. Illustrative statement of directors' responsibilities for the financial statements 
4. Detailed corporate governance disclosure checklists, concerning: 
A. Capital structure 
B. Board structure and functioning 
C. Management discussion and analysis 
D. Remuneration 
E. Audit committee 
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F. Related party transactions 
G. Other mandatory disclosures 
H. Other voluntary disclosures 
The above eight checklists provide very detailed description of the existing disclosure 
requirement in Hong Kong together with the recommendations of the HKSA for 
enhanced corporate governance disclosure. 
3.3.5 Best Corporate Governance Disclosure Awards 
Apart from producing the above reports, the HKSA also engages actively in other 
work to promote and enhance corporate governance best practice. For example, it co-
hosted a Roundtable with the OECD, the World Bank, the Securities and Futures 
Commission and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in May/June 2000 in Hong Kong 
(discussed in section 3.2.4 of this chapter). It also organises regular professional 
seminars on topics related to corporate governance. In addition, it initiated the "Best 
Corporate Governance Disclosure Awards" competition in 2000 with the aim of 
providing a benchmark of existing best practice, thereby assisting and encouraging 
more companies to emulate the achievement of the best of their own corporate 
governance practices, policies and disclosures. In order to qualify for the A wards, the 
wilmers must demonstrate a high standard of corporate governance practices and 
disclosures. 
In the first year of its launch in Year 2000 there were, altogether, 54 entries in the 
competition. The entrants \"ere judged by the quality of presentation and disclosure 
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of corporate governance information in their latest annual reports in respect of the 
financial year up to 31 March 2000. 
The jUdging criteria were as follows (Judges' Report, 2000): 
1. Overall presentation 
2. Promptness of reporting 
3. Quality of disclosure of the following information: 
". Capital structure 
~ Board structure and functioning 
Management discussion and analysis on operating and financial affairs 
as well as on non-financial performance information 
Remuneration policy and packages analysis of directors and key 
executives 
Audit committee's composition, role and function 
Related party transactions and relationship 
Other voluntary disclosures such as social responsibility, community 
services, etc. 
4. Compliance with corporate governance disclosure requirements of the 
Companies Ordinance and the Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
The overall comments of the judges were that compliance with the mandatory 
corporate governance disclosure requirements of the Listing Rules and the Companies 
Ordinance is generally high. Howeyer. companies should be encouraged to make 
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more voluntary disclosures, rather than just merely meeting the minimum statutory or 
regulatory requirements. 
Among the seven winners of various awards, the "Grand A ward" winner was HSBC 
Holdings plc. The overall comment to this Grand A ward winner was that it set a high 
standard of corporate governance that Hong Kong listed companies should aspire to in 
terms of compliance, disclosure, layout and presentation of the annual report. HSBC 
has established more extensive corporate governance practices than those called for in 
local standards. 1 I These include a larger number of independent directors, reports 
from board committees, a detailed "Report of The Directors" which also includes the 
compensation paid to individual directors and senior executives (Judges' Report, 
2000). 
The HKSA once again organised this Awards competition in 2001. The number of 
entrants increased from 54 to 62. The Grand Award winner was still HSBC Holdings 
plc. The judges commented that, while the overall standard had improved, there were 
also areas where improvements could be made. Apart from providing commentaries 
on the annual reports of the individual winners and the overall standard of entries, the 
judges' report also set out recommendations for improvements (Judges' Report, 
2001 ). 
II It must be recognised, of course, that as it is also listed on the London, New York and Paris stock 
exchanges, HSBC is subject to stricter disclosure requirements than other Hong Kong companies. 
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While the first two years' competitions focused more on establishing benchmarks. the 
third competition in 2002 placed more emphasis on encouraging improvements. This 
shift of emphasis was reflected by the introduction of a new "Significant 
Improvement A ward" in the competition. This was introduced to encourage and 
recognise local businesses which, without necessarily being subject to the demands of 
more stringent overseas regulatory requirements, nevertheless show a desire to raise 
their own standards (Judges' Report, 2002). 
The general finding of the third competition was that improvements had been 
observed. More companies and organisations were including statements of policy and 
practice in relation to corporate governance. For example, more information was 
given in relation to the number of board and committee meetings held and there was a 
greater number of independent non-executive directors involved on boards and 
committees (Judges' Report, 2002). 
There was no Grand A ward made in 2002, although HSBC Holdings pic attained the 
"Diamond Award", the highest rank in the Heng Seng Index Category of the 
competition. The awards made to HSBC over the years reflect the fact that, as a UK-
domiciled company, it complies with the UK's Combined Code on corporate 
governance. The fact that no purely Hong Kong-based company has won the top 
award suggests that Hong Kong companies that do not have a foreign listing still have 
room to improve the quality of their corporate governance. 
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3.3.6 Other Corporate Governance Reports and Conferences 
Apart from the HKSA, there are other professional bodies and academic institutions 
active in promoting and enhancing corporate governance in Hong Kong. The 
contributions by these organisations are summarised as follows: 
(a) Reports published bv the Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries 
The Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries ("HKICS") is an independent 
professional body. It is an association of the Hong Kong members of the Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators of London. The principal aim of the 
HKICS is to promote and advance the efficient administration of commerce, industry 
and public affairs. 
The HKICS also works closely with vanous authorities and contributes towards 
corporate governance issues. In April 2001, it published a research report entitled 
Division of Duties and Responsibilities betl,veen the Company Secretary and Directors 
in Hong Kong. The research report was based upon the findings of questionnaire 
returns from company secretaries and directors of Hong Kong listed companies. 
Twenty company secretaries and twenty directors, chairmen and chief executive 
officers were also interviewed in the research process. 
The focus of the report was on the division of duties and responsibilities between the 
corr pany secretary and the directors in the context of recent corporate governance 
developments in Hong Kong. The principal findings and recommendations of the 
report were as follows: 
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1. While the current professional training of company secretaries tends to invoh'e 
a reasonably appropriate balance of legal and financial knowledge, 
consideration needs to be given to introduce other aspects of corporate 
governance, administration and management. The scope must also include 
both the listed and private company dimensions. 12 
2. The role of the company secretary's support for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the board needs to be more fully explored and emphasised. 
The HKICS can do more to enhance the training and effectiveness of company 
secretaries. 
3. The report found that it remains questionable as to whether the independent 
non-executive directors are truly independent and whether they understand 
their roles. Training and education of directors has not been extensive enough. 
It is suggested that the Hong Kong Institute of Directors can do more in this 
regard. 
4. There is no one corporate governance structure that is ideal for all companies 
and circumstances. Prescriptive legislation ought to be avoided. 
5. While the board of directors remains responsible for the governance of 
corporations, the supportive role of company secretaries is an important aspect 
which must not be underestimated. It needs to be built upon and encouraged. 
\2 In addition, to provide a wider degree of training and recognition, the HKICS may explore the 
development of a masters degree programme, for example an MA or MBA in Corporate Governance. 
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(b) Conferences organised bv the Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries 
Apart from conducting regular continuing professional seminars on topics relating to 
corporate governance, the HKICS has also hosted three conferences on corporate 
governance in Hong Kong in the last few years. 13 The first conference was held in 
November 1998 on the theme of "Corporate Governance and the Challenges Ahead". 
Trends in corporate governance and issues related to responsibility, transparency and 
information technology were discussed, as well as governance issues in emerging 
markets. 
The second conference, "Corporate Governance 2000 - A Practical View", was held 
in November 2000 and focused on corporate governance issues related to the banking 
and insurance industries, corporate ratings and audit committees. The third 
conference, "Corporate Governance 2002 - A Practitioner's Perspective", was held in 
October 2002. Following the Enron collapse, the conference focused on the quality of 
directors and on issues concerning ethics and integrity. 
(c) Conferences and Symposia organised by other institutions 
In addition to the HKSA and HKICS, various universities in Hong Kong are also 
active in holding conferences and symposia to exchange ideas and research on 
corporate governance Issues. 
13 Participants at the conferences included academics, professionals, government officials and 
representatives from regulatory authorities. The conferences provide a forum for participants. to 
exchange ideas on improving the corporate governance systems not only for Hong Kong compames, 
but also for various organisations in the East-Asian region and emerging markets more generally. 
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For example, The Chinese University of Hong Kong held is first ;'Symposium on 
Corporate Governance and Disclosures" in March 1999. Discussions in the 
symposium mainly concerned management control and financial disclosures. In 
February 2001, it held a "Symposium on Corporate Governance and Disclosure: 
Enhancing the Competitiveness of Hong Kong", during which corporate governance 
issues such as disclosure and transparency were discussed. In February 2002, it 
organised its third symposium entitled "Symposium on Corporate Governance and 
Disclosure: The Impact on Globalisation". The symposia were well attended by 
academics, professionals and government officials. 
The City University of Hong Kong has been organising its "Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Accounting and Economics Symposium" annually since the Year 2000. Corporate 
governance issues, especially those related to the Asia-Pacific region, have been 
discussed during these symposia. 
In addition to academic institutions, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission ("SFC") held a conference entitled "Corporate Governance in the Pan 
Chinese Market" in Hong Kong in October 200l. Various corporate governance 
issues, such as, the role of shareholders and auditors, the benefits of transparency, and 
the responsibility and training of directors, were discussed during the conference. 
During the conference various representatives from the Stock Exchange and the SFC 
emphasised that they were working together on an overall review of the Listing Rules 
and the Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Repurchases in order to further improve 
the corporate governance regime in Hong Kong . 
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3.3.7 Corporate Governance Review 
In his Budget Speech of 2000/01, the then Financial Secretary Mr. Donald Tsang 
announced that a comprehensive review of corporate governance should be 
undertaken in order to identify and plug any gaps in Hong Kong's corporate 
governance regime. The Standing Committee on Company Law Reform ("SCCLR") 
is responsible for conducting this Corporate Governance Review ("CGR") in Hong 
Kong. 
The primary objectives of having laws and rules are to ensure that minimum standards 
of behaviour are reflected in the law and that they are complied with. However, with 
a view to maximising returns to shareholders, there is a broader objective of raising 
the standards of corporate behaviour, which also involves raising the general ethical 
standards of managers and controlling shareholders. The SCCLR considers that too 
many prescriptive rules and regulations will not achieve the objective of maximising 
returns to shareholders. As each type of company may have different governance 
needs depending on, for instance, its size and objectives, the corporate governance 
"wisdom" is that it is not practicable to prescribe detailed rules for every type of 
company. To achieve a correct balance, it believes that it is crucial that there must 
also be the right "culture". This involves self-discipline, by the board, the 
management and controlling shareholders as well as market discipline, to help 
monitor the performance of companies (SCCLR, 2001). 
In order to address gaps in the regulatory regIme. the SCCLR considers that the 
standard of the regulatory regime in Hong Kong must be at least commensurate with 
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that of international jurisdictions, with variations if necessary to take into account the 
Hong Kong corporate environment. 
For example, one of the considerations of the SCCLR is that in many Hong Kong 
listed companies a single dominant shareholder or single group of persons controls the 
company. This may be the significant shareholder or a person connected with the 
"controlling" shareholder. Typically the "controlling" shareholder would appoint 
persons connected with him onto the board of a listed company, or its subsidiaries. 
One of the first tasks of the CGR has been to commission two major surveys. The 
first is a survey of the attitudes of international institutional investors towards 
corporate governance standards in Hong Kong. The second is a comparative survey 
of the development of corporate governance standards in both the competitor 
jurisdictions in South-East Asia and jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The 
jurisdictions in the survey include Australia, Singapore, Taiwan, the UK and the US. 
In order to conduct the CGR, three sub-committees were established, which are: 
1. The Directors Sub-Committee; 
2. The Shareholders Sub-Committee; and 
3. The Corporate Reporting Sub-Committee. 
The terms of reference of the three sub-committees can be found in Appendices 4 to 6 
at the end of this thesis. 
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Essentially, the CGR is proceeding on two major fronts, as follows: 
1. The universities have been or will be commissioned, after a tendering 
exercise, to undertake various surveys and research projects which have been 
identified by the three sub-committees. 
2. Since mid-2000, the sub-committees have been considering papers on specific 
subjects, having regard to their terms of reference, which can be considered in 
advance of the results of the consultancy projects. It is possible that some of 
these subjects may have to be reconsidered in the light of the findings of the 
consultancy projects while a number of issues cannot be considered until the 
results of the consultancy projects are known. 
In July 2001, the SCCLR published a Consultation Paper seeking public opinions on 
the proposals made in the first phase of the CGR.14 The second phase of the CGR is 
still on-going. It is the plan of the SCCLR to deal with the CGR in phases. This will 
enable some proposals to be implemented at an earlier stage than others, rather than 
including all proposals in a major report, whose preparation would take a longer time 
and delay the implementation of certain reforms. 
1.J A full copy of the Consultation Paper can be found at the web-site of the Hong Kong Companies 
Registry at http://www.info.gov.hk.cr. 
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3.4 A Study of the Audit Committee in Hong Kong 
As discussed in section 3.3.1 above, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in May 1998 
adopted the recommendation made by the HKSA regarding the formation of audit 
committees. Every listed company was required to establish an audit committee for 
accounting periods commencing on or after 1 January 1999. Any company failing to 
comply with this requirement must report the reasons for non-compliance in their 
annual report. 
However, the mere existence of an audit committee in a company does not necessarily 
mean that the quality and transparency of financial reporting will improve and that the 
company will be better monitored and governed. This section explores the 
effectiveness of audit committees in enhancing corporate governance standards in 
Hong Kong. The attributes and functions of an effective audit committee are also 
discussed. 
3.4.1 Attributes of an Effective Audit Committee 
While the precise authority and structure of an audit committee will vary depending 
on the circumstances of the company concerned. the attributes that are essential for an 
effective audit committee include the following (Sun, 1996): 
I. The committee is vested with proper authority, status and responsibility. 
2. The members of the audit committee are remunerated at a level to reflect the 
significant responsibility and time commitment involved in serving on the 
committee. 
..., t-
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3. The committee IS made up of independent non-executives with suitable 
experience and expertise who are prepared to commit sufficient time and 
effort to the task. 
4. The committee meetings are properly planned with a formal agenda and 
supporting materials prepared in sufficient detail to allow consideration of 
issues and an understanding of their implications. 
5. The committee reports formally to the board and the shareholders In the 
annual report. 
George (l999a) also pointed out some essential attributes of an effective audit 
committee: 
1. It should have clear, written terms of reference. 
2. Audit committee meetings should be held regularly, typically three or four 
times each year. Management and auditors can also be invited to attend the 
meetings. The meetings should have an agenda and minutes should be 
properly prepared by the audit committee secretary. 
3. The audit committee members should possess the industry sector knowledge 
and the necessary skills and experience in sufficient breadth and depth. 
4. The chairman of the audit committee should be appointed directly by the 
board. He/she should have a strong and independent character and have a 
financial background and knowledge of the requirements of the Stock 
Exchange. 
5. The chairman should also haye clear communication with the finance director 
of the company and be kept informed of the views of the finance director. 
3-46 
Chapter Three - Contemporary Corporate Governance Initiatives 
3.4.2 Functions and Responsibilities 
An effective audit committee can perform the following functions (Sun, 1996): 
1. it can serve as a vehicle of communication among the shareholders, directors, 
auditors and regulators; 
2. it can create a climate of discipline and sound financial control; 
3. it can contribute to ensuring balanced and understandable financial reporting; 
4. it can be a counterbalance to the chairman, chief executive or finance director. 
While the precise responsibilities of audit committees will vary depending upon the 
circumstances of a particular company, in principle, the basic responsibilities are 
assisting the board to fulfil its duties concerning internal control and financial and 
management reporting (HKSA, 1997): 
(a) Financial and other reporting 
This mainly concerns with the review of the completeness, accuracy and fairness of 
the interim and annual financial statements of the company concerned. The review 
should challenge the quality of earnings and the completeness and fairness of 
disclosures together with the appropriateness of statements given by the directors in 
the Directors' Report. 
(b) Internal control 
Business risk is a major concern for the management of a company. Audit committee 
members should obtain assurances that management systematically identifies key 
areas of risk and that an appropriate control environment is enforced and maintained. 
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In reviewing the adequacy of the control environment, the audit committee has to 
review reports by the internal auditors and any management letters submitted by the 
external auditors. The process may also involve site visits and a review of 
documentation of the company's systems. The audit committee members should also 
meet with the internal auditors, external auditors and management to discuss the 
findings and resolutions. 
(d Audit 
The audit committee should monitor internal and external audit coverage to ensure all 
key risk areas are considered. This involves reviewing and discussing with the 
auditors the current year's audit plan and the resolution of issues from prior years. 
(d) Responding to management needs 
Apart from the above specific areas of financial reporting, internal control and audit, 
the audit committee also considers a wide range of issues. The issues can be 
specifically delegated by the board, be referred to in the terms of reference, or may 
anse as a natural extension of the review of the company's affairs. The audit 
committee may also review compliance with statutory regulations and other 
regulatory, industry or legal requirements and social obligations. 
The detailed responsibilities of the audit committee should be clearly documented in 
the terms of reference (HKSA, 1997). A typical work cycle of an audit committee 
can be found in the figure on the following page: 
3-48 
Chapter Three - Contemporary Corporate Governance Initiatives 
Figure 3.1 Illustrative Work Cycle of an Audit Committee 
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Source: George (1999a), Audit Committees: A Major Corporate Governance Initiati\'e 
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3.4.3 Benefits from an Effective Audit Committee 
An effective audit committee serves as a means to increase board effectiveness , 
accountability, transparency and objectivity. If an audit committee possesses the 
correct attributes and functions properly, it can bring the following benefits to the 
companies and the investors concerned (HKSA, 1997): 
1. improve the quality of financial reporting, by revIewmg the financial 
statements on behalf of the board; 
2. create a climate of discipline and control which will reduce the opportunity for 
fraud; 
3. enable the non-executive directors to contribute an independent judgement and 
playa positive role; 
4. help the finance director, by providing a forum in which he can raise issues of 
concern; 
5. strengthen the position of the external auditor, by providing a channel of 
communication and forum for issues of concern; 
6. provide a framework within which the external auditor can assert his 
independence in the event of a dispute with management; 
7. strengthen the position of the internal audit function, by providing a greater 
degree of independence from management; 
8. increase public confidence in the credibility and objectivity of financial 
statements and of the board. 
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Sun (1996) also suggested that an effective audit committee can produce the 
following benefits: 
1. improve the quality of financial reporting; 
2. reinforce management's control-consciousness and the company's overall 
control environment, thereby reducing the risk of illegal and improper acts or 
management fraud; 
3. in the case of disagreement, mediate between the finance director and the 
auditors. 
However, expenences from both Hong Kong and other parts of the world have 
revealed that there are a number of factors rendering the audit committee ineffective. 
An assessment of the effectiveness of the audit committees of listed companies in 
Hong Kong follows in the next section. 
3.4.4 Assessment of Effectiveness 
As discussed above, an audit committee can only be effective if it possesses a number 
of attributes and is functioning properly. For example, it must have clear written 
terms of reference, with adequate authority and resources, consist of capable members 
and a strong chairman, meet regularly with support from the board and be able to 
establish clear lines of communication \vith the board, finance director and the 
auditors (George, 1999a). 
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However, in practice, audit committees are very often not as effective as they are 
supposed to be. This is because there are a number of factors and limitations which 
may render an audit committee ineffective. For example (Sun, 1996): 
1. when an audit committee is set up for the sake of appearance rather than out of 
a real commitment to good corporate governance, 
2. sometimes an audit committee is set up merely to act as a rubber stamp for 
decisions made by the executive directors, 
3. there is a lack of clarity as to the relationship between the audit committee and 
the board to which it is accountable due to unclear terms of reference, 
4. there is a lack of commitment by the board to allow and encourage the audit 
committee to operate with appropriate authority, independence and objectivity, 
5. there is a lack of appropriate expertise among the audit committee members, 
6. there is a lack of commitment by and incentives to members to devote 
sufficient time and effort to the audit committee. 
While it is generally agreed that the most important characteristics of effective audit 
committee members are independence, business experience and financial expertise 
(Mackintosh, 1999) it is also noted that some common problems with audit 
committees are that many members are not "independent" and do not possess the 
appropriate financial skills (Ng, 2000). Listed companies often find it difficult to 
attract high calibre individuals with broad and relevant business and financial 
experience to act as non-executive directors. Since audit committee members are 
appointed from amongst the non-executive directors of the board, audit committees 
face the same problems in attracting effectiye members (George, 1999b). 
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Ng (2000) also points out that smaller companies may not consider forming an audit 
committee, believing that they have alternative means of handling corporate 
governance matters (such as through the full board of directors) and may not consider 
it necessary or beneficial to form a specific sub-committee. In addition, smaller 
companies may not be in the financial position to be able to afford the potentially high 
costs of forming an audit committee. The possible benefits of audit committees may 
be outweighed by the costs for smaller companies. 
In a recent project on the relationship between audit committees and internal control 
in Hong Kong, conducted by a group of students studying at the Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University, there was a similar finding relating to the size of companies. 
Large companies (measured by number of employees exceeding 5,000) were found to 
prefer setting up an internal audit department, whereas small companies were less 
willing to spend extra resources on internal auditing. They preferred to rely on 
external auditors rather than setting up an internal audit department. Also, small 
companies did not agree that audit committees could perform the functions of 
reviewing accounting and management information systems and internal control 
systems. The other major findings and recommendations of the project were as 
follows: 
1. Most directors agreed that audit committees have the responsibilities to review 
and approve the proposed annual internal audit program, thereby improving 
the internal control systems and the effectiveness of internal audit. 
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2. While the HKSA recommended that audit committees be solely comprised of 
non-executive directors, the aim was that it would lead to more independence. 
Consistent with this assumption, the project group found that audit committees 
with more non-executive directors have more frequent meetings with the chief 
internal auditors. 
3. However, it appears that the audit committees are not very effective as such 
and there is still much room for improvement in the following areas: 
Y Audit committees should be involved in making decisions about the 
dismissal of the chief internal auditors. 
Y Audit committees should have more meetings each year with the internal 
auditors. 
~ Audit committees should be delegated with more authority and they should 
playa more active role in the review and approval of the annual internal 
audit programs. 
As noted from the above project, and the comments made by George, Sun and Ng, 
there are limitations and deficiencies in the current structure and attributes of the audit 
committees in Hong Kong companies. IS Given that most Hong Kong companies are 
family-owned, very often the executive directors are either substantial shareholders or 
related persons. As a consequence, there is a tendency for executive directors to 
retain power in their hands rather than giving authority to the audit committees. 
BeCause of Hong Kong's family-owned corporate structure and its deeply-rooted 
15 George, Sun and Ng are professionals and academics with extensive experience of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. 
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Chinese culture, the setting up of audit committees in listed companies is only a fairly 
recent initiative. It is inevitable that it will take time for companies to improve the 
composition of audit committees and to vest them with proper authority. This is an 
important move as an effective audit committee will not only facilitate 
communication among the company, the auditors and the regulators, it can also serve 
as an agent to improve the corporate governance standard of the company concerned, 
thereby contributing to the improvement of overall corporate governance standards in 
Hong Kong. 
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3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, the work of various international organisations, local professional 
bodies and academic institutions in enhancing corporate governance after the East-
Asian financial crisis are discussed and analysed. While many organisations have 
contributed proposals and ideas to create a better corporate governance framework, it 
is unanimously agreed that there is no single "best" model of corporate governance 
anywhere in the world. As pointed out by Mr. Iskander, Director of the Private Sector 
Development Department of The World Bank, there are many different corporate 
forms and consequently many possible approaches to corporate governance reform. 
Each country must find a model that can best fit its own culture and history and its 
government's capacity to regulate (Company Secretary, 2000). 
Despite the fact that there is no single "best" model, there are some common features 
of effective corporate governance. It is worth noting that all the studies, forums, 
roundtables and conferences have discussed issues relating to the following: 
1. Improving the effectiveness of the board. For example, increasing the number 
of "quality" independent non-executive directors, providing more training to 
directors and requiring the directors to be accountable for their responsibilities 
and duties. 
2. Enhancing the transparency of disclosures In financial statements. For 
example, more voluntary disclosures are encouraged, and a corporate 
governance statement should also be included in annual reports. 
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3. Encouraging more timely disclosures of various financial and non-financial 
transactions, especially if they are material in nature, connected with directors 
and if they are related-party transactions. 
4. Recognising the benefits that can be brought about by an effective audit 
committee, audit committees should be empowered with more authority. The 
terms of reference of audit committee should be clearly defined. The 
attributes and commitments of the audit committee members, the number of 
meetings held and the communications of the audit committee members with 
the management and auditors are also important factors in making the audit 
committee effective. 
5. Establishing remuneration committees can benefit companies in a number of 
aspects. For example, they can recommend to the boards the remuneration of 
executive directors and give advice on various remuneration matters. An 
effective remuneration committee should be composed of wholly or mainly 
non-executive directors. 
As noted by the Asian Development Bank in its study of the corporate governance 
systems in various Asian countries, most countries' governance structures are not far 
from those of the UK or the US. However, the problem is one of enforcement and of 
how to strengthen corporate governance regulations to facilitate enforcement. Many 
countries have rules in place but they do not always have the capacity to enforce 
them. They often lack the human capital and institutional arrangements needed to 
make the rules work (Company Secretary. 2000). 
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From the qualitative analyses in Chapters Two and Three, it is generally found that 
Hong Kong's corporate governance structure is one of the better ones among various 
East-Asian countries. However, there is still much room for improvement, especially 
in respect of audit committees, remuneration committees and the level of transparency 
of disclosures. Further recommendations for improving the corporate governance 
regime in Hong Kong are made in Chapter Seven. In fact, most of the areas that 
require improvements are associated with the family-ownership corporate structure in 
Hong Kong and its traditional Chinese culture. The directors or management who are 
also substantial shareholders are reluctant to delegate authority to independent officers 
and executives. They also tend to keep their decisions and business information as 
secret as possible and they do not like the idea of "transparency". These 
characteristics are not only common in most Hong Kong companies, but also In 
various East-Asian countries. Hence, adoption of corporate governance rules In 
themselves might not be enough to improve corporate performance in Hong Kong and 
in the East-Asian region. There is a greater need, perhaps, to improve the 
infrastructure in order to ensure effective implementation of the rules. For example, 
improving the capacity of the judiciary and the regulatory authorities, as well as 
providing training and continuing education to directors, without which corporate 
governance reforms may never become effective. 
The Hong Kong Government has begun take steps to improve the corporate 
governance regime. Meanwhile, the views of the public have been sought on the first 
phase of proposals contained in the Consultation Paper of the Corporate Governance 
Revie\v ("'COR") in Hong Kong. The second phase of the COR is on-going. Hong 
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Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited is also proposing to amend the Listing Rules 
to enhance corporate governance. 16 It issued a Consultation Paper in January 2002 
seeking public opinions on its proposed changes to the Listing Rules. It is envisaged 
that with the effort and input of the Government and the regulatory bodies, corporate 
governance standards in Hong Kong companies can be further improved. However, 
to be successful, this will require continual efforts by the Government, professional 
organisations, regulatory authorities, as well company management as a whole. 
As discussed above, gIven the umque historical background, culture and family-
ownership structure in Hong Kong companies, the models that are applicable in 
international jurisdictions may not necessarily be suitable and effective in Hong 
Kong. It is reasonable to argue that Hong Kong has been on the right track in 
deriving sound corporate governance principles from the UK while remaining 
"conservative" in certain aspects due to its cultural background. It is not an easy task 
to develop and arrive at an optimal corporate governance framework for Hong Kong 
companies, especially regarding improvements in those corporate governance 
practices which are considered as being "too conservative" and require improvement. 
In order to help to design a better model of corporate governance for Hong Kong 
corporations, the above qualitative analyses are not sufficient in themselves. In the 
remaining parts of the thesis, empirical analyses are conducted to ascertain the 
possible impact of the family-owned corporate structure in Hong Kong on firm 
16 Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) is the holding company of the Stock Exchange 
of Ho;g Kong Limited, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited and the Hong Kong Securities 
Clearing Company Limited. HKEx \vent public in June 2000 following the integration of the securities 
and futures market in March 2000. 
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performance. The possible impact of the East-Asian financial cnSIS on firm 
performance is also analysed empirically. The results from both the qualitative and 
the empirical studies are then reviewed and integrated so as to derive a set of 
recommendations for improving corporate governance standards in Hong Kong. 
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4.1 Chapter Objectives 
In the previous two chapters, a critical analysis of corporate governance regimes in 
selected countries is carried out. The corporate governance initiatives proposed and 
adopted by international organisations, local professional bodies and gov~mments in 
the aftermath of the East-Asian financial crisis are also discussed. However, since 
historical background and culture differ across countries, the corporate governance 
models that are applicable in particular international jurisdictions may not be suitable 
and effective in all East-Asian countries. Therefore, it is not an easy task to develop 
and arrive at an optimal corporate governance framework for companies in each 
jurisdiction. Also, it is suggested by various organisations, for example, the Asian 
Development Bank, that actually the governance structures in most of the East-Asian 
countries are not far from those of the UK or the US. The countries have corporate 
governance rules in place, but they are often weak in terms of the human capital and 
institutional arrangements needed to enforce these rules (Company Secretary, 2000). 
Another reason that may account for the weaker corporate governance structures in the 
East-Asian countries is that the form of corporate ownership differs from that found in 
the UK and the US. There have been numerous academic studies which have 
examined the relationship between ownership and performance, but most of them are 
based on US evidence, where the largely dispersed ownership structure is very 
di~ ferent from the concentrated form of ownership which characterises the East-Asian 
region. It is therefore doubtful whether the findings of these studies are applicable to 
other parts of the world. The recent study of Fan and \\' ong (2002) also suggests that 
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pnor research focusing on US corporations IS not applicable to East-Asian 
corporations due to the differences in ownership concentration and the different types 
of agency problems that they give rise to. 
In this thesis, an empirical study is performed to determine the relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance using Hong Kong evidence. The 
principal aim is to ascertain the impact of managerial ownership on corporate 
performance in a family-owned corporate structure and to uncover any differences 
from the findings in the UK and US contexts. 
Before carrying out the empirical study, this chapter contains a review of the academic 
literature on corporate governance, with particular reference to studies of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance. A discussion 
of corporate ownership structures in the UK, the US and Hong Kong will also be 
included in this chapter, by reference to the relevant literature. The possible impact of 
cultural differences will also be discussed, with emphasis placed on the leading work 
in this area by Hofstede. The chapter ends by discussing the possible impact of the 
endogeneity issue for the study of the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance in the Hong Kong context. 
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4.2 Previous Research on Corporate Governance 
The literature on agency theory provided the major contribution towards corporate 
governance thinking in the late 1970s and 1980s. Key contributions were made by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986). Inherent in 
this theoretical perspective is a particular view of the nature of man: essentially. that 
he is self-interested rather than altruistic. As an individual utility maximiser, he 
cannot be trusted always to act in the best interests of others (Tricker, 1995). Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as: 
"A contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage 
another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. 
If both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers there is good 
reason to believe that the agent will not al\t'ays act in the best interests 
of the principal ... " 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, pg.308) 
As a result of this behaviour, Jensen and Meckling (1976) further argued that the 
transaction costs such as further disclosure, independent outside directors and audit 
committees, should be incurred to the point at \vhich the reduction of the loss from 
non-compliance of the above measures equals the increase in enforcement costs. 
Following the 1987 stock market crash and a number of well-publicized corporate 
collapses such as the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCC1), there has 
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been a great deal of academic and professional debate over the matter of corporate 
governance. Governance problems often arise as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control within a business organization (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to 
control the agency problem to ensure that managers act in the interests of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Several corporate governance mechanisms ha\e 
been identified in the literature. For example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) identify 
seven mechanisms. Of these, three mechanisms are determined by outsiders, namely: 
institutional shareholdings, outside block holdings and takeover activity. The other 
four mechanisms are decided by insiders, namely: board membership and 
characteristics, inside shareholding, debt financing and the use of outside markets for 
managerial talent. The adoption of more governance mechanisms will strengthen 
internal control and provide an "intensive monitoring package" for a firm to reduce 
opportunistic behaviours and information asymmetry (Leftwich et aI., 1981; Welker 
1995). 
There are a number of major areas of research on corporate governance issues. For 
example, on the role and composition of the board of directors, on directors' 
remuneration, on management turnover, on voluntary disclosures, on audit and 
remuneration committees, on institutional shareholders and on managerial O\vnership. 
etc. The leading literature on these studies are discussed in this section. 
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raJ Studies on the role and composition o(the board o(directors 
One major strand of research examines the role and composition of the board of 
directors in reducing agency costs; and whether the existence of non-executive 
directors on the boards are valuable (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Forker, 1992; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Kren and Kerr, 1997). Directors play an important role in 
the corporate governance process (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A major role of the board 
is its control functions (Pound, 1995). Directors monitor and assess managerial 
performance, decide compensation levels of senior managers, provide advice, and 
provide links to other organisations. They resolve the agency conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. Outside directors who are unaffiliated with the firm have 
the most independence to credibly arbitrate these conflicts (Hanson and Song, 2000). 
Outside or independent non-executive directors are perceived as a tool for monitoring 
management behaviour (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Leftwich et al. (1981) and 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the larger the proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board, the more effective it will be in monitoring managerial 
opportunism. Forker (1992) finds that a higher percentage of independent non-
executive directors on the board enhances the monitoring of the financial disclosure 
quality and reduces the benefits of withholding information. Chen and Jaggi (1998) 
also find that the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board is 
positively related to the quality and extent of financial disclosure. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) provide evidence of a positive abnormal stock return 
when outside directors are added to the boards. They suggest that the market expects 
better performance from firms \\·ith more outside directors. Byrd and Hickman 
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(1992), Lee et al. (1992) and Brickley et al. (1994) suggest that board composition 
matters and that outside directors provide effective monitoring. Yermack (1996), on 
the contrary, finds that there is no association between the percentage of outside 
directors and firm performance, though he finds that firm value and performance is a 
decreasing function of board size. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), and Bhagat and Black (1997) all find no meaningful relations 
between board composition and firm performance. Therefore, the results reported in 
the literature in this aspect are mixed, but in general, they suggest that board 
composition may be associated with corporate policies and performance. 
(b) Studies relating to directors' remuneration 
A further line of research studies how corporate performance is related to corporate 
governance factors such as directors' remuneration. The linkage between 
performance-based compensation and firm performance has been studied extensively. 
While some empirical findings establish a strong statistical link between compensation 
and performance, the results are not conclusive (Milkovich and Newman, 1993). It 
can be seem from the findings in the literature that there is still lacking of consensus 
on the precise relationship between directors' remuneration and corporate 
performance. For instance, while Hirschey and Pappas (1981) find a negative 
association between accounting income and directors' cash compensation, Kumar et 
al. (1993) find that there exists a positive relationship between earnings and directors' 
remuneration. Agrawal et al. (1991) analyze pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regressions and find that cash compensation is positively related to both shareholders 
return and sales growth. Ciscel (1977) finds a weak correlation bet\veen cash 
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compensation and both sales and profits, while Baker et al. (1988) find that there is a 
statistically significant positive association between the logarithm of sales and CEO 
compensation. Core et al. (1999) find that board structure variables are somewhat 
more important than ownership structure variables in predicting future performance, 
and that board and ownership structure are associated with the level of chief 
executives' compensation. 
Smyth, Boyles and Peseau (1975) and Hirschey and Pappas (1981) argue that in a rate-
of-return regulated environment such as public utilities, the role of compensation is to 
provide incentives for sales maximization rather than profit maximization. Duru and 
Iyengar (1999) carried out an investigation of firms through a number of years' 
observations and found that there is a positive association between changes In 
compensation and changes in firm performance in the electric utility industry. 
According to Persons (1999), the Research & Development (R&D) expenditure had a 
significantly positive association with executive remuneration. He finds that firms in 
high-technology industries use R&D expenditure, in addition to earnings, in 
compensation contracts to motivate directors to undertake risky R&D projects which 
benefit the firms' long-term well-being. Several studies have documented the 
relevance of R&D, which is a major constituent for some industries (for example high 
technology industry and pharmaceutical industry), in determination of a firm's market 
value. Chan et al. (1990) find a significantly positive market reaction to 
announcements of increased R&D expenditure. Lev and Sougiannia (1996) report that 
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adjusting earnIngs and book values by R&D capitalization measure yields value-
relevant information to investors. 
Both Mayers and Smith (1992) and Traichal et al. (1999) report positive relation 
between growth opportunities and pay-for-performance sensitivity. Traichal et aI. 
(1999) also find evidence in support of Jensen and Meckling's (1976) alignment of 
director incentive through stock ownership, and that stock ownership lowers pay-for-
performance sensitivity. 
So far most of the research in this topic was carried out under the American or 
European contexts. Studies of the Asian countries are limited. The only piece of 
recent literature that used Hong Kong companies data appeared to be Firth et al. 
(1999), which include a spectrum of listed companies in Hong Kong, in 1994 and 
1995, excluding banking corporations. Firth et aI. (1999) find that the major 
explanator of directors' pay levels is company size. Accounting profitability is also 
an explanator while stock return has little or no statistically significant relationship 
with directors' remuneration. 
(c) Studies relating to top management turnover 
Another line of research is on the relationship between firm performance and top 
management turnover. The existence of a negative relationship between firm 
performance and the probability of a top management change is found by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). This finding is supported by the US studies of Schwartz and Menon 
(1985), Warner et aI. (1988), Fredrickson et al. (1988), Lubatkin et al. (1989), Canella 
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et al. (1991), Datta and Guthrie (1994) and Denis and Denis (1995) and the Japanese 
studies by Anderson et al. (1992), Kaplan (1994) and Kang and Shi\'dasani (1995). 
Weisbach (1988) finds that the association between CEO replacement and poor 
performance is greater as the proportion of independent outside directors on the board 
increases. However, Denis and Denis (1995), Davidson et aI. (1990) and Kang and 
Shivdasani (1995) record performance improvements which followed top management 
dismissals. Dalton and Kesner (1983), Friedman and Singh (1989) and Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991) all fail to document any statistically significant relationship between 
firm performance and top management changes. 
(d) Studies on voluntary disclosures in financial statements 
Voluntary disclosure and its determinants is another line of research in corporate 
governance. Again, most studies were done in the US or other developed countries 
(e.g. Malone et aI., 1993; Raffournier, 1995; Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The 
corporate governance attributes that may influence voluntary disclosure practice 
examined in these studies include ownership structure (e.g. Craswell and Taylor, 1992; 
Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Hossain et aI., 1994; Raffournier, 1995), the 
proportion or existence of independent directors (e.g. Forker, 1992; Malone et aI., 
1993), the appointment of a non-executive director as chairman and the existence of an 
audit committee (e.g. Forker, 1992). 
(e) Studies on audit and remuneration committees 
There are also studies on other corporate governance variables. For example, on the 
functions and effectiveness of audit committees and remuneration or compensation 
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committees. The functions of an audit committee include ensuring the quality of 
financial accounting and control system (Collier, 1993). The existence of an audit 
committee may improve internal control system and thus it is regarded as an effective 
monitoring device for improving disclosure quality (Forker, 1992). McMullen (1996) 
also provides support for the association between the presence of an audit committee 
and more reliable financial reporting. The importance of the compensation committee 
is also supported empirically. The compensation committee plays an important role in 
overseeing a firm's compensation programmes and the composition of the committee 
influences executive compensation practices (Newman, 2000). Belliveau et al. (1996) 
find that the social status of the chairman of the compensation committee has a strong 
influence on CEO compensation. O'Reilly et al. (1988) find a strong association 
between CEO compensation and the compensation levels of outside directors on the 
compensation committee. Newman and Mozes (1999) find that CEO compensation 
practices differ depending on whether insiders are present on the compensation 
committee. 
(0 Studies on the impacts o(institutional or block shareholders 
Another study in corporate governance is on the impacts of institutional or blockholder 
ownership. Regarding the studies on the relationship between institutional ownership 
and firm value, Brickley et al. (1988), Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) and Denis and 
Denis (1995) all find a positive relationship between the two variahles. However, 
Pound (1988), Barclay and Holderness (1991) and Lorderer and Martin (1993) suggest 
that the strength of the relationship depends upon the behaviour of the major 
shareholders. Pound (1988) suggests that the major shareholders have an impact on 
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firm value only when they become actively involved in the corporate governance of 
the firm concerned. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contend that blockholders may 
monitor the actions of management effectively because they represent a credible 
takeover threat if firm performance declines. Shivdasani (1993) finds that ownership 
by blockholders who are unaffiliated with the management raise the likelihood of a 
hostile takeover attempt. Denis et al. (1997) suggest that the probability of a CEO 
being terminated is positively related to the presence of an outside blockholder. These 
findings suggest that the larger the shareholding of an outside blockholder, the greater 
the monitoring of management actions. 
(g) Studies on the effect ofmanageriai ownership on firm performance 
The last by not the least, an important study in corporate governance is on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. One of the 
principal findings was contributed by Morek et al. (1988), who find that the 
relationship is non-linear and cubic in nature. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a 
curvilinear relationship between the two variables. Mehran (1995) find that both the 
performance measures of Tobin's Q and return on assets increase significantly with 
CEO ownership. On the contrary, Denis and Denis (1994) find that there is no 
difference in performance between majority-controlled firms and other firms. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also find no systematic relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. The literature concerning the relationship 
between managerial ownership and corporate performance has thus produced mixed 
and contradictory findings. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Rediker and Seth (1995) 
suggest that prior studies on the linkages between ownership concentration and firm 
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performance have been mixed because these studies only focused on a single corporate 
governance variable. They suggest that the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
should be studied as a "bundle" of variables since corporate governance variables may 
be used as substitute devices. 
Given that the mam theme of this thesis is to study the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance, the academic literature in this area of 
study is reviewed in further detail in the next section. In addition, this study also 
incorporates other corporate governance variables apart from managerial ownership in 
order to derive a better measurement of the relationship between ownership and 
performance. The variables include the main corporate governance variables, namely, 
board size, board composition, directors' remuneration, with control variables for the 
effects of size, debt levels, growth, industries and macro-economic conditions. Further 
details of the variables used in this study are provided in Chapter Five . 
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4.3 Relationships between Managerial Ownership and 
Corporate Performance 
There have been numerous academic studies addressing different aspects of corporate 
governance. Section 4.2 has discussed the major findings of the studies about various 
corporate governance attributes, for example, the roles of the board and board 
composition (e.g. Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Forker, 1992) and executive 
compensation (e.g. Core et ai., 1999), etc. in enhancing corporate governance and firm 
performance. Another important line of research in corporate governance concerns the 
effects of managerial ownership on corporate performance (e.g. Morck et aI., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). So far, most of the studies 
have been conducted on US companies. Limited research has been performed on 
Asian or Hong Kong compames. This thesis concentrates on the issue of how 
managerial ownership and other corporate governance variables affect corporate 
performance in the Hong Kong context. This section examines the literature in this 
aspect of corporate governance study. 
Corporate governance problems very often originate as a result of the separation of 
ownership and control within business organization (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In fact, 
this question was raised as early as 1776 by Adam Smith. He argued that the 
separation of ownership and control in large publicly listed corporations created poor 
incentives for professional managers to operate their firms efficiently. "The directors 
of such [joint-stock} companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's 
money than or their 0\1'11. it cannot 11'ell be expected, that they should yl'atch over it 
'+-1'+ 
Chapter Four - Literature Reviell' 
with the same anxious vigilance lvith which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over with their own. " (Jensen and Meckling (1976), quoting Adam 
Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)). Berle and Means (1932) also suggest that there 
is an inverse correlation between the diffuseness of shareholdings and firm 
performance. While both the arguments of Smith and Berle and Means implied that 
performance can be improved by increasing managerial ownership, a view supported 
by a number of subsequent studies, such as the classical "convergence of interest" 
hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976), there are other research findings providing 
contradictory results, the arguments of which are mainly based on the "entrenchment 
of interest" of company management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Hence, there has been 
on-going research and unresolved debates as to the exact nature of the relationship 
between ownership and performance. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that managerial ownership can help to control 
agency problems since share ownership provides managers with incentives to reduce 
private perquisite consumption. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), the notion 
that shareholdings by managers help to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers is well documented in the agency literature. This "convergence of interest" 
hypothesis contends that as managerial ownership in a firm increases, the firm's 
performance increases uniformly, as managers are less inclined to divert resources 
away from value maximization. 
Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983), on the contrary. contend that while 
market discipline forces managers to adhere to value maximization at very low levels 
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of ownership, at higher levels of managerial ownership managers find it worthwhile to 
consume perquisites as they have sufficient control to follow their own objectives 
without fear of discipline from other ownership interests. Under this "entrenchment of 
interest" argument, the managers would believe that additional consumption of 
perquisites, such as an attractive salary, may outweigh the loss that they will suffer 
from a reduced value of the firm. The resultant effect of this "entrenchment of 
interest" is a reduction in firm performance at high levels of managerial ownership. 
The "entrenchment" hypothesis is also supported in Hart (1983) and Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), who contend that low levels of managerial shareholdings may be 
associated with low job security, thereby motivating management to strive for value 
maximization. When shareholdings are sufficiently high to entrench its positions, 
management may start to behave against the interests of the shareholders. 
Apart from the above, there are other empirical studies about the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance which give different and conflicting 
results. Some studies find that there is no relationship between managerial ownership 
and performance. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) perform a linear regression 
of an accounting measure of the profit rate on ownership concentration and find no 
evidence of a relationship between the two variables. Some studies find a positive 
relationship between the two variables. For example, Mehran (1995) find that both the 
performance measures of Tobin's Q and return on assets increase significantly with 
CEO ownership. Other studies suggest that there are non-linear relationships between 
the two variables, exhibiting various patterns, though most of the studies are mainly 
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based on the ""convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
the ""entrenchment of interest" argument of Fama and Jensen (1983). For example, 
while Morck et al. (1988) find a cubic non-linear relationship Calignment-
entrenchment-alignment") between the two variables, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
find a curvilinear relationship ("alignment-entrenchment"). Thus, the actual 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance may arise as a 
result of some "combined effect" of the "convergence of interest" hypothesis and the 
"entrenchment" argument. 
The empirical study in this thesis is mainly based on the "combined effect" argument, 
which was first verified empirically by Morck et al. (1988). Apart from Morck et al. 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999), etc. also find 
that there are non-linear relationships between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. 
ra) The findings of Morek et al. (1988) 
Morck et al. (1988) make use of piecewise linear regression techniques to estimate the 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership of 371 Fortune 500 
firms in 1980. They use Tobin's Q (the ratio of a firm's market value to the 
replacement cost of its physical assets) as a measure of performance and the 
percentage of shares owned by the board of directors c s a measure of managerial 
ownership. Their results reveal a non-linear, cubic relationship between Tobin's Q 
and managerial ownership. with a pattern which takes the form of "alignment-
entrenchment-alignment" as managerial ownership is increased. The relationship is 
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fairly robust to the inclusion of several control variables including R&D and 
advertising ratios, leverage, size and industry dummies and the split in the board 
ownership measure between managers and outside directors. However, the result is 
not robust when profit rate is used as alternative performance measure. 
With regards to the finding of the "alignment-entrenchment-alignmenf' pattern of 
relationship, the two alignment ranges indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership in the range from 0% to 5% and beyond 
the 250/0 ownership levels respectively, though the magnitude of the response of 
performance to given changes in managerial ownership is substantially less beyond the 
25% level. The two alignment ranges suggest that when managerial ownership 
increases, firm performance also improves. That is, "convergence of interest" is 
dominant within the 00/0 to 5% managerial ownership range and above the 25% level. 
However, within the 5% to 250/0 range of ownership, firm performance deteriorates 
when managerial ownership increases. This negative relationship between the two 
variables denotes the "entrenchment" effect. 
Thus, Morck et al. (1988) empirically verify that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance is a ··combined effect" of "alignment" and 
"entrenchment" of interests. When managerial ownership increases from 0% to 5%, 
th :re is alignment of interests. Also, as suggested by Hart (1983) and Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), low levels of managerial shareholdings may be associated with low 
job security, thereby motivating management to strive for value maximization . 
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However, when managerial ownership further increases, firm performance deteriorates 
and this takes place between the levels of 5% and 25% of managerial O\vnership. This 
finding shows that at higher levels of managerial ownership, managers find that they 
have sufficient control to follow their own objectives without fear of discipline from 
other ownership interests. External shareholders find it difficult to control the actions 
of the managers. The managers find that they can benefit more by consuming 
perquisites, resulting in a reduction of firm value within this range of ownership. This 
finding supports the "entrenchment" argument, that is, when shareholdings are 
sufficiently high to entrench its positions, management may start to behave against the 
interests of the shareholders (Fama and Ruback, 1983; Fama and Jensen 1983). This 
results in a reduction of the value of the firms which is positioned in the 
"entrenchment range" of the non-linear relationship in Morek et aI. (1988). 
When managerial ownership further increases beyond 25%, firm performance 
improves again (Morek et aI., 1988). This can be explained by the "convergence of 
interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Managerial ownership can help 
to control agency problems since share ownership provides managers with incentives 
to reduce private perquisite consumption. When managerial ownership in a firm 
increases, the firm's performance increases uniformly, as managers are less inclined to 
divert resources away from value maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When 
managerial ownership is above 25%, the "entrenchment" effect is 0\' ~rridden by the 
'"alignment" effect resulting in a net improvement in firm performance (Morek et aI, 
1988. ) 
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(b) The Findings o(McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
Following Morek et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) also examme the 
relationship between Tobin's Q and insider and blockholder ownership in two 
different cross-sectional samples, one for 1976 and the other one for 1986, using 
slightly more than 1,000 Compustat firms. Tobin's Q is regressed on different 
variations and combinations of measures of insider and blockholder in the ownership 
structure of the firms. For blockholder ownership, they find a positive but 
insignificant relationship. For insider ownership, they find a curvilinear relationship 
between the two variables. This result is obtained by regressing Tobin's Q against 
"managerial ownership" and "managerial ownership squared". 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) find that the coefficient on managerial ownership is 
statistically significant and positive. The coefficient on managerial ownership squared 
is found to be statistically significant and negative. This curvilinear relationship 
between firm performance and managerial ownership shows that the value of the firm 
firstly increases and then decreases, as ownership becomes more concentrated in the 
hands of managers. The point of inflection is around 40% to 50% of managerial 
ownership. That is, alignment (positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance) exists between the 00/0 and approximately 40-50% ownership 
range, beyond which entrenchment (negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance) starts to take place. The results of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) are robust when some control variables used in Morek et al. (1988) are 
included in the regression and also when the accounting rate is used as an alternative 
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performance measure. After McConnell and Servaes adjust their sample to make it 
more comparable to the sample used by Morck et al. (1988), they attempt to replicate 
Morck et al. ' s piecewise linear regression, but they cannot. 
(c) Comparison of the findings of Morek et af. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) 
Although McConnell and Servaes (1990) also find a combination of the alignment and 
entrenchment effects in their study, the pattern of the relationship is different from that 
of Morck et al. (1988). In Morck et al. (1988), the pattern is "alignment-
entrenchment-alignment" and entrenchment occurs in the 5% to 25% ownership range. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), however, find that the pattern is curvilinear in the 
form of "alignment-entrenchment", with the point of inflection at about the 40-50% 
level of managerial ownership. 
Kole (1995) suggests that the different findings of the above two studies are 
attributable to differences in the sizes of the firms analyzed. Morck et al. (1988) 
analyze only large firms (371 firms from the Fortune 500). McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) analyse a larger sample of firms: 1173 firms in 1976 and 1093 firms in 1986, 
and this work is further extended by adding 1943 firms for 1988. Kole (1995) argues 
that "on average, the positive relationship between Tobin's Q and managerial 
ownership is sustained at higher levels of ownership for small firms than it is for larger 
firms" (pg.426). 
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(d) The findings o(SllOrt and Keasev (1999) 
Short and Keasey (1999) perform a test on the relationship between firm performance 
and managerial ownership on 225 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for the 
period from 1988 to 1992. They test for a cubic form of the relationship between firm 
performance and managerial ownership. The model is a general extension of the 
Morck et al. (1988) piecewise model, but Short and Keasey (1999) allow the 
coefficients on the managerial ownership variables to determine their own turning 
points. Their results support the general findings of the US study of Morck et al. 
(1988) of a non-linear cubic relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership. The pattern of the relationship is also the same as that found in the study 
of Morck et al. (1988), that is, it takes the form of "alignment--entrenchment-
alignment" . 
When Short and Keasey (1999) use the return on shareholders' equity (RSE) as the 
firm performance measure, they find that entrenchment occurs within the ownership 
range of 15.58% to 4l.840/0. When they use the valuation ratio (VAL) as the 
performance indicator (VAL = market value of firm at its accounting year end divided 
by the book value of equity at the accounting year end), entrenchment occurs within 
the range of 12.99% to 4l.990/0 of ownership (Short and Keasey. 1999). The similarity 
of the turning points under the two performance measures employed in Short and 
Keasey's (1999) study indicates the robustness of the general relationship for UK 
corporations. 
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(e) Comparison of the findings of Morek et al. (1988) and Short and Keasev 
(1999) 
Although Short and Keasey (1999) also find a non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance and the pattern ("alignment-
entrenchment-alignment") is the same as that found in Morck et al. (1988), there are a 
number of differences between the findings of Short and Keasey (1999) and Morck et 
al. (1988), which are as follows: 
1. A comparison of the entrenchment range found in the Short and Keasey (1999) 
study (approximately 13-16% to 42%) with that found in the Morck et al. 
(1988) study (5% to 250/0) suggests that UK managers become entrenched at 
higher levels of equity ownership than US managers. 
2. Another difference between the findings of Short and Keasey (1999) and 
Morck et al. (1988) is that a cubic relationship between finn perfonnance and 
managerial ownership exists for both the accounting measure (RSE) and the 
market measure (VAL) of perfonnance in Short and Keasey's (1999) study. 
The results for the three ranges (alignment-entrenchment-alignment) are all 
statistically significant. However, in the study of Morck et al. (1988), 
significant results only occur when Tobin's Q (that is, the market measure) is 
used as the dependent variable. When Morck et al. use the accounting measure 
of performance (profit rate) a statistically significant relationship only exists 
for the positive slope in the O~/O to 50/0 ownership range, while the coefficient 
on the variable denoting ownership of 25% or more is negative and 
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insignificant. This suggests that accounting perfonnance does not increase as 
managerial ownership rises above the 25% ownership level in US corporations. 
Thus, although both the studies of Short and Keasey (1999) and Morck et al. (1988) 
indicate that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm perfonnance is 
non-linear with a pattern of "alignment-entrenchment-alignment". there are some 
differences in the details of the findings. 
As noted from the above two US studies of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and the UK study of Short and Keasey (1999), despite the fact that the 
precise form of the relationship between finn performance and managerial ownership 
is still open to debate, the results indicate that the relationship involves a combination 
of the alignment and entrenchment effects, resulting in a non-linear relationship. The 
movement is, in general, from alignment to entrenchment and then, possibly, to 
alignment again as managerial ownership increases. 
(0 Otlter Empirical Evidence 
Apart from the literature discussed above, there are other studies of the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance, which give results supporting 
the "combined effect" argument (a combination of the convergence and entrenchment 
of interests) of Morck et al. (1988). 
For example, Chen, Hexter and Hu (1993), usmg data from the Fortune 500 
companies, find that there is a curvilinear relationship ("alignment-entrenchment") 
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between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership for the year 1976. Tobin's Q increases 
in the managerial ownership range of 0% to 7% and thereafter it falls in the 7% to 
100% range of managerial ownership. However, they find that when data for the two 
years of 1980 and 1984 are used, the relationship takes a non-linear, cubic form with a 
pattern 0 f "al ignment -entrenchment -ali gnment". Tobin's Q increases in the 
managerial ownership range of 0% to 7%, and thereafter it falls, in accordance with 
the results from the 1976 data. However, when the ownership percentage reaches 
120/0, Tobin's Q increases all the way up to the 100% level of managerial ownership. 
There are also other studies which support the "combined effect" argument. Examples 
include Hermalin and Weisback (1991), Hubbard and Palia (1995), Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999) and Davies et al. (2002). I The studies that take the endogeneity issue into 
consideration are further discussed in section 4.6 of this chapter. 
While a number of studies support the "combined effect" argument of Morek et al. 
(1988) with various patterns of the non-linear relationships, some studies only support 
either the "convergence of interest" hypothesis or the "entrenchment" hypothesis. Still 
some others find that there is no systematic relationship between ownership and 
performance at all. For example, the study of Mehran (1995) based on 195 US 
industrial companies finds that both the performance measures of Tobin's Q and return 
I Using data for 752 firms listed on London Stock Exchange during 1995, Davies et al (2002) find 
support for a quintic specification of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. 
suggesting that the correct form of the relationship is a double humped curve. This is in contrast to 
studies, including the present study, that assume a cubic specification and by construction only one 
hump. 
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on assets Increase significantly with managerial (CEO) ownership. This finding 
supports the "convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Holderness et al. (1999), as in Morck et al. (1988) find a significant positive 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership within the 0%-5% 
level of managerial shareholdings but, they do not find any statistically significant 
relationship beyond the 5% managerial shareholdings. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) perform a linear regression of an accounting measure of the 
profit rate on ownership concentration and find no evidence of a relationship between 
the two variables. Denis and Denis (1994) find that there is no difference in 
performance between majority controlled US firms (represented by managerial 
ownership exceeding 50%) and other US firms. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) also 
find no significant difference in performance between majority held and diffusely held 
US firms. Murali and Welch (1989) obtain similar findings in that there is no 
significant difference in performance between closely held and widely held US firms. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also find no systematic relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. 
As noted from the above literature review, it can be observed that so far most of the 
empirical research have been conducted in a non-Asian context (e.g. Forker. 1992: 
Malone et aL 1993; Morck et aL 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Limited 
research has been performed on Asian markets. According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, pg.740): ",\lost of the available empirical e\'idence [on corporate 
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gm'ernance }. .. comes fi"om the United States ... Unfortunately... there has been 
extremely little research done on corporate governance around the It'orld. .. '' 
However, the ownership structure in the US is quite different from that in many other 
countries where the structure takes more of a concentrated form (La Porta et aI., 1999). 
For example, the ownership structure in most East-Asian countries is characterized by 
family-ownership and controlled, which is in contrast to the more diffuse form of 
ownership in the UK and the US (Claessens et aI., 2000). 
Shlerifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et ai. (1999) focus on the central agency 
problem associated with high ownership concentration. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest 
that controlling shareholders' interest is very unlikely to be the same as that of the 
minority shareholders. The central agency problem in corporations with high 
ownership concentration stems from the tendency of the controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the minority shareholders. 
Given that the ownership structures in the UK and the US are very different from that 
in many other countries, in particular the concentrated form of ownership in most 
East-Asian countries, it is doubtful whether the same sort of relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance exists under a concentrated O\vnership 
environment. In addition, even if there is a relationship, the pattern of the relationship 
may not be the same as that found in the UK and US studies given tht differences in 
cultural backgrounds and ownership structures. Fan and Wong (2002) suggest that the 
results of prior research focusing on UK and US corporations are not applicable to 
East-Asian corporations due to the differences in ownership concentration. So far. 
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limited studies have been performed in the East-Asian context. In addition. no 
empirical study has examined the relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate performance using data on family-controlled companies. The present study 
fills this gap in the literature and aims to ascertain the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, and the pattern of the relationship, using Hong Kong 
listed companies as evidence. 
Since ownership structure and cultural background may have impacts on the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, the following two 
sections describe the corporate ownership structure in the UK, the US and Hong Kong, 
with a review of the relevant literature (section 4.4) and the possible impact of culture 
on firm performance, by making particular reference to the "long-term orientation" 
dimension of Hofstede's study of the "five cultural dimensions" (section 4.5). 
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4.4 Ownership Structure in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Hong Kong 
The corporate ownership pattern in Hong Kong is very different from that in the UK 
and the US. In fact, the pattern in the UK is also quite different from that in the US. 
Kester (1992) reports that 60% of the shares in UK listed companies in 1990-91 were 
held by institutional investors (such as pension funds, insurance companies and other 
investment companies). In the US, these types of investors held around 40% of the 
shares in listed companies, that is, two-thirds the level of that in the UK. In the US, 
the majority of shares were held by individual households (54%) while households in 
the UK held around 21 % (Kester, 1992). 
In Hong Kong, institutional ownership is minimal with the majority of listed shares 
held by family members or related parties. Due to its historical background and 
Chinese culture, companies are generally owned, controlled and managed by family 
shareholders. Family members typically constitute the basis for developing business 
from the inception of a company. Most Hong Kong companies usually start off as 
small private companies, and even when they grow bigger and bigger and become 
public and listed companies, family members still retain their shareholdings and 
control of the company. Family control is achieved not only through owning shares 
personally, but also by the use of investment companies or holding companies to hold 
shares in the company concerned. In many cases, vehicles such as nominee 
shareholders and cross-shareholdings of affiliated companies are used to strengthen 
family control. These features and characteristics make the exact nature of family 
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shareholdings in a listed company difficult to ascertain, though it is well recognised 
that the corporate structure in Hong Kong is predominantly family-owned. 
According to a study by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants (HKSA) on all listed 
companies in Hong Kong in 1996, 530/0 of them had one shareholder or one family 
group owning 50% or more of the entire issued capital. In addition, almost nine out of 
ten (880/0) of all listed companies had one shareholder or one family group of 
shareholders owning 25% or more of the entire issued capital (HKSA, 1997). La Porta 
et al. (1999) also find that firms in Hong Kong are family-controlled and there are 
hardly any widely held finns in Hong Kong. Since most companies are family-owned 
and they are also controlled by the same group of family members, a separation of 
ownership and control does not take place for most of the companies in Hong Kong. 
These differences in ownership structures have implications on corporate governance 
mechanisms. For example, Demsetz (1983) suggests that large blockholder is a 
mechanism to curb management entrenchments; Shivdasani (1993) finds that large 
unaffiliated shareholders and hostile takeovers are complementary mechanisms for 
corporate control. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also argues that blockholders may 
monitor management actions effectively because they represent a credible takeover 
threat if company performance declines. Thus, takeover threat is an effective 
corporate governance mechanism in the UK, where the blockholders in most 
corporations are institutional shareholders and they are not the managers of the 
corporations. However, in Hong Kong where the blockholders are very often the 
family shareholders who are also the management, there is seldom separation of 
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ownership and control. Corporate raiders or interested parties will not be able to 
takeover ill-performed compames through open-market purchase given that the 
companies are controlled by family shareholders. Thus, takeover is not an effective 
mechanism for corporate performance monitoring in a family controlled corporate 
environment (Ko et aI., 1999). La Porta et al. (1999) also suggest that in corporations 
with high ownership concentration, controlling shareholders' interest is very unlikely 
to be the same as that of the minority shareholders. Thus, the tendency of the 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders results in the central 
agency problem associated with high ownership concentration. 
Despite the family-controlled business has a number of drawbacks as described above, 
it also has its advantages such as strong leadership and a cohesive management team. 
It may be conjectured that the rapid development of the Hong Kong economy, from a 
fishing village in the early twentieth century to a prosperous industrial economy in the 
1960s and 1970s and thereafter to a major international financial centre is related to 
the "convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) due to the 
convergence of interests of the family controllers who are also the majority 
shareholders. However, as mentioned above there is a risk that the family controllers, 
who are also the majority shareholders, will expropriate the minority shareholders so 
as to maximise their own interest according to the central agency problem, as argued 
by La Porta et al. (1999). As a consequence, the exact nature of the relationship 
between ownership and performance in a family owned corporate environment is 
uncertain unless and until it is found out empirically . 
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However, there has been limited research performed in concentrated ownership 
environments. So far most empirical studies are based on UK and US evidence where 
the ownership structure takes a more diffuse form when compared \vith the 
concentrated form of ownership in most East-Asian countries. One of the few 
empirical studies using a concentrated ownership structure as evidence is that of Mak 
and Li (2001). Their study is based on evidence from Singapore, which has, according 
to the authors, more concentrated stock ownership and a weaker market for corporate 
control than the US. Mak and Li (2001) find that corporate ownership and board 
structure are related in Singapore, but none of their ownership and board structure 
variables are significantly associated with firm value. However, it does not follow that 
the results based on Mak and Li' s Singapore evidence are representative of all other 
countries with concentrated ownership. In addition to family members, the 
government is another important blockholder in Singapore corporations. The 
corporate ownership structure In Singapore can best be described as a mixture of 
family-based and government-based ownership, rather than just family-based 
ownership (Mak and Li, 2001). This can be contrasted with the ownership structures 
in Japan and Germany, which are bank-based, and the ownership structure in Hong 
Kong, which is family-based. 
Claessens et al. (2000) find that there is extensive family control in more than half of 
the East-Asian corporations. In addition, the separation of management from 
ownership control is rare. The top management of about 60% of firms that are not 
widely held is related to the family of the controlling shareholder (Claessens et al.. 
2000). Hong Kong is giyen as an example of a place which has a family-controlled 
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ownership structure. The findings of Claessens et al. (2000) have important 
implications for the ability and incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate 
from minority shareholders, which is also suggested by La Porta et al. (1999). Despite 
the fact that the family ownership is a predominant form of ownership in most East-
Asian countries, no empirical study has yet been performed to determine the impact of 
a family-based ownership structure on firm performance, hence the focus of the 
present study is on this topic. 
The way in which family control may affect corporate performance can be viewed 
from two perspectives: convergence and entrenchment of interests. The exact pattern 
of the relationship between ownership and performance depends on the interactions 
between the two perspectives: whether one perspective dominates the other (that is, 
whether "convergence" will override "entrenchment" or vice versa). Also, the 
interactions might not be the same under different ownership ranges (that is, there 
might be a non-linear relationship). Given the fact that managers who are also family 
shareholders tend to align their interest more to the companies than those managers 
who are unconnected with the companies concerned, ownership structure might affect 
the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Studying the 
relationship is important because the family-owned corporate structure is not unique to 
Hong Kong. A number of other countries, especially those in the East-Asian region, 
also have a family-owned corporate environment (La Pnrta et aI., 1999). Hence, 
studying the relationship is not only important for the Hong Kong context, but also can 
contribute to the structural development of corporate governance systems in other 
family-o\\ned corporate regimes. 
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4.5 Culture and Hofstede's "Five Cultural Dimensions" 
ra) Definitions o(culture and problems in applving Hofstede's findings 
Apart from ownership structure, the historical and cultural backgrounds of 
corporations may also have impacts on the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. This section discusses the possible impacts of culture on firm 
performance, with particular reference to Hofstede's study. 
There are many definitions of culture, but almost all of them refer to culture as a set of 
shared values, beliefs and practices. For example, Kuper defines culture as "a matter 
of ideas and values, a collective cast of mind" (Kuper, 1999). Another well-known 
'anthropological consensus' definition of culture is that "culture consists in patterned 
ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, 
constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artifacts,' the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i. e. 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values" 
(Kluckhohn, 1951, pg. 86). The milestone research in culture is contributed by 
Hofstede. According to Hofstede, culture is the aggregate of values, beliefs, and 
customs that define common characteristics of a human group much like personality 
explains an individual's identity (Hofstede, 1980). He also defines culture as "the 
collective programming of the mind ·which distinguishes the members of one group 
fro n another" (Hofstede, 1991). Collective programming takes place at the national 
and at the organizational level. While national cultures distinguish members of one 
nation from another, organization cultures distinguish the employees of one 
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organization from another. There is a clear distinction between national cultures and 
organization cultures. National cultures refer to the profound beliefs, yalues and 
practices that are shared by the vast majority of people of a certain nation. They are 
reflected in the ways people behave at school, in the family, on the job, etc. and they 
are reinforced by national laws and governmental policies. Organization or corporate 
culture refers to the values, beliefs and practices that are shared by most members of 
an organization. These values, beliefs and practices may stem from regional or 
occupational groups or from common organizational experiences and, consequently, 
may not be applicable outside that organization. Therefore, cultures as found within 
organizations will differ to some extent within one nation, but they are supposed to 
differ even more from nation to nation (Van Oudenhoven, 2001). 
Baskerville (2003) identifies the problems of using Hofstede's cultural indices in 
accounting research. The problems include the assumption of equating nation with 
culture and the difficulties of, and limitations on, a quantification of culture 
represented by cultural dimensions and matrices. Baskerville (2003) suggests that a 
problem in the assumption of Hofstede is that he equates nation states with culture. 
Cultures do not equate with nations; for example, from the Encyclopedia of World 
Cultures (O'Leary and Levinson, 1991), it can be identified that in the Middle East 
there are 35 different cultures in 14 nations. There are 98 different cultures identified 
in 48 countries in Africa and 81 cultures in 32 countries of Western Europe. In North 
America, there are 147 American native cultures and 9 American folk cultures 
(Baskerville, 2003). For any study of cross-cultural comparisons, one has to address 
two important problems, which are about classification and definitions: and the 
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problem of sampling and the units of comparison (Goodenough, 1964). Despite the 
fact that there have been critiques periodically of Hofstede's work, the attractiveness 
of using his indices in research is compelling. Some recent accounting studies 
involving cross-cultural comparisons have incorporated some or all of Hofstede's 
dimensions, for example, Yamamura et al. (1996), Tsui (1996), Chow et al. (1999) and 
Goodwin and Goodwin (1999). 
Arguments against usmg Hofstede's indices of cultural dimensions in accounting 
research mainly stem from the assumption of Hofstede that nations are equated with 
culture. However, as noted from the argument of Van Oudenhoven (2001) discussed 
above, it is inevitable that cultures as found within organizations will differ to some 
extent within one nation, but they are supposed to differ even more from nation to 
nation. Hence, though it might not be totally correct to assume that nations are equal 
to culture, it is reasonable to use Hofstede's study of cultural dimensions to identify 
the cultural characteristics of a nation and to compare it with the other nations. In 
particular, since the empirical study in this thesis is about the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong, which does not involve a 
cross-country or cross-cultural empirical analysis, the problems as suggested by 
Baskerville (2003) on the quantification of culture represented by cultural dimensions 
and matrices are not concerns in the current study. What is relevant in the current 
study is to identify the cultural characteristics in Hong Kong, by making references to 
Hofstede's milestone study in culture's consequences, in order to assist in identifying 
the possible impact of culture on the relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance in a family-controlled, concentrated ownership environment like 
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Hong Kong. In fact, Hofstede (2001) also recognizes the increasing popularity of 
studying "organizational" or "corporate" culture in the management literature (e.g. 
Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Peters and Waterman, 1982, etc.). Hofstede (2001) also 
points out that "if national cultures describe the collective mental programming of 
other1-vise similar persons from different nations, organizational cultures should 
describe the collective mental programming of otherwise similar persons from 
different organizations. 'Otherwise similar' also means from within the same 
nation (s). " Hofstede's study is reviewed in the following section. 
(b) Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions 
Back in 1967, employees in International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) were 
asked to complete an attitude survey in order to provide a management tool for 
organization development. The survey was repeated until 1973, which resulted in 
more than 116,000 responses from 88,000 employees in 72 countries. Hofstede was 
the head of the international team conducting the survey. Out of the 72 countries, 40 
countries were initially used for further analysis for reasons of stability of data. In a 
later stage, data from 10 more countries and three multicountry regions were added to 
the analysis (i.e. 53 nations in total). From the analysis and theoretical reasoning, 
Hofstede postulated four cultural dimensions on which the nations differ from one 
another. Each of the 53 nations was given a score based on the four dimensions, 
which were factored from attributes such as achievement, creativity, autonomy, and 
self-determination, among others, to provide a relative measure of group 
characteristics that, taken together, represent value orientations. The publication 
"Culture's Consequences" \vas published in 1980. Since Hofstede has otTered an 
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empirically based classification of cultures and his coverage of nations is impressive. 
his study has made a major contribution to contemporary cross-cultural psychology. 
The four cultural dimensions in Hofstede's 1980 study are as follows: 
1. Power distance 
The term power distance is taken from the work of Mulder. Mulder (1977, pg. 
90) defines power as "the potential to determine or direct the behaviour of 
another person or other persons more so than the other way round, " and 
power distance as "the degree of inequality in power between a less powerful 
Individual (I) and a more powerful Other (0), in which I and 0 belong to the 
same social system." Power distance can thus be used as a measure of the 
interpersonal power or influence between a boss and a subordinate as perceived 
by the less powerful of the two, that is, the subordinate. This dimension 
resembles Fiske's (1992) Authority Ranking which refers to cultural patterns 
which vary according to the degree of rank and hierarchy. It also corresponds 
to Schwartz's (1994) Hierarchy value. 
2. Uncertainty avoidance 
Uncertainty about the future IS a basic fact of human life. In a country, 
employment stability and rule orientation are two ways of avoiding 
uncertainty. In an organization this can be coped with by the use of technology 
or rules (Hofstede, 2001). It relates to the strictness of rules used to deal \\"ith 
uncertain and ambiguous situations. This concept is the opposite of Schwartz' s 
Intellectual Autonomy (Sch\vartz, 1994) . 
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3. Individualism-Collectivism 
It relates to the degree to which people have freedom to adopt their own 
approach to their job. Triandis (1994) defines individualism as follows: 
"People in individualistic cultures often give priority to their personal goals, 
even when they conflict with the goals of important in-groups, sllch as the work 
group ...... conversely, people in collectivist cultures give priority to in-group 
goals" (Triandis, 1994). Employed individuals in an individualist culture are 
expected to act rationally according to their own interests, and work should be 
organized in such a way that this self-interest and the employer's interest 
coincide. In a collectivist culture, an employer never hires just an individual, 
but a person who belongs to an in-group and the employee will act according 
to the interests of this in-group (Hofstede, 2001). 
4. Masculinity-Femininity 
This dimension relates to the extent to which highly assertive values 
predominate, such as acquiring money and goods at the expense of the others, 
versus showing sensitivity and concern for the welfare of others. Masculine 
culture countries strive for a tough, performance society while feminine 
countries strive for a tender, welfare society (Hofstede, 2001). This dimension 
corresponds a great deal with Schwartz's Mastery versus Harmony value 
(Schwartz, 1994). 
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Although Hofstede's work encompassed 116,000 respondents in 72 countries, the 
measurements were distinctly "Western". A further work carried out around 1985 by 
Hofstede and Bond included a fifth dimension. This fifth dimension was found from 
the answers of a "Chinese Value Survey" (CVS), which was carried out in 23 
countries and developed by Michael Harris Bond in Hong Kong from values suggested 
by Chinese scholars. This dimension was not found in the IBM survey because the 
IBM questionnaire was designed by Westerners. This "Eastern" dimension, 
comprised of eight individual values, was initially named by the authors as "Confucian 
dynamism", and was later termed as "long-term orientation". It was initially termed 
"Confucian dynamism" because it is based on items reminiscent of the teachings of 
Confucius, on both of its poles. It opposes long-term to short-term aspects of 
Confucian thinking: persistence and thrift to personal stability and respect for 
tradition. A culture which is deemed to demonstrate a high degree of Confucian 
dynamism will rank four particular values as being of high importance, and 
concurrently rank four values as being relatively unimportant. Those values considered 
relatively important are: (1) persistence or perseverance, (2) ordering relationships by 
status and observing this order, (3) thrift, and (4) having a sense of shame. Those 
considered relatively unimportant are: (1) personal steadiness or stability, (2) 
protecting one's "face", (3) respect for tradition, and (4) reciprocation of greetings, 
favours, or gifts. Hofstede and Bond explain these values specifically in terms of East-
Asian entrepreneurship and the unusual success of private enterprise development in 
non-communist Asian economies. While Confucian dynamism is not proprietary to 
China or to other Asian cultures, and Hofstede and Bond also find parallel yalues 
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among a number of South American. African, and subcontinental Asian populations. 
the composite concepts are conspicuously missing in Western values systems. 
(c) Hong Kong's "position" in the (our cultural dimensions study ofHo(stede 
Table 4.1 below shows a summary of the index scores and ranks of the UK, the US 
and Hong Kong in the IBM survey conducted by Hofstede, before adding the fifth 
dimension of "long-term orientation": 
Table 4.1 Index Score and Rank of the UK, the US and Hong Kong 
in Hofstede's IBM Survey 
Power Uncertainty Indi vidualism! Masculinity! 
Distance Avoidance Collectivism Femininity 
Country Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank Index Rank 
The UK 35 42-44 35 47-48 89 3 66 9-10 
The US 40 38 46 -13 91 1 62 15 
Hong Kong 68 15-16 29 49-50 25 37 57 18-19 
Source: Hofstede (2001 pg. 500) 
As shown in Table 4.1, Hong Kong has a relatively high index score in power distance 
when compared with the UK and the US. This implies that in Hong Kong 
organizations have more centralized decision structures and more concentration of 
authority. The ideal boss is an enlightened autocrat and managers rely more on formal 
rules. Subordinates are expected to be told rather than to be consulted. The leadership 
style is authoritative rather than consultative (Hofstede, 2001). 
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Regarding uncertainty avoidance, the index score of Hong Kong is a little bit lower 
than that in the UK and the US, but they are comparable in terms of the rank. That is, 
there is not much difference in this dimension among the three countries. All three are 
relatively weak in terms of uncertainty avoidance. 
However, there is a great difference between the scores of Hong Kong and those of the 
UK and the US in terms of individualism and collectivism. The UK and the US rank 
high in the individualism dimension by having very high index scores, in contrast to 
the low index score of Hong Kong. Hong Kong exhibits more characteristics in the 
'collectivism' dimension while the UK and the US are 'individualistic'. Thus, in work 
organizations employees in the UK and the US are supposed to act as economic men. 
The hiring and promotion decisions are based on skills and rules only. Employees 
perform best as individuals and there is more belief in individual decisions. On the 
contrary, employees in Hong Kong act in the interest of their 'in-groups'. The hiring 
and promotion decisions take the employees' in-group into account. Family 
relationships are seen as an advantage in hiring. Employees perform best in 'in-
groups' and there is more belief in collective decisions. 
Lastly regarding masculinity and femininity, the index score of Hong Kong is 
conparable to that in the UK and the US, though it is a little bit lower. That is, there is 
not much difference in this dimension among the three places. All the three places are 
relatively more masculine than feminine. 
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In summary. Hong Kong is "positioned" as having a large power distance and weak 
uncertainty avoidance, and it is also more collectivistic and masculine. \Vhile it is 
similar to the UK and the US in the two dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and 
masculinity, it is quite different from the UK and the US in possessing small power 
distance and individualistic characteristics. These findings are reflected in the 
ownership structure and management style in Hong Kong: the large power distance is 
characterized by centralized decision structures and concentration of authority is a 
result of the majority family owners centralizing their power and controlling their 
companies. At the same time, because the companies are owned and controlled by 
majority family shareholdet:s, in Hong Kong the ethos is collectivist rather than 
individualist. As argued by Hofstede, in a collectivist country, family relationships are 
seen as an advantage in hiring. Employees act in the interest of their 'in-groups' and 
the hiring and promotion decisions take the employees' 'in-group' into account. 
Employees perform best in 'in-groups' and there is more belief in collective decisions. 
However, at the same time, since Hong Kong was under the sovereignty of the UK, it 
had an established set of rules and regulations and was a fairly stable city, and so it is 
therefore weak in the aspect of uncertainty avoidance. In addition, given that Hong 
Kong is a capitalist city, it was influenced by the Western culture to be more 
masculine than feminine. 
(d) Hong Kong's "position" in the tifth cultural dimension stud') of Hofstede 
and Bond 
Table 4.2 belmv shows the long-term orientation (L TO) index values of the 23 
countries under the Chinese Value Survey of Hofstede and Bond. 
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Table 4.2 Long-term Orientation Index Values for 23 Countries 
Score Rank Country or Region Long-tenn Orientation 
Index 
1 China 118 
2 Hong Kong 96 
3 Taiwan 87 
4 Japan 80 
5 South Korea 75 
6 Brazil 65 
7 India 61 
8 Thailand 56 
9 Singapore 48 
10 Netherlands 44 
11 Bangladesh 40 
12 Sweden 33 
13 Poland 32 
14 Germany (F.R.) 31 
15 Australia 31 
16 New Zealand 30 
17 United States 29 
18 Great Britain 25 
19 Zimbabwe 25 
20 Canada 23 
21 Philippines 19 
22 Nigeria 16 
23 Pakistan 00 
Source: Hofstede (200] pg. 356) 
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As shown in Table 4.2. the top five positions are occupied by East-Asian countries, 
namely, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Hong Kong has a high 
index of "long-term orientation" (96) which ranks second after China (118).2 It can 
be seen that, apart from China, the other four places have demonstrated fast 
development in the last few decades of the twentieth century, though China has been 
catching up rapidly in recent years. Among the four places, Japan is well-known as a 
developed nation. The other three places are actually three of the "Four Little 
Dragons" in East Asia. Singapore, being one of the "Four Little Dragons", also ranks 
fairly high in the index scores. Its position is the ninth among the 23 countries in 
Bond's study. 
The economic miracle of Japan and the Four Little Dragons has taken economists by 
surprise. The existence of a relationship between Confucius's teachings and economic 
growth in the latter part of the twentieth century has been suggested before, but it has 
never been proven. One of the defendants was the American futurologist Herman 
Khan who formulated a "neo-Confucian hypothesis" in 1979. It was suggested by 
Khan that the economic success of the countries in East Asia could be attributed to 
their common cultural roots going back far into history, and that this cultural 
inheritance under the world market conditions of the post-World War II period became 
a competitive advantage for successful business activity. 
2 Bond initially published factors scores for 22 countries which varied from -1.00 for Pakistan to 0.91 
for Hong Kong in 1987. These factor scores were brought into a 0-100 range by a linear transformation. 
The data for China came in after the scale had been fixed. As a result, the index for China was put 
outside the range, at 118. The figures represent the relative positions of the countries which are not 
absolutes (Hofsetde, 2001, pg.355). 
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The data collected in the Chinese Value Survey (CVS) lend support to Khan's views. 
The L TO scores of the CVS are strongly correlated with national economic growth in 
the period of 1965-1985 preceding the CVS study, and even more in the period of 
1985-1995 following it. L TO is identified as a major explanation of the explosive 
growth of the East-Asian economies in the latter part of the twentieth century. The 
East-Asian instrument of the CVS provides strong evidence for the role of culture in 
the development of the East-Asian countries and lends support to the "neo-Confucian 
hypothesis", so far considered speculative (Hofstede, 2001. pp.371 and 378). 
However, it should be noted that culture in the form of certain dominant values is a 
necessary but not a self-sufficient condition for economic growth. The two other 
conditions necessary are the existence of a market and the existence of a political 
context that allows development. The need for a market explains why the growth of 
the East-Asian economies started only after 1955, as this was the first time in history 
that the conditions for a truly global market were fulfilled. The need for a supportive 
political context was met in Japan and the Four Little Dragons, though in different 
ways, with the role of the Government varying from active support to laissez-faire. 
Economic growth of China, however, was hampered by the violence of the 1966-76 
Cultural Revolution. This period is a traumatic memory for almost all Chinese, and 
was, among other things, an attempt by the then ruler in China, Mao Zedong, to escape 
the Confucian tradition. Mao preached the positive value of contradiction and 
conflict, as opposed to the Confucian value of harmony. Eventually. the thinking of 
Confucius 'won' again. In spite of the hampering effect brought about by the Cultural 
~ - 46 
Chapter Four - Literature RevieH' 
Revolution, China's average economIC growth rate for 1965-85 (4,8%) was 
comparable to that in Japan (4.70/0) (World Bank, 1987). Of course, it should be noted 
that China started at a very low national income level. It is obviously more difficult to 
turn around a nation of more than a billion people than one of 3 million, like 
Singapore. Politics has also played a major role in economic development and will 
continue to do so (Hofstede, 2001, pg.368). 
From the findings of Hofstede's study of five cultural dimensions, it may be concluded 
that Hong Kong's position is fairly unique. Its Chinese culture and customs enable it 
to score very high in the L TO index. These L TO scores are found to be strongly 
correlated with national economic growth. The fact that Hong Kong has operated 
under a laissez-faire political policy has been an important ingredient in generating 
fast economic growth, given its high L TO index . 
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4.6 The Endogeneity Issue 
Before describing the conduct of the empirical study, it is necessary to consider the 
endogeneity issue. The studies performed by Morek et al. (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999) do not consider the endogeneity issue. 
Demsetz (1983) argues that ownership structure is endogenously determined. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide evidence of the endogeneity of a firm's ownership 
structure, argued for by Demsetz (1983). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) treat O\vnership 
structure as an endogenous variable and run a linear regression of an accounting 
measure of the profit rate with ownership concentration. They find no evidence of a 
relationship between the profit rate and ownership concentration. Kole (1996) also 
provides evidence of a reversal of causality in the ownership-corporate value 
relationship. She suggests that corporate value could be a determinant of the 
ownership structure rather than being determined by it. 
Cho (1998) replicates the study of Morek et al. (1988) by running OLS regressions 
based on a cross-section of Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991. He reports a 
similar non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance as that found by Morek et al. (1988). The OLS regression results show 
that ownership structure affects corporate value with a pattern of "alignment-
entrenchment-alignment". However. when Cho (1998) treats the ownership structure 
as endogenously determined, he finds that it is actually corporate value that affects 
ownership structure but not vice versa. The findings of Cho (1998) call into question 
the results of those studies that treat ownership structure as exogenous . 
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The results of other studies of the relationship between ownership and perfonnance 
which take into consideration the endogeneity issue are mixed. For example. 
Holderness et al. (1999) confirm the endogeneity of managerial shareholdings in their 
study. Lorderer and Martin (1997) find that insider ownership fails to predict 
performance (Tobin's Q), but that Tobin's Q IS a negative predictor of insider 
ownership. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find a significant non-monotonic 
relationship between managerial ownership and perfonnance (alignment-
entrenchment-alignment). Himmelberg et al. (1999) find no meaningful correlations 
between managerial ownership and performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also 
find that there are no systematic relationships between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
Most compames 111 Hong Kong are founded by families who are also major 
shareholders and are involved in the management of their companies. As a result, the 
nature of share ownership is not influenced by firm performance to the same extent as 
it would be in the US or the UK, where family ownership is less prevalent. There is 
thus reason to believe that the ownership structure of Hong Kong companies is 
exogenously rather than endogenously determined. That is, managerial ownership is 
more likely to have an impact on corporate perfonnance than vice versa. The 
endogeneity issue is thus likely to be less relevant in the Hong Kong context. 
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4.7 Summary 
In the qualitative analyses in Chapters Two and Three it is noted that Hong Kong has 
not adopted all of the UK's corporate governance practices. In addition, there are a 
number of particular weaknesses in Hong Kong's corporate governance regime, for 
example, the lack of remuneration committees, inadequate disclosure and a question 
mark over the 'independence' of independent non-executive directors. These 
weaknesses mainly stem from the Chinese culture, reflected in the family-owned 
corporate structure in Hong Kong, which differs from the more diffuse form of 
ownership in the UK and the US. 
To better investigate what corporate governance initiatives and changes should be 
implemented in Hong Kong, it is necessary to study the effects of various corporate 
governance variables on firm performance and the impact that culture is likely to play 
in affecting firm performance. Before carrying out the empirical study to ascertain the 
effect of the concentrated family-owned corporate structure on firm performance in 
Hong Kong, this chapter has reviewed the academic literature on various aspects of 
corporate governance. The detailed review of the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance shows that the relationship can take different forms 
when different data are used in different years in different countries. For example, 
some studies find a linear relationship (e.g. Mehran, 1995) while some find a 
cun ilinear relationship (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1990) and others find a cubic 
relationship (e.g. Morck et aL 1988 and Short and Keasey, 1999). The various forms 
of the relationship found in the above studies all support the "convergence of interest" 
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hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and/or the "entrenchment of interest'" 
argument of Fama and Jensen (1983). 
However, the existing studies have mostly been carried out in the UK or the US 
contexts. There has been limited research performed using data from East-Asian 
corporations. The ownership structure in most East-Asian countries is characterized 
by family-owned and controlled firms, in contrast to the more diffuse form of 
ownership structure prevalent in the UK and the US (Claessens et aI., 2000), As a 
consequence, the empirical results based on UK and US data may not be applicable to 
the East-Asian context. The empirical study in this thesis fills a gap in the academic 
literature by determining the nature of the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance under the concentrated family-owned corporate structure in 
Hong Kong, 
The review of the academic literature in this chapter concerning the characteristics of 
the ownership structure in Hong Kong suggest that the family ownership structure 
might beneficially affect firm performance as there is a convergence of interests 
between the family shareholders who are also typically in control. However, there is 
also a risk that the family controllers will expropriate the minority shareholders so as 
to maximize their own interest according to the central agency problem associated 
with high ownership concentration, as argued by La Porta et aI. (1999). Hence, the 
form and the pattern of the relationship between ownership and performance in Hong 
Kong corporations will not be known until the empirical study is carried out. 
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Apart from ownership structure, the chapter also reviews and discusses the possible 
impact of culture on firm performance. The leading work on culture by Hofstede is 
reviewed, with particular reference to the "long-term orientation" (L TO) dimension of 
his "Five Cultural Dimensions" study. Given the fact that Hong Kong has a very high 
score on the L TO dimension, its Chinese oriented culture might be beneficial to 
performance, as suggested by Hofstede in his L TO study. His study suggests that the 
fast economic growth of the East-Asian countries in the latter half of the twentieth 
century could be partly explained by the Chinese culture in these countries. L TO 
scores are found to be highly correlated with economic growth. The fact that Hong 
Kong had been a colony of the UK and operated under a laissez-faire political policy is 
also a factor has served to enhance its L TO index and thus its economic growth. 
Thus, despite the fact that a number of other East-Asian countries also have the 
family-owned form of corporate structure, Hong Kong's historical background and its 
Chinese culture made it different in certain aspects from the other East-Asian 
jurisdictions. Hence, the effect of the concentrated form of family-ownership on 
corporate performance in Hong Kong can only be uncovered after performing the 
empirical study, the results of which are reported in the remaining chapters of the 
thesis. 
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5.1 Chapter Objectives 
As noted from the literature review ill Chapter Four, there has been continuous 
research performed on vanous corporate governance variables, though limited 
research has been performed in the East-Asian context. Chapter Four also shows that 
the ownership structure in Hong Kong is very much different from that in the UK and 
the US. In Hong Kong, companies are mainly family-owned and controlled. The 
directors are very often a group of individuals from the same family or are related to 
the substantial shareholders who come from the same family. This different form of 
corporate structure, however, is not unique to Hong Kong. Claessens et al. (2000) 
find that large family shareholders reign over more than half of the East-Asian 
corporations. It is therefore of interest to find out whether this form of corporate 
structure will have a similar or a totally different effect on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance when compared with the studies in the 
UK and the US, where the ownership structure is more diffuse in form. 
The empirical part of this thesis is thus to find out the relationship between 
managerial ownership and corporate performance using Hong Kong evidence. The 
principal aim is to ascertain the impact of managerial ownership on corporate 
performance in a family-owned corporate structure and to uncover any differences 
from the findings in the UK and US contexts. Further analysis will also be performed 
to ascertain whether the East-Asian financial crisis has any impact on the relationship. 
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While the results of the empirical study will be discussed in Chapter Six, this chapter 
presents the empirical framework and the research methodology. To test the 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance in Hong 
Kong, the 0 LS regression method is adopted. The regression is performed on a set of 
panel data which consists of 1406 firm-year observations for the period from 1995 to 
1998 on companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The sample and 
variables used in the study are described in detail in this chapter. 
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5.2 Empirical Framework 
The convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that managerial ownership can help 
to control agency problems since share ownership provides managers with incentives 
to reduce private perquisite consumption. As managerial ownership increases, firm 
performance increases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, this alignment of 
interests is offset and replaced by the entrenchment effect when ownership further 
increases as managers have sufficient control over firms and find it worthwhile to 
consume perquisites, which reduces the value of the firms. This entrenchment 
behaviour stems from the separation of ownership and control in business 
organizations (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
The "convergence" and "entrenchment" of interests arguments are supported by a 
number of subsequent studies. In particular, Morck et al. (1988) is the first paper 
verifying the "combined effect" of the "convergence of interests" hypothesis and the 
"entrenchment" argument. This "combined effect" results in a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance as found in a number of studies, 
for example, Morck et al. (1988), rv1cConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and 
Keasey (1999). Under this "combined effect" argument, the exact pattern of the 
relationship depends on the interactions between the two perspectives: whether one 
perspective dominates the other (that is, whether "convergence" will override 
"entrenchment" or vice versa). Also. the interactions migl t not be the same under 
different ownership ranges (that is, there might be different patterns of the non-linear 
relationship). It can be noted from the studies in the UK (Short and Keasey, 1999) 
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and the US (Morek et aL 1988; McConnell and Servaes. 1990) that the pattern of the 
non-linear relationship runs from alignment to entrenchment and then possibly 
alignment again, though there are differences in terms of the statistical significance of 
the results and the turning points of alignment and entrenchment. It is of interest to 
know whether a similar pattern of relationship will exist in Hong Kong 'vvhere the 
ownership structure is very different from that in the UK and the US. 
The main issues are therefore: is there any relationship between firm performance and 
managerial ownership in Hong Kong? If there is such a relationship, is it a linear one, 
or is it non-linear in nature? If it is non-linear in nature, does it take the form of a 
curvilinear relationship, as in the study of McConnell and Servaes (1990)? Or, is it of 
a cubic form, similar to that reported in the studies of Morek et al. (1988) and Short 
and Keasey (1999)? Even if it is non-linear in nature, is the pattern of the relationship 
the same or different from the findings in the above UK and US studies? An 
empirical study based on a sample of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong is conducted for the present study to answer the above questions. 
As stated above and explained in the literature review sections in Chapter Four, the 
relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance is non-linear 
and cubic in nature 'vvith the pattern of "alignment-entrenchment-alignmenC in Morek 
et a. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999), though the range of entrenchment in the 
latter (approximately 13-16% to 42%) is different from the former (5% to 25%). This 
shows that UK managers become entrenched at higher levels of equity ownership than 
US managers. Short and Keasey (1999) suggest that greater institutional monitoring 
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and a lower ability to mount takeover defences in the UK lead to management 
becoming entrenched at higher levels of ownership \-vhen compared with the situation 
in the US. Nevertheless, the above two studies in general provide strong evidence of 
a positive relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership at high 
levels of ownership, which is consistent with the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model. 
High levels of managerial ownership help to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling. 1976) where there is separation of ownership and 
control. 
In Hong Kong, however, the situation differs from that in the UK and the US. Most 
companies in Hong Kong are family-owned and controlled. Almost nine out of ten 
listed companies in Hong Kong have one family group holding 25% or more of the 
issued capital (HKSA. 1997). Hence. the separation of ownership and control does 
not take place for many companies in Hong Kong. Given the likelihood that 
managers who are also family shareholders have more incentive to align their interests 
with the interests of their company than those managers who are unconnected with the 
company for which they work. we might expect family ownership to affect the 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Because of the 
concentrated family ownership structure in Hong Kong, which contradicts the normal 
assumption that ownership and control are separated, I have reason to hypothesize 
that the nature of the relationship between managerial ownersh p and firm 
performance in Hong Kong will be different from that in the UK and the US. 
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Given that no study of the relationship between managerial ownership and tirm 
performance has been conducted under a concentrated family-ov.:ned corporate 
structure before, the exact pattern of the relationship will not be known unless and 
until it is verified empirically. Hence, I adopt an exploratory approach by 
constructing three hypotheses which might explain the nature of the relationship. 
Nevertheless, no matter which hypothesis is supported in the OLS regression 
analyses, I believe that it is reasonable to expect there to be a wide range of alignment 
between managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong, possibly with 
some entrenchment effects. This expectation is based on the fact that there is seldom 
separation of ownership and control in Hong Kong corporations. Family owners who 
are also managers should align their interests more to their companies' interests in 
comparison to UK or US managers with no family connections. In addition, as shown 
in the findings of Hofstede and Bond's cultural study of the "long-term orientation" 
dimension, Hong Kong's inherent Chinese culture and family relationships are 
positively related to economic performance. The "convergence of interests" effect 
should, therefore, be prevalent in Hong Kong companies. 
However, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999), there are central agency problems 
associated with high ownership concentration. There may be a tendency for the 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders \vhen there is high 
ownership concentration. When this expropriation happens, the entrenchment effect 
might override the alignment effect. The resultant effect of "entrenchment of 
interests" will lead to a decrease in firm performance. Hence, the exact pattern of the 
relationship \vill depend on the interactions between the two effects under different 
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levels of managerial ownership, which might also be affected by macro-economic 
conditions or the presence of other variables. All of these possible implications are 
taken into account in this study and are explained in the relevant sections of the thesis. 
The section which immediately follows explains the three hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong 
companies that are tested. 
5 - 8 
Chapter Five - Empirical Framework and Afethodology 
5.3 Hypotheses 
Given that this is the first empirical study of the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance in a family-owned and controlled context, an 
exploratory approach is taken by constructing three hypotheses to test the relationship, 
using Hong Kong companies as evidence. It is envisaged that the hypotheses can test 
whether there is any relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership, and, if the answer is "yes", that the form and pattern of the relationship 
can be determined. 
The arguments of the three hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis (1) 
Because of the different ownership structure in Hong Kong, I hypothesize that the 
effect of managerial ownership on firm performance is very different from that in the 
UK and the US. In the UK and the US, when managerial ownership gradually 
increases, firm performance improves due to the convergence of interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, when managerial ownership increases up to a certain 
point, the issue of the separation of ownership and control jumps in. Firm 
performance deteriorates due to the entrenchment of interests (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). However, when managerial ownership further increases, the alignment effect 
comes in again and offsets the entrenchment effect. Firm performance increases 
again due to convergence of interest at high levels of managerial ownership (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The two turning points according to Morck et aI's (1988) study 
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are 5% and 250/0. For Short and Keasey's (1999) study, the turning points are 
approximately 13-16% and 42% respectively. 
Since Hong Kong's situation is that most companies are owned and controlled by the 
same group of family members, I anticipate that the entrenchment effect may not take 
place (or it may be relatively insignificant) when managerial ownership increases. 
Instead, the alignment effect should be further reinforced since the managers, who are 
also the family shareholders, are more concerned about firm performance as their 
levels of ownership in the firm are higher. So, I expect that the relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership will be a linear and positive one. That is, 
firm performance increases as managerial ownership increases due to the convergence 
of interest. 
Hvpothesis (2) 
However, as argued by La Porta et al. (1999), there are central agency problems 
associated with high ownership concentration. There is a tendency for the controlling 
shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders when there is high ownership 
concentration. Hence, there is a possibility that at high levels of managerial 
ownership the managers are exploiting their powers to the detriment of the minority 
shareholders. This will harm the value of the firms. This is especially the case if 
some of the managers are employed personnel and not family members. So, I believe 
that firm performance will deteriorate at high levels of ownership due to the 
entrenchment effect. If this is true, the relationship between firm performance and 
managerial ownership will be curvilinear (alignment followed by entrenchment), 
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which would be similar to the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990). However, 
since most Hong Kong companies are family-owned, I expect that the range of 
alignment for Hong Kong companies will be wider than that in the US that is 
, , 
entrenchment will occur at a managerial ownership level higher than the findings (40-
50%) of McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
Hypothesis (3) 
There is a third possibility for the relationship. While I expect that alignment of 
interests takes place for a wide range of managerial ownership due to the family-
owned corporate structure, and that at high levels of managerial ownership there may 
be some entrenchment effect, it is doubtful that there will be a relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership at the low levels of managerial 
ownership. Given that almost nine out of ten of all listed companies have one family 
group holding 25% or more of the issued capital (HKSA, 1997), very few companies 
in Hong Kong are not family-owned. In those companies which are not family-
owned, the managers are very often employed personnel. If these managers own 
shares in the companies, their percentage holdings are usually not very high. While 
there is a possibility that they will align their interests with the companies (alignment 
of interest), there is also a likelihood that they will look out for their own interests 
(entrenchment effect). Hence, at low levels of managerial ownership, the relationship 
between firm performance and managerial ownership may be positive (alignment) or 
negative (entrenchment). If it is positive, then the overall effect is a curvilinear 
relationship (alignment at both the 1m\' and mid levels of managerial ownership and 
followed by entrenchment at high levels of managerial ownership), which is similar to 
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the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1990). However, if the relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership is negative at the low level of managerial 
ownership, the overall picture will be entrenchment followed by alignment and then 
by entrenchment again. Under this scenario, though there are also two turning points, 
the pattern of the relationship is "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" which is 
the opposite of the findings of "alignment-entrenchment-alignment" in the studies by 
Morek et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). 
The three hypotheses are tested by performing OLS regressions on the following: 
Performance = a + ~I Managerial Ownership + y Control variables (1) 
Performance = a + ~I Managerial Ownership 
+ ~2 Managerial Ownership2 + y Control variables (2) 
Performance = a + ~I Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+~3 Managerial Ownership3 + y Control variables (3) 
Hypothesis (1) 
As explained above, the aim of Hypothesis (1) is to test whether there is a linear 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. Managerial 
ownership is defined as the percentage of ordinary shares held by the directors in the 
company. Two measures of performance are employed in the study, namely. 
accounting and market measures. Following Short and Keasey's study, the ratio of 
the return on shareholders' equity (RSE) is used as the accounting measure. 
Regarding the market measure, the valuation ratio (ProxyQ) is employed. This is 
defined as the sum of the market value of ordinary shares issued and the book value of 
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total debt divided by the book value of total assets. It can be seen as an 
approximation to Tobin~s Q as used in the US studies of Morek et al. (1988) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990). Hypothesis (1) can be further elaborated as follows: 
RSE = a + ~ I Managerial Ownership + y Control variables (l )(a) 
ProxyQ = a + ~l Managerial Ownership + y Control variables (l )(b) 
Hypothesis (2) 
The aim of Hypothesis (2) is to test whether there is a curvilinear relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership, in line with the findings of McConnell 
and Servaes (1990). The turning point (whether it is "from alignment to 
entrenchment" or "from entrenchment to alignment") will be determined should a 
curvilinear relationship be found. Hypothesis (2) can be further elaborated as follows: 
RSE = a + ~ I Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ y Control variables (2)(a) 
ProxyQ = a + ~l Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ y Control variables (2)(b) 
Hypothesis (3) 
The aim of Hypothesis (3) is to test whether there is a cubic form of the relationship 
between firm performance and managerial ownership, as per the findings of Morek et 
al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). If the cubic relationship is found (whether it 
is . alignment -entrenchment -alignment" or "entrenchment -alignment -entrenchment"), 
the turning points will be computed as appropriate. Hypothesis (3) can be further 
elaborated as follows: 
5 - 13 
Chapter Five - Empirical Framework and Methodology 
RSE = a + ~ I Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ ~3 Managerial Ownership3 + y Control variables (3 )(a) 
ProxyQ = a + ~ I Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial O\vTIership2 
+ ~3 Managerial Ownership3 + y Control variables (3)(b) 
The reasons why the OLS regression method is adopted are discussed in section 5.4. 
Regarding the sample chosen for the study and the variables used in the regressions, 
they are described in section 5.5. 
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5.4 The OLS Regression Model 
To examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, 
multiple regression analyses are performed on 1406 firm-year observations of Hong 
Kong listed companies. This allows "firm performance" to be set as the dependent 
variable and "managerial ownership" and other corporate governance variables to be 
set as the independent variables so that the impact of the individual independent 
variables on firm performance can be measured quantitatively. This methodology is 
adopted because it is most suitable under the circumstances. The financial data for 
the regression analysis were collected from databases while the ownership data were 
obtained manually from company annual reports. Despite the time consumed in 
collecting the ownership data, the data sources are reliable and the final sample size is 
sufficient for performing empirical tests. For this type of research, alternative 
methodologies such as using questionnaires and conducting interviews are likely to 
have been less successful. This is because response rates to these types of surveys in 
Hong Kong are usually fairly low as people are reluctant to disclose information. In 
addition, as the aim of this research is to study the relationship between firm 
performance and managerial ownership, an empirical test using the regression method 
is the most appropriate method to ascertain the nature of the relationship. 
In this study, the ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regreSSIOn method IS 
employed. Thi~ method is adopted because of the following reasons: 
1. Despite the name of OLS. there is nothing 'ordinary' about this method. In 
fact. it has some 'extraordinary' properties and it is used most frequently to 
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estimate the population regression function (PRF) on the basis of the sample 
regression function (SRF) (Gujarati, 1999). 
2. This study not only aims to test the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, but also aims to explore whether there are 
any relationships between other corporate governance variables (board size, 
board composition and directors' remuneration) and firm performance. 
Hence, the OLS regression is not just performed on two variables, but rather 
on a number of variables. A regression model with more than one explanatory 
variable is known as a multiple regression model. The OLS regression 
method allows multiple regression analyses to be performed on the equations 
as detailed in section 5.3 to test the hypotheses and the possible relationships 
between firm performance and various corporate governance variables. Other 
control variables can also be added to the OLS regression model. In this 
study, the control variables used are firm size, sales growth and the debt ratio. 
3. The sample of this study consists of a set of panel data: 1406 firm-year 
observations from 1995 to 1998 on companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The OLS multiple regression method is an appropriate method to 
test this "pooled time-series cross-sectional regression model". For example, 
Fan and Wong (2002) and Qi et al. (2000) also use this regression method on 
their panel data sets which pool observations both cross-sectionally and 
intertemporally. One way to apply the method to panel data is to set dummy 
variables to control for the fixed effects. In this study, these correspond to the 
calendar years and the industry groups. By defining the years and the 
industries as dummy variables, the pooled OLS multiple regressIOns can 
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control for the changes in macro-economic conditions over time and the 
possible effects of industry types on the relationship between firm 
performance and the explanatory variables. 
4. As explained in section 5.3, given that this is the first empirical study of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the 
family-owned and controlled context of Hong Kong, an exploratory approach 
is taken to test the relationship. The OLS regression method allows separate 
regressions to be performed on each of the three equations, as detailed in 
section 5.3, in order to test whether the relation')hip is linear or non-linear 
(curvilinear or cubic) in nature. Should a non-linear relationship be found, the 
turning points can then be computed by the mathematical method of 
differentiation as in Short and Keasey (1999). 
5. Most importantly, given that the dependent variables in this study are RSE and 
ProxyQ, which are "continuous quantitative" variables rather variables which 
are "discrete", "dummy" or "qualitative" in nature, the OLS regression method 
is appropriate, rather than other regression methods like logit, probit or 
ANOV A. The logit and the probit methods are used when the dependent 
variable is a dummy, or dichotomous, or binary variable and the explanatory 
variables can be dummy, or quantitative, or a combination of both. The 
ANOV A method is used when the regression model contains only dummy 
explanatory variables (Gujarati, 1999). In this study, the dependent variable is 
quantitative in nature and the explanatory and control variables are a 
combination of quantitative and dummy variables; hence. the OLS multiple 
regression model is the BLUE (the best linear unbiased estimator) with these 
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types of variables. The coefficient values of each quantitative independent 
variable found from the regression results will indicate the respective 
magnitude of their impact on the dependent variable in the regression, while at 
the same time controlling for the effect of the year and industry dummy 
variables. 
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5.5 Description of the Data 
5.5.1 Sample 
The sample consists of 1406 observations from compames listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong for the period from 1995 to 1998. The basis of selection is 
random and the sample consists of property companies, industrial and utility 
companies and consolidated enterprises. Consolidated enterprises include companies 
such as hotels and retail companies. Finance companies are specifically excluded 
from the sample because they have different income measuring rules from companies 
in other sectors. I The breakdown of the sample is shown in Table 5.1: 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of Sample (by Sectors and Years) 
Sector 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Consolidated Enterprises 140 140 138 136 554 
Properties 77 75 75 75 302 
Industrial 135 129 125 125 514 
Utilities 9 9 9 9 36 
Total 361 353 347 345 1406 
I There were 553 companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange as at 31 December 1995 and the 
number increased gradually to 693 by the end of 1998. The number of finance companies was 61 
during the four years 1995-1998. That is, the financial sector comprised of 11 % and 9% of the total 
number of listed companies in Hong Kong during the years ending 31 December 1995 and 1998 
respectively. 
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5.5.2 Variables 
The variables used in this study include measures of firm performance, managerial 
ownership and other control variables. Ownership data mainly come from the 
Wardley cards published by Wardley Data Services Ltd. and individual companies' 
annual reports. Financial data are collected from the Pacap (Pacific-Basin Capital 
Markets Research Center) database, Datastream and also individual companies' 
annual reports. Table 5.2 gives a summary of the variables used in the study: 
Table 5.2 Description of Variables 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
RSE 
ProxyQ 
Ownership Variable 
Managerial Ownership 
(DIRSH) 
Control Variables:-
Board Structure Variables 
Remuneration (lnRem) 
Board Size (BoardSize) 
Board Composition 
(PropNexe) 
Other Control Variables 
Size (lnSales) 
Debt Ratio (TD/TA) 
Growth (Salesgrowth) 
Description 
Return on Shareholders' Equity 
Tobin's Q (approximation) 
Percentage of ordinary shares held by directors 
Natural logarithm of Directors' remuneration (fee + 
emoluments + bonus) 
Total number of directors on the board 
Percentage of non-executive directors on the board 
Natural logarithm of sales 
Total debt divided by book value of total assets 
Annual gro\\;1h rate of sales 
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(a) Firm Performance Variables 
The accounting based measure of performance used in this study is the return on 
shareholders' equity (RSE). It is calculated as the profits attributable to shareholders, 
divided by the value of shareholders' equity as at the financial year end of the 
individual firms in each of the four years 1995 to 1998. 
Regarding the market based measure of performance (ProxyQ), it is calculated based 
on the sum of the market value of shares and the book value of total debt divided by 
the book value of total assets as at the financial year end of the individual firms in 
each of the four years 1995 to 19982• It is an approximation to Tobin's Q used in the 
US studies by McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Morek et al. (1988). 
(b) Managerial Ownership Variable 
Managerial ownership (DIRSH) is measured by the percentage of ordinary shares 
owned by directors as at the financial year end in each of the companies concerned. 
That is, all the four years' managerial ownership data are collected. This should give 
a better and more accurate estimate than most previous studies where only cross-
section data are used or where only one year of ownership information is collected in 
a set of panel data. Table 5.3 shows the data relating to managerial ownership of 
equity for the sampled years: 
2 See section 5.6 for the limitations of data relating to ProxyQ. 
5 - 21 
Chapter Five - Empirical Framework and 1\ [e rho do logy 
Table 5.3 Managerial Ownership Data 
Managerial Ownership 1995 1996 1997 1998 
(DIRSH) % 
Mean 42.67 4l.53 40.16 39.11 
Median 48.75 47.69 46.94 46.18 
Standard deviation 24.64 24.38 25.09 25.19 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 83.24 78.15 86.82 80.76 
(d Control Variables 
A number of control variables are used in the regression model to control for potential 
influences on the performance of firms in addition to managerial ownership. The 
variables used include directors' remuneration. board size, board composition, firm 
size, firm growth and the debt ratio. 
Directors' remuneration is included as a control variable to account for its possible 
effect on firm performance. The variable is measured by taking the natural logarithm 
of the aggregate value of directors' fees, emoluments and bonuses received during the 
financial year concerned (lnRemi. 
:; See section 5.6 for the limitations of data relating to directors' remuneration. 
- '-' :> ---
Chapter Five - Empirical Framework and .\fethodology 
A number of studies have examined how board size and board composition atTect 
firm performance. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) document the 
monitoring function of outside directors. They find that companies \vill benefit in 
terms of corporate performance and stock returns by increasing the number of outside 
directors. The number of directors (BoardSize) and the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board (PropNexe yt are used in the study not only as control variables, 
but also as an attempt to determine whether they have any impact on corporate 
performance. In common with the other variables in the study, the above three board 
structure variables (lnRem, BoardSize and PropNexe) are also collected at the 
financial year end for each firm in the sample for each of the four years 1995 to 1998. 
Firm size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the sales value (lnSales) as at 
the financial year end of each firm in each of the four years. The size of a firm affects 
performance because larger firms may find it easier to generate funds internally and to 
access funds from external sources. Bigger firms also allow economies of scale 
which can bring a number of beneficial effects on firm performance. The variable of 
annual growth rate in sales (Salesgrowth) is used to control for the impact of growth 
on the firm's performance. 
The debt ratio is measured by the book value of total debt divided by the book value 
of total assets (TD/T A) as at the financial year end of each firm in each of the four 
years. Stiglitz (1985) argues that control over management actions is cffecti\'t~ly 
4 See section 5.6 for the limitations of data relating to board composition. 
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exercised not by shareholders, but by lenders and, in particular, the banks. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1982) also suggest that debt may be used to 
resolve conflicts between managers and shareholders as it reduces management 
discretion to consume excessive perquisites, which should increase the value of the 
firm's equity. Alternatively, firms with higher debt ratio have heavier interest 
burdens and their profits are eroded by the higher interest expenses. In addition, 
according to the pecking order theory, each firm's observed debt ratio reflects its 
cumulative requirements for external finance. In this case, the debt ratio is negatively 
correlated with the profitability of the firm (Myers, 1984)5. The debt ratio is used as a 
control variable in this study to determine its possible relationship with firm 
performance. 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the summary statistics and the Pearson correlation matrix for 
the variables used in the study. The correlation coefficients among the explanatory 
variables are found to be low, and all are well below the arbitrary cut-off point of 0.80 
used in most research (Studenmund, 2001). This suggests that there are no 
multicollinearity problems. 
5 Myers (1984. pg. 582) states that "recent work based on asymmetric informatio~ gives pr~dictions 
roughly in line with the pecking order theory." He goes on to argue that "in the modIfied peck~ng order 
story. observed debt ratios wi II reflect the cumulative requirement for external ~na~cI~g ... For 
example ... a profitable firm will end up with an unusually low debt ratio compar.ed WIth Its mdus~ry 
averaae and it won't do much of anything about it. It won't go out of its way to Issue debt and retIre 
equit)~ t~ achieve a more normal debt ratio. An unprofitable firm in the same industry will end up with 
a relatively high debt ratio (Myers 1984, pg. 589)." 
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Table 5.4 Summary Statistics for Variables (Data from 1995 to 1998) 
Variables Mean Standard Maximum Median Minimum 
Deviation 
Performance Variables 
Return on 
Shareholders'Equity (RSE) 
-0.04 0.7929 2.51 0.05 -21.94 
Tobin's Q approximation 1.03 1.0930 30.37 0.85 0.14 
(ProxyQ) 
Ownership Variable 
Managerial Ownership (%) 40.89 24.83 86.82 47.31 0.00 
(DIRSH) 
Control Variables: 
Board Structure Variables 
Directors' Remuneration 15.68 l.3106 19.64 15.81 9.21 
(lnRem) 
Board Size (BoardSize) 8.64 2.8461 22.00 8.00 3.00 
Board Composition 0.41 0.1565 l.00 0.38 0.00 
(PropNexe) 
Other Control Variables 
Size (lnSales) 20,47 l.4911 24.71 20.60 14.29 
Debt Ratio (TDfT A) 0.40 0.1934 l.70 0.39 0.01 
Growth (Salesgrowth) 0.20 l.0072 20.25 0.06 -0.97 
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Table 5.5 Pearson Correlation Matrix (Data from 1995 to 1998) 
Variables RSE ProxyQ DIRSH InRem Board Prop InSales TDffA Sales 
Size Nexe growth 
RSE 1.000 -0.070** 0.052 0.054* 0.041 0.034 0.105** -0.240** 0.058* 
(0.008) (0.052) (0.044) (0.122) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000) (0.028) 
ProxyQ 1.000 -0.021 0.030 0.023 0.004 -0.015 0.067* -0.003 
(0.435) (0.266) (0.396) (0.882) (0.586) (0.012) (0.899) 
DIRSH 1.000 0.008 -0.133** -0.070** -0.100** 0.063* -0.018 
(0.763) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.019) (0.489) 
InRem 1.000 0.297** -0.055* 0.493** 0.137** 0.053* 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.049) 
BoardSize 1.000 -0.015 0.416** 0.008 -0.002 
(0.580) (0.000) (0.752) (0.939) 
PropNexe 1.000 0.075** -0.111 ** -0.023 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.395) 
InSales 1.000 0.257** 0.090** (0.000) (0.001) 
TD/TA 1.000 0.026 (0.328) 
Sales 1.000 
growth 
Note: 
Significance levels of the Pearson correlation between the variables are shown 
underneath the relevant correlation coefficient in bracket and in italic form. 
* Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* * Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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5.6 Limitations of the Data 
There are a number of limitations relating to the sample and the variables adopted in 
this study: 
ra) Sampled Years from 1995 to 1998 
At the time of data collection, the financial data available from the Pacap database 
was up to the year 1998. In addition, audit committees were only made a requirement 
from 1 January 1999 onwards. Given the above facts, it was decided to define the 
sample period from 1995 to 1998 for the following reasons: first, the sample period 
consisting of four years of panel data covering 1406 observations, which should be 
sufficient to estimate the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. Second, the sample period of 1995 to 1998 allows a study of the 
impact of the East-Asian financial crisis on the relationship. This is performed by 
running separate regressions for the pre-crisis (1995-97) and the post-crisis period 
(1998). Third, of course, it would have been preferable to include observations for a 
greater number of years and, in particular, to include more years in the post-crisis 
period after 1998. However, given that the collection of managerial ownership data 
was conducted manually, observation by observation, the data collection process was 
very time-consuming. Thus, including more years after 1998 would not only have 
involved much more time in the collection of the ownership data, but would also have 
involved much more time in getting the financial data from sources other than the 
then available Pacap database. Matching the data from other sources with the data 
obtained from the Pacap database would have represented a significant problem. 
Fourth, given that audit committees were only made a requirement with effect from 1 
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January 1999. it might be more appropriate to repeat the study again in later years by 
incl uding several more years' observations (for example, the years 1999 to 2001), so 
that the presence of an audit committee can be included as an additional variable to 
measure its possible impact on firm performance. Having considered the above costs 
and benefits relating to data availability, it was decided that the sample period for this 
study would be the four years from 1995 to 1998. 
(b) Exclusion of Finance Companies from the Sample 
The sample consists of 1406 observations from companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong for the period from 1995 to 1998. The basis of selection is 
random and the sample consists of companies from all the industries except the 
finance industry. Finance companies are specifically excluded from the sample 
because they have different income measuring rules from companies in other sectors. 
Although finance companies are excluded, the sample is a representative one given 
that the financial sector only comprised of 11 % and 9% of the total number of listed 
compal1les 111 Hong Kong during the years ending 31 December 1995 and 1998 
respectively. 
(c) Measurement of Ownership 
This study is mainly concerned with the impact of the concentrated family ownership 
structure in Hong Kong on firm performance. Hence, ori.~inally it was my intention 
to measure the effect of family ownership. rather than managerial ownership, on firm 
performance. However. during the manual data collection process, I noted that it is 
impracticable to collect data on family ownership. This is because. although the 
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annual reports of Hong Kong companies disclose directors' shareholdings, there are 
no disclosures of shares held by family shareholders. To determine precisely the 
number of shares held by family shareholders is not possible because very often 
shares are held by nominees or by holding or related companies. Hence, I can only 
adopt an alternative measurement: to measure managerial ownership (DIRSH). I have 
decided to use DIRSH as the explanatory variable, not only due to the fact that other 
researchers have used it as their independent variable, but also because it is 
impractical to measure family shareholdings accurately in Hong Kong. 
However, I nevertheless attempt to ascertain the relationship between family 
shareholdings and DIRSH in Hong Kong. Some "large scale" funded researchers, for 
example, Claessens et al. (2000, pg.l 06) have investigated this issue; they found that 
66% of all firms in Hong Kong in 1996 were held by family members. Also, the 
HKSA (1997) found that 53% of all firms in Hong Kong in 1996 had one family 
group holding 50% or more of the entire issued capital. Although this study measures 
DIRSH and not family shareholdings, it can be seen from the studies of Claessens et 
al. (2000) and the HKSA (1997) that the major form of ownership in Hong Kong is 
"family" ownership. 
It was possible to test the correlation between DIRSH and family shareholdings in 
Hcng Kong using the percentage of shares held by family members for 53 companies 
from the sample in this study (for these 53 companies, the percentage of family 
shareholdings could be determined). It was found that the correlation bet\\ccn family 
shareholdings and DIRSH is 0.978 (p-yalue<O.OOO 1). In Demsetz and Villalonga 
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(2001, pg.214) where the sample of companies is the same sample used in the original 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) study, they find that the correlation between the fraction of 
shares owned by important shareholding families and the fraction owned by 
management is 0.67. Given that the correlation is not a low figure in the US, where 
the corporate structure is not as "family-concentr~ted" as it is in Hong Kong, it is not 
surprising that a correlation of 0.978 is found from the sub-sample in this study. 
While the 53 companies for which family ownership data are available may not be 
representative of the full sample in this study, we would expect the correlation 
between family ownership and DIRSH in Hong Kong to be higher than that found for 
companies in the US (i.e. at some point between 0.67 and 0.978). Hence, DIRSH can 
be regarded as a surrogate (or at least a close approximation) for family ownership in 
Hong Kong. 
(d) Measurement of Market Performance 
In US studies (e.g. Morck et al. 1988), Tobin's Q is used as a common measure of the 
market performance of a firm. In Hong Kong, given that the replacement values of 
assets are not available in annual reports, I have adopted an alternative way to 
calculate a market measure which is based on the sum of the market value of shares 
and the book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets as at the 
financial year end of the individual firms in each of the four years 199:' to 1998. The 
measure is termed ProxyQ in this study which denotes the fact that it is a close 
approximation to the measure of Tobin's Q used in the US studies. 
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(e) Measurement o(Directors' Remuneration 
In this study, directors' remuneration is included as a control variable and it is 
measured by taking the natural logarithm of the aggregate value of directors' fees. 
emoluments and bonuses received during the financial year concerned. There are 
some deficiencies in this measure because certain benefits received by the directors, 
such as stock option benefits, are not included in the measure. This is due to the fact 
that the disclosures of options and other benefits received by the directors are not 
standardised and are not adequately reported in Hong Kong company annual reports. 
(0 Measurement o(Board Composition 
Board composition is another control variable In this study. Originally it was 
intended to collect data on both the number of independent non-executive directors 
and the number of non-executive directors (i.e. to examine them as two separate 
variables). However, during the process of data collection, it was found that the 
reporting of the information was not adequate for this purpose and was not 
standardised in most of the company annual reports. 
Some companies report only non-executive directors without defining whether they 
are independent or not. Some companies report independent non-executive directors 
without any additional information on the non-executive directors. Some companies 
make no disclosures of non-executive and independent non-executive directors. 
Some further annual reports disclose both types of directors. 
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Hence. the only solution is to aggregate the disclosed numbers of independent non-
executive directors and non-executiye directors of each firm, and then divide this 
aggregate number by the board size of the firm. This generates the variable 
PropNexe, which represents the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. 
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6.1 Chapter Objectives 
In this chapter, OLS regression analyses are performed on panel data comprising 1406 
firm-year observations to determine the relationship between managerial ownership, 
various corporate governance variables. and firm performance during the period from 
1995 to 1998. The results suggest that the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance is non-linear and cubic in nature. The particular pattem found is 
'"entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" which supports Hypothesis (3) as detailed in 
Chapter Five. 
Although this pattern of '"entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" supports the 
'"combined effect" argument of Morek et al. (1988), it is the reverse of the pattem 
found by Short and Keasey (1999) and Morek et al. (1988). Both of these studies 
found an "alignment-entrenchment-alignmenC relationship in their UK and US studies 
respectively. This suggests that the concentrated ownership structure in Hong Kong 
may affect the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in a 
different way, compared to the less concentrated ownership structures in the UK and 
the US. This finding is also supported by the suggestion of the recent study of Fan and 
Wong (2002) that studies based on UK or US data are not necessarily applicable to 
East-Asian corporations due to differences in the degree of ownership concentration. 
Another aim of the empirical study is to ascertain whether the East-Asian financial 
crisis had any effect on the relationship bet\\'een managerial o\vnership and corporate 
performance. The second part of this chapter reports the results of the OLS 
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regressions in \vhich the original sample was partitioned into the pre-crisis period of 
1995-1997 and the post-crisis year of 1998. The regression analyses are also 
performed on the individual years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively. The 
results suggest that the different macro-economic environments prior to and after the 
crisis. and in individual years, did affect the relationship. During prosperous years 
( 1 996 and 1997) the convergence effect is more dominant. However, managers 
become entrenched at very high levels of ownership, and this behaviour is even more 
intense during the difficult times after the East-Asian financial crisis in 1998 and in the 
less prosperous year of 1995. The findings suggest that the East-Asian financial crisis 
did play an important role in affecting the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance. 
The empirical research conducted for this thesis has produced results that are 
statistically significant. The findings contribute to the academic literature in that 
ownership structure and macro-economic conditions do appear to have an influence 
upon corporate performance. The details of the findings are presented in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. 
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6.2 Findings and Analyses 
6.2.1 Accounting Measure of Performance 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the relationship between firm performance as 
measured by the return on shareholders' equity (RSE) and managerial ownership 
(DIRSH) using the data from 1995 to 1998. The explanatory power of the regression 
model is fairly good, given the significant F-statistics shown in the table. It can also 
be seen from the table that both Hypothesis (l) and Hypothesis (3) are supported. 
Under Hypothesis (l), there is a positive linear relationship between RSE and 
managerial ownership because the coefficient on the variable DIRSH is positive and it 
is statistically significant. Firm performance improves as managerial ownership 
. . . Increases In compames. 
Hypothesis (3) is also supported. The coefficients of the variables DIRSH, DIRSH2 
and DIRSH3 are all statistically significant. The relationship is found to be of the 
cubic form. Since the signs of the coefficients of the variables DIRSH, DIRSH2 and 
DIRSH3 are negative, positive and negative respectively, the relationship between 
RSE and managerial ownership is "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment"'. This is in 
accordance with the argument that I set out in Chapter Five. The two turning points 
are 16.100/0 and 62.73% respectively.l 
1 The turning points of the cubic function are calculated by denoting RSE as y and DIRSH as x in the 
equation: y = -1.87'5.\" + ~.318x~ - 6.189x3. The values of the turning points (x) are found by 
differentiating y with respect to.\". That is, letting 0'0: = ° and solving for the values of x. To 
determine whether the turning point is a maxima or a minima, the value of c\r'Xc is computed. If 
c'\ (:\.-' > 0, it is a maxima. If (~-~" ('\,: < 0, it is a minima. 
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Table 6.1 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Regression Results using the Data from 1995 to 1998 (n=1406) 
Dependent 
variable (RSE) Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
variables t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
DIRSH 0.294 0.111 -1.875 
3.345 **** 0.364 -2.287 ** 
DIRSH- N/A 0.262 7.318 
0.624 2.674 *** 
DIRSHJ N/A N/A -6.189 
-2.609 *** 
InRem -0.0005 0.0016 0.0029 
-0.026 0.082 0.149 
BoardSize -0.0085 -0.0087 -0.0069 
-l.000 -l.032 -0.808 
PropNexe -0.0284 -0.0219 0.0038 
-0.205 -0.158 0.028 
lnSales 0.111 0.111 0.106 
5.875 ***** 5.822 ***** 5.553 ***** 
TD/TA -1.250 -l.247 -1.229 
-10.784 ***** -10.747 ***** -10.591 ***** 
Salesgrowth 0.0401 0.0398 0.0396 
1.893 * 1.882 * 1.876 * 
Intercept -1.855 -l.860 -l.776 
-5.408 ***** -5.420 ***** -5.165 ***** 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.094 0.098 
F -statistic 20.808 ***** 18.248 ***** 17.048 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 16.10% 
62.73% 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.294 DIRSH 
Hypothesis 3: RSE = - 1.875DIRSH + 7.318DIRSH2 - 6.189DIRSH3 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 contidence level using t\\"o-tailed test 
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As shown in Table 6.1 under Hypothesis (3). RSE firstly deteriorates as manaoerial 
. e 
ownership increases. When managerial ownership reaches 16.10%, RSE increases 
until managerial ownership reaches 62.73%. Thereafter. RSE decreases again \\'ith 
further increases in managerial ownership. 
From the above findings, it can be noted that the relationship has elements of two 
functional forms: a linear and a cubic form of the relationship bet\\een RSE and 
managerial ownership. In general, managerial ownership is beneticial to firm 
performance as indicated by the significant positive linear relationship under 
Hypothesis (1) (p-value = 0.001). When the percentage of shares owned by managers 
in a company increases, firm performance as measured by RSE also increases. 
However, it can also be seen from the regression results under Hypothesis (3) that the 
relationship can also take a cubic form. That is, at low levels of managerial 
ownership, the relationship between RSE and DIRSH is a negative one. This is 
consistent with my argument that in those companies which are not family-owned, the 
managers are very often employed personnel. If these managers own shares in the 
company concerned, their percentage shareholdings are likely not to be very high. 
These types of managers will usually tend to look out for their own interests 
(entrenchment effect) relatively more than aligning their interests with the company. 
The regression results shov-; that at levels of managerial ownership below 16.10%, the 
relationship bet\veen RSE and managerial O\\'nership is negati\'e. These are likely to 
be the cases \\here the companies are not family-o\\'ned. 
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On the other hand, when the managerial ownership is between 16.10% and 62.73%, 
the relationship between RSE and managerial ownership becomes positive and more 
significant. These are likely to be the cases where the managers are also family 
members, as their percentage of shareholdings in the companies are higher. These 
types of managers will tend to align their interests with the company's interests since 
they are also the family owners. Hence, these results support the view that family-
ownership is beneficial to corporate performance, due to the convergence of interests, 
in accordance with Jensen and Meckling (1976). Also, the results confirm my 
hypothesis that the range of alignment is much wider in the Hong Kong context due to 
the family form of ownership. 
When managerial ownership further increases to high levels (beyond 62.73%) the 
managers appear to be exploiting their power to the detriment of the minority 
shareholders as the relationship between RSE and managerial ownership becomes 
negative again. This is consistent with the suggestion of La Porta et al. (1999) that in 
corporations with high ownership concentration, controlling shareholders' interests are 
very unlikely to be the same as those of the minority shareholders. Thus, there is a 
tendency for the controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders at 
high levels of ownership. This is the result of the central agency problem associated 
with high ownership concentration (La Porta et aL 1999). The overall behaviour is 
therefore "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". Although there are also t\\"O 
turning points, the pattern is opposite to the findings of "alignment-entrenchment-
alignn1enC reported in the studies of Short and Keasey (1999) and Morek et al. (1988). 
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This is in line with my argument that a different type of relationship may be expected 
between managerial ownership and performance in Hong Kong due to the different 
form of corporate ownership in Hong Kong compared to the UK and US. 
Given that the regression results lend support to both Hypotheses (1) and (3), this 
suggests that in Hong Kong corporations the convergence effect is very strong over a 
wide range of managerial ownership (that is, a positive linear relationship as supported 
by Hypothesis (1)); at the same time, there are some entrenchment effects at both ends 
of the managerial ownership ranges (that is, negative relationships at the very low and 
very high levels of managerial ownership, as supported by Hypothesis (3)). Hence, 
the functional form of the relationship between firm performance and managerial 
ownership in this study can be taken to be "non-linear and cubic", with a pattern of 
"entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment", with the range of alignment being very wide 
(between 16.10% and 62.73%). 
Regarding the board structure variables, namely directors' remuneration, board size 
and board composition, no significant relationships can be found from the regression 
results. These results are consistent with the findings of Baysinger and Butler (1985), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and Bhagat and Black (1997), who all find no 
meaningful relations between board composition and firm performance. Yermack 
(1996) also finds no association between the percentage of outside directors and firm 
performance. However, the results reported in the literature for these aspects are 
mixed. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) provide evidence that shareholder 
wealth is affected by the proportion of outside directors and Yermack (1996) finds that 
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firm value and performance is a decreasing function of board size. Core et al. (1999) 
also find that board structure variables are somewhat more important than the 
ownership structure variables in predicting future performance, and that board and 
ownership structure are associated with the level of chief executives' compensation. 
In this study, it is found that managerial ownership is more important than the board 
structure and remuneration in explaining the accounting performance of firms. 
Apart from managerial ownership, it is also found that under both Hypotheses (1) and 
(3), RSE is positively related to firm size and sales growth and is negatively related to 
the debt ratio. These results are consistent with prior research in that firm size, growth 
and the debt ratio have all been shown to have effects on firm performance. Hence, 
they are used as control variables in this study. 
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6.2.2 Market Measure of Performance 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the relationship between firm performance as 
measured by the ratio of Tobin's Q (in fact an approximation referred to as ProxyQ) 
and managerial ownership (DIRSH) using the data from 1995 to 1998. Although the 
explanatory power of the regression model is still fairly satisfactory as the F -statistics 
are significant at the 0.001 level of confidence, the adjusted R-squared figures (1.4% 
to 1.50/0) are not as good as those reported in the regressions ofRSE against DIRSH as 
indicated in Table 6.1 (9.4% to 9.80/0). It can also be seen from Table 6.2 that all the 
three hypotheses are not supported as all the coefficients of the variables DIRSH, 
DIRSH2 and DIRSH3 are not significant. 
The regressIon results show that there are no significant relationships between 
managerial ownership and the market performance of firms. This is in contrast to the 
findings of Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). However, it is in line 
with some other studies, such as Core et al. (1999) which suggest that board and 
ownership structure more consistently predict accounting performance than stock 
market performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) also suggest that when assessing 
the effect of ownership on performance, the accounting measure is superior when 
compared with the market measure. They suggest that it is more sensible to look at 
what management "'has" accomplished rather than what management "will" 
accomplish. The accounting profit rate is backward-looking, while Q is forward-
looking. They also point out that the accounting profit rate is not affected by the 
psychology of investors whereas Tobin's Q is affected by investor psychology. 
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Table 6.2 Relationship between ProxyQ and Managerial Ownership 
Regression Results using the Data from 1995 to 1998 (n=1406) 
Dependent 
variable 
(ProxyQ) Hy~othesis 1 Hn~othesis 2 Hy~othesis 3 
Independent Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
variables t -statistic t -statistic t-statistic 
DIRSH 
-0.144 -0.632 -l.848 
-l.171 -1.4 77 -l.603 # 
DIRSH- N/A 0.701 5.020 
1.190 1.305 ## 
DIRSH J N/A N/A 
-3.788 
-l.136 ### 
InRem 0.061 0.067 0.067 
2.231 ** 2.404 ** 2.432 ** 
BoardSize 0.020 0.019 0.020 
1.675 * 1.608 1.699 * 
PropNexe 0.114 0.131 0.147 
0.585 0.673 0.752 
InSales -0.067 -0.069 -0.072 
-2.520 ** -2.591 *** -2.689 *** 
TD/TA 0.690 0.698 0.709 
4.242 ***** 4.287 ***** 4.349 ***** 
Salesgrowth 0.015 0.015 0.014 
0.510 0.489 0.485 
Intercept l.005 0.992 1.043 
2.088 ** 2.060 ** 2.158 ** 
Adjusted R- 0.014 0.014 0.015 
F-statistic 3.688 **** 3.405 **** 3.171 **** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 26.14% )see 
62.21 % )note 
All the three Hypotheses are not supported because: 
All the t-statistics of DIRSH, DIRSH2 and DIRSH3 are not statistically significant. 
Note: Although the result is not significant (weak relationship), the inflection points 
(26.14% and 62.21 %) are computed assuming Hypothesis 3 holds: 
~ 3 
Hypothesis 3: ProxyQ = - 1.848DIRSH + 5.020DIRSH- - 3.788DIRSH 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 confidence level using two-tailed test 
## Significant at 0.19 confidence level using tv.·o-tailed test 
### Significant at 0.26 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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Despite the absence of significant results from the regressIOn of ProxyQ and 
managerial ownership, the inflection points are still computed assuming that 
Hypothesis (3) holds. As shown in Table 6.2, the inflection points are 26.14% and 
62.21 %. Despite the weak relationship, the general pattern is still "'entrenchment-
alignment-entrenchment". This is in line with the findings of the regression of RSE 
and managerial ownership. As shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the range of alignment is 
wide (Table 6.1: 16.10% - 62.73%; Table 6.2: 26.14% - 62.21%). Also. it 
demonstrates the robustness of the results given that roughly the same point of change 
from alignment to entrenchment (62.73% and 62.21 %) is obtained from both analyses. 
These results, in particular. the wide range of alignment, support the view that the 
family form of ownership 2 is beneficial to firm performance, in line with the 
"convergence of interest" hypothesis proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
However, at a very high level of managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect 
becomes dominant. The central agency problem suggested by Fama and Jensen 
(1983) becomes material. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) focus 
on the central agency problem associated with high ownership concentration. They 
argue that the controlling family members might take advantage of the minority 
shareholders in order to maximize their own interests. The results of this study lend 
support to both the arguments above. A comparison of the findings of Short and 
Kease; (1999). Morek et al. (1988) and this study is summarised in Table 6.3. 
~ In this study. managerial ownership (DIRSH) is used as a surrogate for family ownership in Hong 
Kong. For details of the limitations of the data, please refer to section 5.6 in Chapter Five. 
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Table 6.3 Comparison of Findings on the Relationship between Firm 
Performance and Managerial Ownership 
Empirical Study Cubic Form of Turning Significant Result 
Relationship Points 
The United Kingdom - Alignment - Accounting measure 
Short and Keasey (1999) Entrenchment - 13-16% (RSE) and 
Alignment 42% Market measure (VAL) 
(i.e. positive-negative-
positive) 
The United States- Alignment - Market measure only 
Morck et al. (1988) Entrenchment - 5% (Tobin's Q) 
Alignment 25% 
(No significant result for 
(i.e. positive-negative- the accounting measure oj 
positive) \projit rate) 
Hong Kong- Entrenchment - Accounting measure only 
This study Alignment - 16% (RSE) 
Entrenchment 62% 
(No significant result for 
(i.e. negative-positive- the market measure of 
negative) ProxyQ) 
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6.3 Robustness of Results and Sensitivity Analyses 
In order to determine the robustness of the significant results for the accounting 
measure of performance, further analyses are performed on the regressions of return 
on shareholders' equity (RSE) against managerial ownership (DIRSH) in this section. 
6.3.1 Year and Industry Dummies 
Dummy variables are added to the regression models to control for changes in the 
macro-economic environment and for possible industry effects on firm performance. 
The following three regression analyses are performed: 
RSE = a + P I Managerial Ownership + y Control variables 
97 3 
+ L <5 J Dummy Year J + L A k Dummy Industry k 
j- 9j k - I 
RSE = a + P I Managerial Ownership + P2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ Y Control variables 
97 3 
+ L <5 J Dummy Year J + L Ak Dummy IndustrYk 
J - 95 k - I 
RSE = a + PI Managerial Ownership + P2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ P3 Managerial Ownership3 + y Control variables 
97 3 
+ L <5 j Dummy Year J + L A k Dummy Industry, 
J ,95 k - I 
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Dummy Year J is a dummy variable that equals one for year j, and zero otherwise. 
which is used to control for changes in the macro-economic environment over time. 
Dummy Industry k is a dummy variable to control for industry effects on finn 
performance. The regression results are presented in Table 6.4. 
It can be seen from Table 6.4 that the regression results are similar to the findings 
presented in Table 6.1 where dummy variables are not included. Both Hypothesis (1) 
and Hypothesis (3) are supported. When dummy variables are included in the 
analyses, the adjusted R-squared figures improve (from 9.4% - 9.8% as shown in 
Table 6.1 to 10.8% - 11.2% as indicated in Table 6.4). The coefficients of DIRSH 
under Hypothesis (1) are similar (0.294 in Table 6.1 and 0.269 in Table 6.4). The 
inflection points under Hypothesis (3) are also very close to one another (16.10% and 
62.730/0 in Table 6.1; 16.86% and 63.17% in Table 6.4). These findings demonstrate 
the robustness of the results. The relationship between RSE and DIRSH is non-linear 
and cubic in nature, with a pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". 
Additional findings are obtained from the regressions with the dummy variables. As 
shown in Table 6.4, the coefficients of the dummy variables, DUMConEnt. 
DUMProperties and DUMIndustrials 3 are all statistically insignificant. This result 
indicates that industrial sectors do not have a significant impact on RSE. 
3 When a qualitative variable has m categories, the number of dummy variables should be (m - 1) 
(Gujarati, 1999). If this rule is not followed, there will be a problem of perfect multicolli~earity. This 
is the reason why the utilities industry is not included as a dummy variable in the regressIOns. I have 
chosen to exclude the utilities industry from the list of dummy variables due to the relatively small 
number of observations of utilities in the sample. 
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Table 6.4 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Regression Results including Dummy Variables (1995 - 1998) (n=1406) 
Dependent variable 
(RSE) H~~othesis I H~~othesis 2 H~~othesis 3 
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
t -statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
DIRSH 0.269 0.016 
-1.985 
3.075 *** 0.051 
-'A'3** 
DIRSH- N/A 0.364 7.458 
0.863 2.733 *** 
DIRSW N/A N/A 
-6.213 
-2.631 *** 
InRem -0.002 0.001 0.002 
-0.112 0.035 0.113 
BoardSize -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 
-1.018 -1.068 -0.867 
PropNexe -0.028 -0.020 0.000 
-0.194 -0.142 0.000 
InSales 0.117 0.116 0.111 
6.133 ***** 6.069 ***** 5.777 ***** 
TD/TA -1.368 -1.366 -1.346 
-11.168***** -11.142 ***** -10.986 ***** 
Sales growth 0.035 0.035 0.035 
1.662 * 1.647 * 1.650 * 
Intercept -2.073 -2.066 -1.944 
-5.325 ***** -5.305 ***** -4.968 ***** 
DUM95 0.239 0.239 0.238 
3.987 ***** 3.983 ***** 3.967 ***** 
DUM96 0.202 0.203 0.201 
3.382 **** 3.395 **** 3.357 **** 
DUM97 0.190 0.190 0.190 
3.179 *** 3.178*** 3.174 *** 
DUMConEnt 0.003 -0.0 II -0.041 
0.022 -0.076 -0.270 
DUM Properties -0.043 -0.056 -0.087 
-0.282 -0.364 -0.564 
DUM Industrials 0.102 0.092 0.064 
0.661 0.595 0.414 
Adjusted R- 0.108 0.108 0.112 
F -statistic 13.355 ***** 12.452 ***** 12.136 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 16.86% 
63.17% 
Hypothesis I and Hypothesis 3 are supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis I: RSE = 0.269 DIRSH 
Hypothesis 3: RSE = - 1.985DIRSH + 7.458DIRSH2 - 6.213DIRSH3 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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On the contrary, it is found that the coefficients of DUM95, DUM96 and DUM9i are 
all statistically significant. This indicates that while the three years (1995, 1996 and 
1997) have similar significant effects on RSE in the three years, the effect of 1998 
may be different from that of the three years from 1995 to 1997. If this is the case, it 
is most likely due to the East-Asian financial crisis which took place in late 1997. In 
order to confirm that there is a significant difference between the three-year period 
(1995 to 1997) and the year of 1998, and that the difference is due to the effect of the 
financial crisis, a test is carried out to compare the means of RSE during the period 
from 1995 to 1998 with the means from each other year. The comparison results are 
reported in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Comparisons ofRSE among the Years 1995 -1998 
Post Hoc Test (Bonferroni II) 
Year (I) Year (J) 
Mean Difference in RSE p-value 
(I-J) 
1995 1996 0.0393 1.000 
1997 0.0142 1.000 
1998 0.2175* 0.002 
1996 1995 -0.0393 1.000 
1997 -0.0251 1.000 
1998 0.1782 * 0.017 
1997 1995 -0.0142 1.000 
1996 0.0251 1.000 
1998 0.2033 * 0.004 
1998 1995 -0.2175 * 0.002 
1996 -0.1782 * 0.017 
1997 -0.2033 * 0.004 
# The Bonferroni test is more powerful than the other types of Post Hoc tests in comparing small 
number of pairs. It has the advantage of adjusting the observed significance level for the fact that 
multiple comparisons are made. The overall error rate is controlled (Norusis, 1996). 
* The mean difference is siRnificant at the 0.05 level . 
.t Year 1998 is excluded from the dummy variable list in order to avoid the problem of perfect 
multicoIlinearity. I propose that the effect of Year 1998 on RSE. ifany, should be different from 1995. 
1996 and 1997 due to the East-Asian financial crisis. 
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The results in Table 6.5, where the Post Hoc (Bonferroni) pain-VIse multiple 
comparison test is performed on the mean values of RSE, confirm that the mean value 
of RSE in 1998 is significantly less than those in the years 1995 to 1997. Further 
analyses on the relationship between RSE and managerial ownership before and after 
the East-Asian financial crisis are performed in section 6.4. 
6.3.2 Alternate Accounting Measures of Performance 
To further test the robustness of the results, other accounting measures of performance 
are used as the dependent variable in the regression analyses. The accounting 
measures employed include the ratios of return on capital employed (ROCE) and 
return on total assets (ROA). Regressions are run for the three hypotheses for the 
whole period under study (1995-1998). The regressions produce similar results to 
those obtained when RSE is used as the dependent variable. All the independent and 
control variables, which show significant results when RSE is used as the dependent 
variable in the regressions, also give significant results when ROCE or ROA is 
replaced as the dependent variable. Table 6.6 summarises and compares the 
regression results when different accounting measures are used in the regressions 
against managerial ownership, board structure variables, other control variables and 
the dummy variables. 
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Table 6.6 Relationship between Different Accounting Measures 
and Managerial Ownership 
Extract of Regression Results for Comparison (1995 - 1998) (n=1406) 
Dependent variable (RSE) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R" 
F-statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROC E) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R" 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROA) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
DIRSH" 
DIRSH 3 
Adjusted R" 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Hypothesis 1 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
0.269 
3.075 *** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.108 
13.355 ***** 
N/A 
0.202 
3.904 ***** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.114 
14.100 ***** 
N/A 
0.093 
5.711 ***** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.171 
21.987 ***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 2 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
0.016 
0.051 
0.364 
0.863 
N/A 
0.108 
12.452 ***** 
N/A 
0.046 
0.256 
0.224 
0.896 
N/A 
0.114 
13.148 ***** 
N/A 
0.092 
1.611 
0.002 
0.021 
N/A 
0.170 
20.40 I ***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 3 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
-1.985 
-2.423 ** 
7.458 
2.733 *** 
-6.213 
-2.631 *** 
0.112 
12.136 ***** 
16.86% 
63.17% 
-1.162 
-2.392 ** 
4.509 
2.787 *** 
-3.753 
-2.680 *** 
0.118 
12.809 ***** 
16.14% 
63.96% 
-0.276 
-1.799** 
1.308 
2.559 *** 
-1.144 
-2.586 *** 
0.173 
19.570 ***** 
12.65% 
63.57% 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are supported when different accounting measures are used as the 
dependent variable in the re~ressions a~ainst mana~erial ownership and other control variables 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
* * * * Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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Table 6.6 shows that F-statistics increase when ROCE and ROA are used (for RSE: 
12.136-13.355; for ROCE: 12.809-14.100; for ROA: 19.570-21.987). The adjusted R-
squared figures also improve (for RSE: 10.8%-11.2%, for ROCE: 11.4%-11.8%, for 
ROA: 17.00/0-17.30/0). The results also show that both Hypothesis (1) and Hypothesis 
(3) are supported. This supports the robustness of the findings as indicated in Table 
6.4. 
As shown in Table 6.6, the positive linear relationship between the accounting 
measure of performance and managerial ownership under Hypothesis (1) is even more 
strongly significant when ROCE and ROA are used as the dependent variable. 
Regarding the cubic form of relationship under Hypothesis (3), the results show that 
the relationship between the accounting measure of performance and managerial 
ownership also follows an "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" pattern. The 
range of alignment is similar under alternate specifications (for RSE: 16.86%-63.17%; 
for ROCE: 16.140/0-63.960/0; for ROA: 12.65%-63.57%). All of these findings 
demonstrate the robustness of results, which further confirms that the relationship 
between RSE and DIRSH is non-linear and cubic in nature, with a pattern of 
"entrenchment -al ignment -entrenchment". 
6.3.3 Heteroskedasticity and Outliers Tests 
To furt ler test the robustness of the results, the regressions of RSE against managerial 
ownership are re-run using the White's (1980) procedure to correct for 
heteroskedasticity (Gujarati. 1999). All the variables that show significant 
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relationships with RSE in the original regressions also give significant results and \\-ith 
the same signs of the coefficients under the heteroskedasticity test. Table 6.7 presents 
the results of the regressions with the adjusted t-statistics after checking for 
heteroskedasticity. 
OLS regressions are also re-run by eliminating observations in the 99th percentile in 
order to control for the possible influences of outliers on the results. All the variables 
that show significant relationships with RSE in the original regressions also give 
significant results in the re-run regressions where the 99th percentile observations are 
excluded 5. Table 6.8 presents the results of the regressions based on 1386 
observations. Adjusted R-squared figures improve after the outliers are eliminated 
(Tables 6.4 and 6.7: 10.8%-11.2%; Table 6.8: 16.2%-16.5%). Both Hypothesis (1) 
and Hypothesis (3) are supported. These re-run regressions are also checked using the 
heteroskedasticity test. The adjusted t-statistics show that the relationships are even 
more significant than the original regressions. Similar inflection points are obtained 
under Hypothesis (3) (Tables 6.4 and 6.7: 16.86% and 63.17%; Table 6.8: 16.30% and 
63.59%). All of the above findings demonstrate the robustness of the results. 
5 While all the variables that show significant results in the original regressions also giv( significant 
results in the re-run regressions where outliers are excluded, an additional finding from the outliers test 
is that the relationship between PropNexe and RSE is negative, which is contrary to expectations. 
However, as the coefficients are not statistically significant \\e cannot conclude that the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board (PropNexe) has a negative impact on firm performance (RSE). 
This result nevertheless casts some doubt on the effectiveness of non-executive directors as effective 
corporate governance mechanisms in Hong Kong. 
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Table 6.7 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Heteroskedasticity Test on Full Sample (1995 - 1998) (n=1406) 
Dependent variable 
(RSE) Hl']~othesis 1 Hy~othesis 2 Hy~othesis 3 
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Adjusted t-statistic Adjusted t-statistic Adjusted t-statistic 
DIRSH 0.269 0.016 
-1. 985 
2.847 *** 0.079 
-1.157 # 
DIRSH- N/A 0.364 7.458 
1.030 1.688 * 
DIRSW N/A N/A 
-6.213 
-1.686 * 
InRem -0.002 0.001 0.002 
-0.170 0.051 0.160 
BoardSize -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 
-1.157 -1.183 -1.061 
PropNexe -0.028 -0.020 0.000 
-0.175 -0.126 0.000 
InSales 0.117 0.116 0.111 
4.096 ***** 4.154***** 4.332 ***** 
TDITA -1.368 -1.366 -1.346 
-3.702 **** -3.716 **** -3.775 **** 
Sales growth 0.035 0.035 0.035 
2.410** 2.398 ** 2.386 ** 
Intercept -2.073 -2.066 -1.944 
-3.200 *** -3.212 *** -3.340 **** 
DUM95 0.239 0.239 0.238 
2.949 *** 2.951 *** 2.966 *** 
DUM96 0.202 0.203 0.201 
2.469 ** 2.464 ** 2.473 ** 
DUM97 0.190 0.190 0.190 
2.564 ** 2.563 ** 2.572 ** 
DUMConEnt 0.003 -0.011 -0.041 
0.053 -0.200 -0.756 
DUM Properties -0.043 -0.056 -0.087 
-0.580 -0.811 -1.447 
DUMlndustrials 0.102 0.092 0.064 
0.890 0.843 0.664 
Adjusted R- 0.108 0.108 0.112 
F -statistic 13.355 ***** 12.452 ***** 12.136 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 16.86% 
63.17% 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.269 DIRSH 
Hypothesis 3: RSE = -1.985DIRSH + 7.458DIRSH 2 - 6.213DIRSH3 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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Table 6.8 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Outliers Test: Outliers Excluded from the Sample (1995 - 1998) (0=1386) 
Dependent variable 
(RSE) H~(!othesis 1 H~(!othesis 2 H~(!othesis 3 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Independent variables t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
Adjusted t-statistic Adjusted t-statistic Adjusted t-statistic 
DIRSH 0.187 0.037 -1.163 
3.327 **** 0.187 -2.208 ** 
4.149 ***** 0.209 -2.092 ** 
DIRSH- N/A 0.216 
-+..+70 
0.796 2.548 ** 
0.797 2.353 ** 
DIRSHo N/A N/A -3.726 
-2.454 ** 
-2.294 ** 
InRem -0.013 -0.011 -0.010 
-1.025 -0.877 -0.807 
-1.204 -1.077 -1.005 
BoardSize -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 
-0.815 -0.864 -0.678 
-1.072 -1.145 -0.901 
PropNexe -0.174 -0.170 -0.157 
-1.916* -1.860 * -1.717 * 
-1.788 * -1.763 * -1.621 # 
InSales 0.102 0.102 0.099 
8.348 ***** 8.289 ***** 8.020 ***** 
5.734 ***** 5.790 ***** 5.723 ***** 
TD/TA -1.091 -1.090 -1.078 
-13.767 ***** -13.749 ***** -13.609 ***** 
-5.535 ***** -5.556 ***** -5.550 ***** 
Sales growth 0.024 0.024 0.024 
1.789* 1. 772 * 1.786 * 
2.896 *** 2.881 *** 2.863 *** 
Intercept -1.567 -1.564 -1.494 
-6.256 ***** -6.242 ***** -5.935 ***** 
-6.135 ***** -6.155 ***** -5.948 ***** 
Adjusted R- 0.162 0.162 0.165 
F -statistic 20.493 ***** 19.069 ***** 18.269 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 16.30% 
63.59% 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 3 are supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.187 DIRSH 
Hypothesis 3: RSE = -1.163DIRSH + 4.470DIRSH2 - 3.726DIRSH3 
Year and industry dummies are included in the regressions though not reported for simplicity. 
* Significant at 0.1 confide-nee level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.0 I confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.00 I confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.000 I confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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6.4 Effect of the East-Asian Financial Crisis on the 
Relationship 
From the regression results as presented in sections 6.2 and 6.3 of this chapter. it is 
evident that the relationship between the accounting measure of firm performance and 
managerial ownership in Hong Kong takes the non-linear, cubic form of 
"'entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment". The results also show that both board 
structure variables and the industry variable do not have significant impacts on firm 
performance. However, it is noted that the macro-economic environment over time 
may affect firm performance. This section aims to find out w:lether macro-economic 
conditions and, in particular, the East-Asian financial crisis that commenced in late 
1997, had any impact on the relationship between corporate performance and 
managerial ownership in Hong Kong. 
Before carrying out the regression analyses, it is necessary to review the economic 
conditions, both before and after the financial crisis. Particular reference will be made 
to the economic condition over the four years 1995 to 1998, which is the sampled 
period in this study, in order to facilitate explanation of the regression results. 
6.4.1 Economic Conditions Before and After the East-Asian 
Financial Crisis 
The year 1997 was an eventful year for the Hong Kong economy. On 1 July 1997 the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong was returned by the British Government to the People's 
Republic of China. With the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
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Region and the implementation of the "One Country, Two Systems" policy. Hong 
Kong remained as a productive and prosperous region until it was affected by the East-
Asian financial turmoil, in late 1997. 
Before the East-Asian financial crisis, Hong Kong had a prosperous economy. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) registered accelerated growth of 6.8% in the second quarter 
of 1997. The property and stock markets were also booming so much that there was, it 
is now clear, "a bubble economy" in Hong Kong. The Hang Seng index expanded to a 
then record level of 16,820 in August 1997. The average property price went up by 
480/0 during the period from January to October 1997. With the East-Asian financial 
turmoil, which first broke out in Thailand in July 1997 and then extended to other 
economies in the region, Hong Kong, as a global financial centre, could not remain 
immune from the disaster. The Hong Kong dollar came under a major speculative 
attack in October 1997 and local interest rates became subject to strong upward 
pressure. This event, together with the overheating bubble economy, contributed to 
the fast rate of collapse of the stock and property markets and the Hong Kong 
economy as a whole. 
Hong Kong's GDP growth dropped tremendously from 5% in 1997 to -5.3% in 1998. 
There was a major decline in the inflation rate from 5.8% in 1997 to 2.8% in 1998. 
From 1999 onwards, Hong Kong has experienced deflation (1999: -40/0, 2000: -3.8%, 
2001: -1.6% ). The unemployment rate increased sharply after 1997 and reached a 
record high level of 7.80/0 in July 2002. Figures 6.1 to 6.3, below, report the values of 
the major economic performance indicators during the years 1995 to 2001 - i.e. the 
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period of study (1995-1998) and the three years following 1998. Figures 6.4 and 6. -
show the property and rental prices of residential properties and office premises in 
Hong Kong from 1995 to 2000. 
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Figure 6.2 Inflation Rate (in Percentage) 
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Figure 6.4 Residential Property Prices and Rentals 
* Covering all completed flats, but excluding pre-completion flats. 
Source: Hong Kong Year Book - Year 2000, The Hong Kong Government 
Figure 6.5 Office Premises Prices and Rentals 
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Source: Hong Kong Year Book - Year 2000, The Hong Kong Government 
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Figures 6.6 and 6.7 below show the market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock 
market during the last decade (from 1991 to 2002) and the growth of Hong Kong s 
GOP over the period from 1997 to 2002 (with quarterly and seasonally adjusted data) . 
I t appears from the two figures ' statistics that there was a slight revival in late 1999 
and early 2000. However, the economic conditions worsened again in 2001 as Hong 
Kong was affected by negative spillovers from the world economy, aggravated by the 
" September 11 event" in New York in 2001. 
Figure 6.6 Market Capitalization of Hong Kong Listed Shares 
" ": " ' .. ~, , , ' Market Capitalisation by Industry* (HK$ billion) 
Consolidated 
Total Finance Utilities Properties Enterprises Industrials Hotels Others 
As at end 
1991 949 ,2 154.0 175,7 255 .6 270.7 65,9 20.8 6.3 
1992 1,332.2 297.9 222.8 332.7 352.3 92.6 28.1 5.8 
1993 2,975.4 599.7 420 ,7 856,7 828 .8 186.7 73,6 9.1 
1994 2,085.2 452.4 321 ,7 533.3 581.4 128.7 59 .1 8,6 
1995 2,348.3 570.0 328 .0 621 ,1 634.9 137.3 52,1 5.0 
1996 3,476.0 805.5 357 ,5 1,079.4 903,1 252,0 68,8 9,6 
1997 3,202,3 864,0 598 .9 679.3 674 .8 320,0 48.2 17.4 
1998 2,661 .7 787.4 527 ,7 562.6 528 .0 217 .0 31 .6 7.5 
1999 4,727.5 1,224,2 1,132.5 773 .5 1,170.7 377.5 40.0 9.2 
2000 
-, 
4,795.2 1,441 ,1 290.0 698.4 1,968.4 333,8 34.6 28,8 
2001 3,885 .3 1,142.4 265.6 576.6 1,435,1 431 .3 28.0 6.4 
2002 
01 3,855.3 1,133.4 286 ,2 535,1 1,367 ,8 500.4 28.9 3.4 
02 3,791 .7 1,130.0 286 .5 530.6 1,286,3 525 .5 29.7 3.0 
03 3,327 ,1 1,102.4 288 .0 414 .5 1,036.8 458 .2 24.2 2.9 
• Main Board only 
Remark : Figures may not add up to totals due to rounding 
Source: The Hong Kong Exchange and Clearing Limited 
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Figure 6.7 Hong Kong's Change in Gross Domestic Product 
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6.4.2 Regression Results 
In this section, analyses are performed to determine whether the East-Asian financial 
crisis that took place in late 1997 has any impact on the relationship between firm 
performance (RSE) and managerial ownership (DIRSH). The sample and the 
variables used in the regressions are the same as those used for the study reported in 
previous sections. That is, it is based on 1406 firm-year observations during the 
period 1995 to 1998. The three hypotheses are also the same, as follows: 
RSE = a + ~l Managerial Ownership + y Control variables 
RSE = a + ~ 1 Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ y Control variables 
RSE = a + ~ 1 Managerial Ownership + ~2 Managerial Ownership2 
+ ~3 Managerial Ownership3 + y Control variables 
Since it is found from the results in Table 6.5 that the mean value of RSE in 1998 is 
significantly less than those in the years 1995 to 1997, two separate regressions are 
run: one for the period 1995 to 1997 (pre-crisis) and one for the year 1998 (post-
crisis). The aim is to determine whether there are any differences in the pattern of the 
relationship between RSE and managerial ownership from the findings reported in 
Table 6.4 above. The regression results are presented in Table 6.9 (pre-crisis) and 
Table 6.10 (post-crisis) respectively. 
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Table 6.9 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Regression Analysis (Pre-crisis: 1995 - 1997) (0=1061) 
Dependent variable 
(RSE) H~l!0thesis 1 H~l!0thesis 2 H~l!0thesis 3 
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
t-statistic t -statistic t -statistic 
DIRSH 0.167 -0.032 -0.822 
2.961 *** -0.163 -1.547# 
DIRSH L N/A 0.286 3.080 
1.055 1.743 * 
DIRSH~ N/A N/A 
-2.444 
-1.600 # 
InRem 0.004 0.006 0.007 
0.326 0.494 0.526 
BoardSize -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
-1.029 -1.085 -0.940 
PropNexe -0.073 -0.067 -0.058 
-0.809 -0.742 -0.636 
InSales 0.078 0.077 0.075 
6.300 ***** 6.231 ***** 6.040 ***** 
TDITA -0.847 -0.844 -0.836 
-10.678 ***** -10.648 ***** -10.527 ***** 
Sales growth 0.020 0.020 0.020 
1.619 1.593 1.585 
Intercept -1.264 -1.258 -1.21 1 
-4.998 ***** -4.976 ***** -4.761 ***** 
DUM95 0.038 0.038 0.038 
1.146 1.142 1.132 
DUM96 0.002 0.002 0.001 
0.048 0.069 0.044 
DUMConEnt -0.042 -0.053 -0.063 
-0.436 -0.549 -0.654 
DUMProperties -0.111 -0.120 -0.13 I 
-1.119 -1.211 -1.314 
DUMlndustrials -0.033 -0.040 -0.049 
-0.330 -0.401 -0.495 
Adjusted R- 0.127 0.127 0.128 
F -statistic 13.079 ***** 12.160 ***** 11.492 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 16.64%) See 
67.38%) Note 
Hypothesis 1 is supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hy~othesis 1: RSE = 0.167 DIRSH 
Note: Not very significant results:-
Hypothesis 3: RSE = - O.822DIRSH + 3.080DIRSH2 - 2.444DIRSH3 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.000 I confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 to 0.1'2 confidence k\ el using two-tailed test 
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Table 6.10 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Regression Analysis (Post-crisis: Year 1998) (n=345) 
Dependent variable 
(RSE) Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
t-statistic t -statistic t-statistic 
DIRSH 0.476 -0.046 -5.769 
l.60 I # -0.044 -2.078 ** 
DIRSH- N/A 0.764 21.144 
0.521 2.278 ** 
DIRSH 3 N/A N/A -17.921 
-2.224 ** 
InRem -0.016 -0.009 0.000 
-0.227 -0.130 0.006 
BoardSize -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 
-0.763 -0.80 I -0.728 
PropNexe 0.051 0.067 0.088 
0.103 0.133 0.177 
InSales 0.214 0.212 0.196 
3.291 **** 3.243 **** 3.005 *** 
TD/TA -2.864 -2.861 -2.823 
-6.783 ***** -6.766 ***** -6.712 ***** 
Salesgrowth 0.185 0.187 0.193 
1.573 1.582 1.648 
Intercept -3.532 -3.516 -3.161 
-2.704 *** -2.688 *** -2.414** 
DUMConEnt 0.226 0.194 0.083 
0.441 0.375 0.162 
DUM Properties 0.227 0.197 0.070 
0.431 0.372 0.132 
DUM Industrials 0.456 0.430 0.316 
0.871 0.816 0.601 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.125 0.136 
F -statistic 5.770 ***** 5.258 ***** 5.292 ***** 
Inflection points N/A N/A 17.56% 
61.10% 
Hypothesis 3 is supported 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis 3: RSE =- 5.769DIRSH + 21.144DIRSH2 -17.921DIRSH3 
Note: Not very significant results:-
Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.476 DIRSH 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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Table 6.9 shows that the relationship between RSE and DIRSH is linear for the period 
of 1995-1997. This is robust to the findings as shown in Table 6.4. The pattern of the 
cubic relationship (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) can also be observed (with 
inf1ection points 16.64% and 67.38%) but the relationship is not as significant as the 
findings for the whole period under study (1995-1998) as shown in Table 6 . .+. This 
shows that during the period of 1995-1997 (that is, before the East-Asian financial 
crisis), accounting performance (RSE) appears to have a strong positive linear 
relationship with managerial ownership (DIRSH). The entrenchment effect appears 
not to be so significant in the "prosperous" years (i.e. 1995-1997). 
The situation is just the reverse for the year 1998 as indicated by the regression results 
in Table 6.10. After the financial crisis, the relationship between RSE and DIRSH is 
in a cubic form (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment). The range of alignment 
(17.560/0 - 61.100/0) becomes narrower, but it is still similar to the findings as shown in 
Table 6.4 (16.86% - 63.170/0). The linear relationship can still be observed though it is 
not as significant as that for the period of 1995-1997. 
The findings of the two regressIOns (Tables 6.9 and 6.10) not only indicate the 
robustness of the results as presented in Table 6.4, they also show that the pattern of 
the relationship is more positive and linear in nature in the "prosperous" years and 
takes a more non-monotonic form (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) during 
"difficult" times. It is found that macro-economic condition does affect the 
relationship between corporate performance and managerial o\\nership. A summary 
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of the results for the whole period of study (1995-1998), pre-crisis (1995-1997) and 
post-crisis (1998) is presented in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11 Comparison of Relationship between RSE and 
Managerial Ownership 
Dependent Variable: Significant Result Found Turning Points 
RSE (YeslNo) 
Explanatory Variable: Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis 3: (Compute when or 
Managerial Ownership Linear Relationship Cubic Form of assume that 
Relationship Hypothesis 3 holds) 
1995 - 1998 Yes Yes 
(Whole period) RSE=0.269DIRSH Entrenchment -
(significant positive Alignment - 16.86% 
linear relationship) Entrenchment 63.17% 
1995 -1997 Yes No 
(Pre-crisis) RSE=0.167DIRSH (not very 
(significant positive significant 
linear relationship) "Entrenchment - 16.64%) not very 
Alignment - 67.38%) significant 
Entrenchment" results 
relationship) 
Year 1998 No Yes 
(Post-crisis) (not very significant Entrenchment -
positive linear Alignment - 17.56% 
relationship) Entrenchment 61.10% 
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6.4.3 Robustness of Results and Sensitivity Analyses 
To further test the robustness of the results, other accounting measures of performance 
are used as the dependent variable in the regression analyses. The accounting 
measures employed include the ratios of return on capital employed (ROCE) and 
return on total assets (ROA). Regressions have been run for the three hypotheses for 
the whole period under study (1995-1998) in section 6.3.2 already (Table 6.6). In this 
section, additional regressions are run for the period of 1995-1997 (pre-crisis) and the 
year 1998 (post-crisis). These regressions produce similar results to those obtained 
when RSE is used as the dependent variable. All the independent and control 
variables, which show significant results when RSE is used as the dependent variable 
in the regressions, also give significant results when ROCE or ROA is replaced as the 
dependent variable. 
Table 6.12 summarIses the regresslOn results when RSE, ROCE and ROA are 
employed as the dependent variable in the regressions for the period from 1995 to 
1997. The results show that the positive linear relationship between the accounting 
measure of performance and managerial ownership under Hypothesis (1) is even more 
strongly significant when ROCE and ROA are used as the dependent variable. This is 
robust to the results as shown in Table 6.6 and Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.12 Relationship between Different Accounting Measures 
and Managerial Ownership 
Extract of Regression Results for Comparison (1995 - 1997) (n=1061) 
Dependent variable (RSE) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R" 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROCE) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R2 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROA) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R2 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Hypothesis 1 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
0.167 
2.961 *** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.127 
13.079 ***** 
N/A 
0.131 
3.832 ***** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.136 
14.136 ***** 
N/A 
0.072 
4.536 ***** 
N/A 
NlA 
0.137 
14.219 ***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 2 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
-0.032 
-0.163 
0.286 
1.055 
N/A 
0.127 
12.160 ***** 
N/A 
-0.049 
OA12 
0.259 
1.574 
N/A 
0.138 
13.259 ***** 
N/A 
0.015 
0.272 
0.082 
1.070 
N/A 
0.137 
13.215 ***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 3 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
-0.822 
-1.547 # 
3.080 
1.743 * 
-2A44 
-1.600 # 
0.128 
11A92 ***** 
16.6-1% ) See 
67.38% ) Nole 
-OAI7 
- 1.292 ## 
1.558 
1A53 ## 
-1.137 
-1.227 ## 
0.138 
12A26 ***** 
16.29%) See 
7506%) Nole 
-0.216 
-1.442 ## 
0.901 
1.807 * 
-0.717 
-1.662 * 
0.139 
12A91 ***** 
1-1.50% ) See 
Hypothesis I is supported when different accounting measures are used as the dependent 
variable in the regressions against managerial ownership and other control variables 
Note: Not very significant results for Hypothesis 3 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** * * * Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
# Significant at 0.11 to 0.122 confidence level using two-tailed test 
## Significant at 0.146 to 0.2' confidence level using two-tailed test 
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Regarding the cubic form of the relationship under Hypothesis (3), the results show 
that the relationship between the accounting measure of performance and managerial 
ownership is not very significant but the "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment"' 
pattern can still be observed. This, again, is robust to the results as indicated in Table 
6.6 and Table 6.9. The turning points are computed assuming that Hypothesis (3) 
holds. The range of alignment is also fairly similar under alternate specifications (for 
RSE: 16.64%-67.38%; for ROCE: 16.29%-75.06%; for ROA: 14.50%-69.27%). 
Table 6.13 summanses the regressIOn results when RSE, ROCE and ROA are 
employed as the dependent variable in the regressions for the year 1998. The results 
show that when ROCE is used as the dependent variable, both Hypotheses (1) and (3) 
are supported. The relationship between ROCE and DIRSH has elements of both the 
functional forms: a positive linear relationship as supported by Hypothesis (1); and a 
cubic form of the relationship (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) as supported 
by Hypothesis (3) with turning points of 16.54% and 60.46%. When ROA is used as 
the dependent variable, Hypothesis (1) is supported while Hypothesis (3) is only 
supported in the second and third range of the "entrenchment-alignment-
entrenchment" pattern of the relationship. The second turning point (58.50%) 
computed under Hypothesis (3) is comparable to the findings in earlier regressions. 
All the above results in general demonstrate the robustness of the regression results. 
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Table 6.13 Relationship between Different Accounting Measures 
and Managerial Ownership 
Extract of Regression Results for Comparison (Year 1998) (n=345) 
Dependent variable (RSE) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R2 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROCE) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R2 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Dependent variable (ROA) 
Independent variables 
DIRSH 
Adjusted R2 
F -statistic 
Inflection points 
Hypothesis 1 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
0.476 
1.601 
N/A 
N/A 
0.127 
5.770 ***** 
N/A 
0.365 
2.080 ** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.122 
5.550 ***** 
N/A 
0.148 
3.370 **** 
N/A 
N/A 
0.172 
7.790 ***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 2 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
-0.046 
-0.044 
0.764 
0.521 
N/A 
0.125 
5.258 ***** 
N/A 
0.224 
0.362 
0.207 
0.238 
N/A 
0.119 
5.036 ***** 
N/A 
0.305 
1.971 ** 
-0.229 
-1.056 
N/A 
0.172 
7.186***** 
N/A 
Hypothesis 3 
Coefficient 
t-statistic 
-5.769 
-2.078 ** 
21.144 
2.278 ** 
-17.921 
-2.224 ** 
0.136 
5.292 ***** 
17.56% 
61.10% 
-3.482 
-2.128 ** 
13.406 
2.450 ** 
-11.607 
-2.443 ** 
0.133 
5.186 ***** 
16.54% 
60.46% 
-0.462 
-1.125 
2.502 
1.823 * 
-2.401 
-2.015 ** 
0.180 
6.989 ***** 
10.96% 
58.50% 
When RSE is used as the dependent variable, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
When ROCE is used as the dependent variable, both Hypotheses 1 and 3 are supported. 
When ROA is used as the dependent variable, Hypothesis 1 is supported while Hypothesis 3 is 
supported in the second and third range of the "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" pattern 
of relationship. 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
* * * * * Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using t\vo-tailed test 
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6.S Individual Year Analyses 
While it is found that the relationship between firm performance (RSE) and 
managerial ownership (DIRSH) has a more positive linear nature during the pre-crisis 
period of 1995-1997, further analyses are performed in this section to ascertain 
whether the relationship is similar in each of the individual years 1995. 1996 and 
1997. The regression results show that in 1995, only Hypothesis (3) is supported, 
denoting a cubic (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) relationship. For 1996 and 
1997, Hypothesis (l) is supported which shows that the relationship between RSE and 
DIRSH is positive and linear in nature. 
Table 6.14 summarises the regression results for the individual years 1995, 1996 and 
1997. Only the hypotheses which give significant results are presented in Table 6.14 
for simplicity and ease of comparison. 
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Table 6.14 Relationship between RSE and Managerial Ownership 
Individual Years Regression Analyses (Year 1995,1996 & 1997) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 
Dependent variable (n=361) (n=353) (n=3~7) 
(RSE) H~I!0thesis 3 H~I!0thesis 1 H~I!0thesis I 
Independent variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
DIRSH -1.4 70 0.198 0.206 
-1.738 * 1.764 * 2.244 ** 
DIRSH- 5.241 N/A N/A 
1.876 * 
DIRSH J -4.381 N/A N/A 
-1.825 * 
InRem -0.011 0.015 0.017 
-0.519 0.581 0.869 
BoardSize -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 
-1.475 -0.200 -0.058 
PropNexe -0.209 0.039 -0.042 
-1.412 0.226 -0.278 
InSales 0.114 0.057 0.054 
5.839 ***** 2.358 ** 2.610*** 
TD/TA -0.945 -0.787 -0.774 
-7.205 ***** -5.248 ***** -5.872 ***** 
Sales growth 0.019 0.019 0.013 
1.339 0.565 0.486 
Intercept -1.495 -1.116 -1.049 
-3.631 **** -2.272 ** -2.578 ** 
DUMConEnt -0.031 -0.030 -0.107 
-0.193 -0.161 -0.674 
DUM Properties -0.172 -0.083 -0.109 
-1.056 -0.434 -0.671 
DUM Industrials -0.032 -0.082 -0.032 
-0.193 -0.429 -0.194 
Adjusted R- 0.190 0.085 0.106 
F -statistic 7.512 ***** 4.095 ***** 4.920 ***** 
Inflection points 18.16%) See N/A N/A 
61.59% ) Note 
Note: Hypothesis 3 is supported in 1995 
Assuming all other variables are constant: 
Hypothesis 3: RSE = -1.470DIRSH + 5.241DIRSH2 - 4.381DIRSH3 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in 1996 
Assuming all other variables are constant: Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.198 DIRSH 
Hypothesis 1 is supported in 1997 
Assuming all other variables are constant: Hypothesis 1: RSE = 0.206 DIRSH 
* Significant at 0.1 confidence level using two-tailed test 
** Significant at 0.05 confidence level using two-tailed test 
*** Significant at 0.01 confidence level using two-tailed test 
**** Significant at 0.001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
***** Significant at 0.0001 confidence level using two-tailed test 
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From the regression analyses shown in Table 6.14. the general robustness of results is 
demonstrated. While the regression of the pre-crisis period from 1995 to 1997 
supports Hypothesis (l) as indicated in Table 6.9, (that is, the relationship between 
RSE and managerial ownership is in general positive and linear in nature): the 
regression analyses of individual years' data also show that Hypothesis (l) is 
supported in the two years of 1996 and 1997 (Table 6.14). 
However, it is found that in the year of 1995, Hypothesis (3) is supported as the 
coefficients of the managerial ownership variables (DIRSH. DIRSH2 and DIRSH3) are 
all significant and the signs of the coefficients are "negative-positive-negative". The 
relationship between RSE and DIRSH IS cubic (entrenchrnent-alignment-
entrenchment) in nature in 1995. The range of alignment is wide (Table 6.14: 18.16% 
_ 61.59%) and is very close to the findings of the full sample (Table 6.4: 16.86% -
63.170/0) and the year of 1998 (Table 6.10: 17.56% - 61.10%) respectively. 
Table 6.15 summarises and compares the findings of the regressions for whole period 
and individual years in this study. 
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Table 6.15 Comparison of Relationship between RSE and 
Managerial Ownership (Overall and Yearly Datal 
Dependent Variable: Significant Result Found Turning Points 
RSE 
Explanatory Variable: Hypothesis 1: Hypothesis 3: (Compute when 
Managerial Ownership Linear Relationship Cubic Form of Hypothesis 3 holds) 
Relationship 
Overall period: Yes Yes 
1995 - 1998 RSE=0.269DIRSH Entrenchment -
(Table 6.4) (significant positive Alignment - 16.86% 
linear relationship) Entrenchment 63.17% 
Year 1995 No Yes 
(Table 6.14) Entrenchment -
Alignment - 18.16% 
Entrenchment 61.59% 
Year 1996 Yes No N/A 
(Table 6.14) RSE=0.198DIRSH 
(significant positive 
linear relationship) 
Year 1997 Yes No N/A 
(Table 6.14) RSE=0.206DIRSH 
(significant positive 
linear relationship) 
Year 1998 No Yes 
(Table 6.10) (weak positive Entrenchment -
linear relationship) Alignment - 17.56% 
Entrenchment 61.10% 
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The results reported above can be explained by reference to the condition of the Hong 
Kong economy as presented in section 6.4.1. In 1995, the GDP growth rate was 3.9% 
with a relatively high inflation rate of 9.1 %. Compared with 1996 and 1997 in which 
the GDP gro\V1h rates were higher (1996: 4.5%, 1997: 5.0%) and the inflation rates 
were lower (1996: 6.3%, 1997: 5.8%), 1995 was less prosperous than 1996 and 1997 
(Figures 6.1 and 6.2). In addition, the unemployment rate in 1995 (3.2%) was higher 
than that in 1996 (2.80/0) and 1997 (2.2%) (see Figure 6.3). From the above statistics, 
it is noted that the economy in 1995 was not as prosperous as it was in 1996 and 1997. 
In addition, both the property and the stock markets were more buoyant in 1996 and 
1997 as reflected by the property prices and the market capitalization of the stock 
market (see Figures 6.4 - 6.6). 
The regression results show that in 1995 the relationship between RSE and DIRSH is 
cubic (entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment) in nature, \vhich is similar to the 
findings for the year 1998 after the East-Asian financial crisis. This reflects and 
confirms that macro-economic conditions affect the pattern of the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. When the economy is prosperous and 
booming (1996 and 1997), the relationship is more positively linear in nature because 
of the convergence of interests. However, during less prosperous periods (1995) or 
difficult times (1998), the relationship becomes a non-linear one (entrenchment-
alignmel t-entrenchment) due to the entrenchment of interests at high levels of 
managerial ownership. 
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On the whole. the regressions findings (positive linear relationship bet\veen RSE and 
DIRSH in prosperous years and a wide range of alignment in the cubic relationship 
even during difficult times) confirm that the family form of ownership in Hong Kong 
supports the "convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
This can also be related to the Chinese culture of the Hong Kong people, as Hofstede's 
work on the "long-term orientation" dimension indicates that this dimension can 
explain the fast economic growth experienced by the East-Asian countries in the last 
few decades of the twentieth century. Both ownership structure and culture affect the 
relationship between corporate performance and managerial ownership. 
Although the study provides evidence supportive of the view that the family form of 
ownership and the cultural background in Hong Kong are beneficial to firm 
performance, there are times where, at a very high level of managerial ownership, 
especially when the economic condition is less buoyant or is deteriorating, the 
entrenchment effect becomes more dominant. Yet, it is found that the range of 
alignment is still wide under such situations, roughly between the 17% and 62% range 
of managerial ownership. 
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6.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter presents and analyses the regression results of the relationship between 
firm performance and managerial ownership of Hong Kong listed companies. 
Significant results are obtained for the regression analyses of the accounting measure 
of performance (RSE) and managerial ownership (DIRSH). The relationship between 
RSE and DIRSH has elements of two functional forms: a positive linear and a cubic 
("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") relationship for the full sample under study 
(1995-1998). The cubic pattern of the relationship is the reverse of the findings 
("alignment-entrenchment-alignment") of Morek et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey 
(1999). This finding supports the view that studies based on UK and US evidence are 
not necessarily applicable to East-Asian corporations due to the differences in the 
degree of ownership concentration (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
These findings indicate that in Hong Kong corporations the convergence effect is very 
strong over a wide range of managerial ownership (a positive linear relationship as 
supported by Hypothesis (1 ». At the same time, there are some entrenchment effects 
at both ends of the managerial ownership ranges (negative relationships at the very 
low and very high levels of managerial ownership, as supported by Hypothesis (3». 
Hence, the functional form of the relationship between firm performance and 
managerial ownership in this study can be taken to be "non-linear and cubic", with a 
pattern of '"entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment", with a very wide range of 
alignment (between 16.10% and 62.73%) for the full sample. 
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The regression results also find that board size, directors' remuneration and board 
composition do not have any significant relationships with RSE. All of the above 
results are robust when dummy year and industry variables are added to the analyses 
to capture the possible macro-economic environment and industry effects. It is found 
that while industry does not have a significant impact on RSE, the macro-economic 
environment does have an effect on RSE. 
Sensitivity analyses are performed on the relationship between accounting measures of 
performance and managerial ownership. Alternate accounting measures of 
performance, ROCE and ROA, are employed to re-run the regressions with dummy 
variables. The results are robust to the regressions of the full sample when RSE is 
used as the accounting measure of performance. 
In addition, though significant results cannot be obtained for the relationship between 
the market measure of performance (ProxyQ) and managerial ownership, a general 
pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" is found to exist during the period 
of study, with a wide range of alignment. As indicated in Table 6.2, the range of 
alignment is 26.14% to 62.21 % when ProxyQ is used as the dependent variable. This 
is comparable to the significant result obtained when RSE is used as the dependent 
variable (16.10% to 62.73%) as indicated in Table 6.1. 
Further regression analyses are performed to analyse the possible impact of the East-
Asian financial crisis on the relationship between firm performance and managerial 
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ownership in Hong Kong corporations. The empirical results confirm that the macro-
economic environment does affect RSE. Regression analyses on the sampled 
companies for the period 1995-1997 and the year 1998 reveal that the relationship 
between RSE and DIRSH is of a more positive linear character during the pre-crisis 
period of 1995-1997. Regarding the year 1998, the relationship is more non-
monotonic ("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") in nature. Yet, despite the cubic 
form of relationship in 1998, the range of alignment is still very wide (17.56% to 
61.100/0), which is similar to the findings of the regression for the whole period of the 
study (16.860/0 to 63.170/0) (Table 6.15). 
To further test the robustness of the results, sensitivity analyses are performed. 
Alternate accounting measures of performance, ROCE and ROA, are employed to re-
run the regressions with dummy variables, both for the pre-crisis period (1995-1997) 
and the post-crisis year (1998). The results are in general robust to the regressions 
when RSE is used as the accounting measure of performance. The relationship 
between accounting measures of performance and managerial ownership has a more 
positive linear character during the pre-crisis period. For the year 1998, the cubic 
("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") relationship becomes more dominant. 
Further analyses are performed by running regressions for each of the years 1995, 
1996 and 1997 respectively. The results reveal and confirm that the relationship 
between RSE and managerial ownership is affected by macro-economic conditions. In 
1995, when the economy was not as prosperous and buoyant as in 1996 and 1997, the 
relationship has a cubic rather than a positive linear character. 
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On the whole, the empirical results suggest that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and performance in Hong Kong supports the classical "convergence of 
interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The Chinese culture in most 
Hong Kong corporations is also beneficial to performance, as suggested by Hofstede' s 
cultural study of "long-term orientation" dimension. The relationship between RSE 
and DIRSH is a positive linear one during the prosperous years. However, there are 
times when, at very high levels of managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect 
becomes dominant, as denoted by the non-monotonic relationship during less 
prosperous periods. This may be attributed to the central agency problem associated 
with high ownership concentration, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La 
Porta et al. (1999). The results of this study support all of the arguments cited above. 
Controlling family members are more likely to take advantage of minority 
shareholders in order to maximize their own interests at very high level of managerial 
ownership. The present study further finds that this type of behaviour appears more 
.likely to take place during less prosperous periods. This finding is also supported by 
the recent study of Lemmon and Lins (2003) who suggest that during times of 
declining investment opportunities (the East-Asian financial crisis in their study) there 
are increases in the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority 
shareholders, resulting in declines in firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q and stock 
returns in their study. 
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In summary, this study finds that under a family-o\\"ned corporate structure. 
managerial ownership is a useful predictor of the accounting performance (RSE) of 
firms and that macro-economic condition affects the pattern of this relationship. The 
results suggest that if managerial ownership could be modified in an appropriate \\"a)' 
(for example, if managerial ownership was to be maintained at, say. somewhere 
between 17% and 620/0), then corporate performance would be optimized due to the 
convergence of managerial interests. However, due to the strong family-owned nature 
of Hong Kong companies altering the level of managerial ownership is not a task 
which could easily be undertaken. 
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7.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis investigates empirically the relationship between corporate performance 
and managerial ownership under the family-owned corporate structure in Hong Kong. 
using a dataset of companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). It 
also investigates the impact of macro-economic conditions, in the form of the East-
Asian financial crisis, on the relationship between corporate performance and 
managerial ownership in Hong Kong. In addition, it conducts a qualitati\'e analysis of 
the development of corporate governance regimes in selected countries, the impact of 
efforts by international organisations to improve global corporate governance 
practices, and the way in which corporate governance in Hong Kong has been 
affected by these developments. This chapter summaries and concludes the thesis. 
Recommendations are then made for structural improvements to the corporate 
governance regime in Hong Kong. 
Following the well-publicized demise of a number of large corporations in late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the importance of corporate governance became widely recognized 
by investors, corporations, professional bodies, governments and international 
organizations. Increasing demands for market transparency and accountability in the 
UK led to the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, which is generally regarded 
as a milestone in the development of corporate governance, both in the UK and 
elsewhere. The subsequent publication of the Greenbury Report, the Hampel Report. 
the Combined Code and the Turnbull Guidance further enhanced the 
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee in developing an effective corporate 
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governance system in the UK. These efforts are perceived to have been successful. as 
evidenced by the results of various surveys and analyses conducted by specialists and 
research consultants in corporate governance.' For example, as noted in the 
comparison study in Chapter Two, the UK is ranked at the top of the list of countries 
by both the US-based Davis Global Advisors (DGA) and the Belgian-based Deminor 
in their analyses of five developed nations and seventeen European countries in 1999 
and 2000 respectively (DGA, 1999; Deminor, 2001). 
At an international level, various organisations such as the OECD, the International 
Corporate Governance Network, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
have organised forums, roundtables and conferences to discuss issues related to 
corporate governance principles and practices. The issues debated have included 
ways of improving the effectiveness of the board, enhancing the transparency of 
disclosures in financial statements, encouraging more timely disclosures of various 
financial and non-financial transactions, and of improving the effectiveness of the 
audit committee and the remuneration committee. 
It is noted from Chapter Three of the thesis that the problem in most Asian countries 
is one of enforcement and of how to strengthen corporate governance regulations to 
facilitate enforcement. rather than with the regulations per se. Many Asian countries 
I The UK authorities, however, in common with authorities in many other countries, instigated reviews, 
in 2002, of their corporate governance rules as a result of the Enron scandal and related developments 
in the US. 
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have the rules in place but do not ahvays have the capacity, in terms of human capital 
and institutional arrangements, to enforce them (Company Secretary, 2000). 
As a colony of the UK for one and a half centuries, the Hong Kong legal system \\as 
greatly influenced by the UK law, and Hong Kong's corporate gO\·ernance code of 
best practice is based on the UK's voluntary corporate governance code. However, 
given the Chinese cultural background of Hong Kong and the fact that share 
ownership is characterized by a high degree of concentration, much of it in family 
hands, its corporate governance rules are not an exact copy of the UK's Combined 
Code. For example, as noted in Chapter Two, while UK companies are required to 
have nomination and remuneration committees, Hong Kong is still only considering 
the possibility of introducing such committees. 
Despite the fact that Hong Kong's corporate governance system still has much room 
for improvement, it is nevertheless regarded as one of the major financial centres in 
the world. Although the East-Asian financial crisis brought about many corporate 
collapses in the region from late 1997 onwards, in the eyes of many investors and 
expatriates Hong Kong is still regarded as a place with a reasonable degree of 
transparency for business and investment, as evidenced by the 1999 survey results of 
the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited (PERC, 1999) noted in section 
2.6.4, Chapter Two. In analyzing the reasons behind the East-Asian financial crisis 
and associated corporate failures. many commentators cite deficiencies in corporate 
governance sYstems as a contributory factor, in addition to financial attacks bv 
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speculators. Therefore. if Hong Kong can further develop and improve its corporate 
governance system, investors' confidence will be further enhanced, benefiting its 
economic development. At present, although the Hong Kong corporate governance 
system is perceived as a fairly good benchmark for some countries in the Asian 
region. there are nevertheless some areas which lag behind other countries. For 
example. as noted from the companson study in Chapter Two, the code of best 
practice in Hong Kong is not regarded as being comprehensive enough by the Asian 
Corporate Governance Association (ACGA, 2000). 
Apart from the breadth of the code of best practice, improvements are also required in 
a number of other areas, especially the role of audit committees, remuneration 
committees and the transparency of disclosures. These areas for improvement 
mainly stem from the weaknesses brought about by the family-dominated corporate 
structure in Hong Kong. Directors or managers with substantial shareholdings are 
typically reluctant to delegate authority to independent officers and executives. They 
also tend to keep their decisions and business information as secret as possible and do 
not like the idea of "transparency". These characteristics are not unique to Hong 
Kong; they are common in other East-Asian countries. Hence, adoption of corporate 
governance rules in themselves may not be enough to improve corporate performance 
in Hong Kong and in the East-Asian region. There is ar~uably a greater need to 
improve the infrastructure in order to ensure effective implementation of the ruks. for 
example by improving the capacity of the judiciary and the regulatory authorities, and 
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by pro\·iding training and continuing education to directors. without \\·hom corporate 
governance reforms may never become effective. 
Given the ul11que historical background and ownership structure of Hong Kong 
companies. the corporate governance models that are applicable in international 
jurisdictions may not be suitable and effective in Hong Kong. The models in the UK 
and the US cannot be applied blindly to Hong Kong. It is necessary to ascertain the 
relationship between various corporate governance variables (such as managerial 
ownership and board composition) and corporate performance before the principles 
can be applied correctly and sensibly. 
Reviewing the academic literature on the relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm performance, it is evident that this relationship can take a number of forms. 
However, most of the empirical studies to date have been performed using US or UK 
data. To my knowledge, no study has ever been performed to find the relationship 
between ownership and performance under a family-ownership structure. The 
empirical part of this thesis is performed by running OLS multiple regressions on a set 
of panel data which consists of 1406 observations from companies listed on the 
HKSE for the period from 1995 to 1998. 
The study finds significant results for the regressIOn analyses of managerial 
ownership (DIRSH) on the accounting measure of performance (RSE). The 
relationship between RSE and DIRSH for the full sample period (199.5-1998) has 
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elements of the two functional forms: a positive linear form and also a cubic form 
("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment"). The alignment range in the cubic 
relationship is very wide (16.86%-63.170/0). However, the pattern of the cubic 
relationship is opposite to the pattern ("alignment-entrenchment-alignment"') reported 
by Morek et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). In addition, board size. 
remuneration and composition are not found to have a significant relationship with 
RSE in this study. 
The study results also show that while industry does not have any significant impact 
on RSE, the macro-economic environment does affect RSE. The relationship is more 
positive and linear in nature during the pre-crisis period of 1995-1997. Regarding the 
year 1998, the relationship between RSE and DIRSH is more non-monotonic 
C'entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") in nature. Individual year analyses also 
confirm the findings that the relationship between RSE and managerial ownership is 
affected by macro-economic conditions. In 1995, when the economy was not as 
prosperous and buoyant as in 1996 and 1997, the relationship has a cubic 
("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") rather than a positive linear character as in 
1996 and 1997. 
In addition. though significant results are not obtained for the relationship between the 
market measure of performance (ProxyQ) and managerial ownership, a general 
pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchmenC is also found to t?xist during the 
period of the study. with a wide range of alignment (26.14%-62.21 %). This is 
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comparable to the significant result obtained when RSE is used as the dependent 
variable in the regressions utilising the full sample (range of alignment: 16.86%-
63.17%). 
The overall results (a positive linear relationship in prosperous years and a \vide range 
of alignment in the cubic relationship even during difficult times) demonstrate that the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in Hong Kong 
supports the classical "convergence of interest" hypothesis of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). In addition, the family-oriented Chinese culture in Hong Kong is beneficial to 
firm performance as evidenced by the fast rate of economic growth in most of the 
East-Asian countries, including Hong Kong, in the latter part of the twentieth century 
(Hofstede, 2001). As suggested by Hofstede, this is brought about by the "long-term 
orientation" of the "five cultural dimensions", though he also recognises that it is 
difficult to definitively prove this link (Hofstede, 2001). The suggestion of Hofstede, 
however, is supported by the finding in this research that there is a wide range of 
alignment between managerial ownership and firm performance: under the family-
owned corporate structure, firm performance improves when managerial ownership 
increases, and this occurs at most of the ownership levels (approximately from 16% to 
62%). The aggregate result of individual firms' improvement in performance is 
economic growth. The relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance is therefore a positive linear one during prosperous years and this 
"conn?rgence of interest" effect is still very significant as demonstrated by the \\ide 
range of alignment even during difficult periods. 
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However, there are when times the entrenchment effects become dominant as , 
denoted by the entrenchment ranges in the cubic relationship, during difficult times. 
This is due to the entrenchment effects at the lower levels of o'vvnership and the 
central agency problem associated with high ownership concentration, as suggested 
by Fama and Jensen (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999). 
Controlling family members might take advantage of minority shareholders in order 
to maximize their own interests at very high levels of managerial ownership. This 
study finds that this type of behaviour appears more likely to take place during less 
prosperous periods. This finding is also supported by the recent study of Lemmon 
and Lins (2003) who suggest that during times of declining investment opportunities 
(the East-Asian financial crisis in their study) there are increases in the incentives of 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders, resulting in declines 
in firm value, as measured by Tobin's Q and stock returns in their study. 
On the whole, the results of this study show that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance corresponds in general to a cubic form, with a 
pattern of "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment", and that the range of alignment is 
very wide (approximately between 16% and 620/0). The findings support all of the 
arguments concerning "convergence of interests", the "entrenchment effects" and the 
"central agency problem'" associated with high ownership concentration. The 
findings suggest that in Hong Kong managerial o\\"nership has some yalue as a 
predictor of the accounting measure (RSE) of firm performance and that macro-
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economic conditions affect the pattern of the relationship. The fact that the pattern 
found from this study ("entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment") is the reverse of that 
found in the UK and the US studies ("alignment-entrenchment-alignmenf') of Short 
and Keasey (1999) and Morek et al. (1988) also confirms my suggestion that 
ownership structure and culture do affect the nature of the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. This conclusion is supported by Fan 
and Wong (2002) who suggest that studies based on UK or US data are not 
necessarily applicable to East-Asian corporations due to differences in the degree of 
ownership concentration. 
The findings from both the qualitative and quantitative studies in this thesis are 
interrelated In a number of aspects. They both lend support to the view that 
differences In historical background, culture and legal systems are reflected m 
different corporate governance policies and practices. As a consequence, it may be 
argued that there is no single corporate governance model that can be applied 
universally. In the Hong Kong context, there are particular weaknesses in terms of 
the adequacy of disclosures in annual reports, the independence of non-executive 
directors, the comprehensiveness of the code of corporate governance, the 
effectiveness of the audit committee and the absence of remuneration and nomination 
committees. These characteristics are consistent with Chinese culture and the 
concentrated form of family-ownership structure. Chinese family owners tend to keep 
control in their own hands and do not like to delegate their authority. HO\\\~\'~r. at the 
same time, the research reported her~ finds that family ownership is beneficial to 
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performance, which may be explained by the convergence of interests since there is 
no separation of ownership and control. Therefore, if the family fonn of ownership 
can be controlled at a certain level (for example, at say, between 16% and 62%), 
corporate performance may be optimized due to the convergence of interests. 
However, due to the strong family-owned nature of Hong Kong companies, altering 
the level of managerial ownership may not be an easy task. Under such 
circumstances, if a company's managerial ownership is very highly concentrated (say, 
more than 62% ), the company should pay even more attention to improving its 
corporate governance practices in order to enhance its performance. The 
recommendations for improvements are further discussed in the next section. 
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7.2 Recommendations 
Based on the findings of the qualitative and quantitative analyses performed in the 
previous chapters, there are a number of areas in which Hong Kong can make 
improvements in its corporate governance system. 
I would suggest the following ways to improve the corporate governance regime in 
Hong Kong: 
(a) Frequency o(board meetings 
From the comparative study performed in Chapter Two, it is noted that in the UK, full 
board meetings are required to be held regularly. However, the Listing Rules in Hong 
Kong only require full board meetings to be held no less than once every six months. 
It is important for the directors, who manage the affairs and operation of companies, 
to meet regularly to discuss the current business situation and determine the future 
plans of their company. During the process of data collection from annual reports as 
part of the empirical study, it was noted that a number of annual reports do not 
disclose the number of board meetings held each year. From the above observations, 
my recommendation is that full board meetings should be held more frequently (say, 
at least once every quarter). In addition, disclosure of the frequency of board 
meetings should be made mandatory in companies' annual reports. 
(b) Number and quality o(independent non-executive directors 011 the board 
The comparative study in Chapter Tvy'o notes that in the UK, at least one-third of the 
board must be comprised of non-executive directors. Ho\\·ever. every listed company 
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In Hong Kong is only required to have two independent non-executive directors. 
During the data collection process for the empirical study, it was found that the 
disclosures about independent and non-executive directors are not standarised and are 
not widespread. The empirical study, reported in Chapter Six, also finds that there is 
no significant relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board and firm performance in the Hong Kong context, though significant results are 
found in a number of foreign studies. This finding indicates that there may be 
deficiencies in this corporate governance variable in the Hong Kong context, which 
may account for the absence of any apparent relationship with firm performance. 
Based on the above findings, my recommendation is that the proportion of 
independent non-executive directors on the board should be increased. This would 
bring about more balanced decision-making. Furthermore, if the independent non-
executive directors are from different business sectors, they will bring in different 
ideas and enable greater sharing of valuable experiences. The regulatory authorities 
should also revise the Listing Rules or the relevant regulations in order to encourage 
and ensure full disclosure of the number and types of non-executive and independent 
non-executive directors on the board. The rules and regulations should also work to 
ensure the "independence" of the independent non-executive directors. This is 
necessary in Hong Kong where, as a result of the family-owed and controlled 
corporate structure, "independent" non-executive directors might be related directly or 
indirectly to the family owners. It should be noted that ir.dependent non-executive 
directors can only perform the corporate governance function effectively if they are 
trul y independent. 
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(c) Composition of the board and audit committee 
While independent non-executive directors are an effective mechanism for improving 
corporate governance if they can function properly, I would also recommend that, 
apart from independent non-executive directors, representatives from institutional 
investors and minority shareholders be elected to the board or the audit committees. 
This would allow different groups of shareholders' views to be expressed and 
considered. Also, under this board structure, shareholders would have a more timely 
awareness of the situation of the company and would be able to participate better in 
decision-making processes. 
(d) Qualification requirements of directors 
I would suggest that the deficiencies of the board structure, as highlighted by both the 
qualitative and the quantitative studies, are not only related to the relatively low 
number of, or inadequate disclosure concerning independent non-executive directors, 
but are also related to the quality of the other board members. It is vital for all the 
directors, whether executive or non-executive, to possess the ability to carry out their 
duties effectively and efficiently. However, there are no qualification requirements of 
directors in Hong Kong corporations, except that they must be at least 18 years of age 
and that they are not disqualified from acting as directors. Examples of 
disqualification include bankruptcy and insanity. In my view. these are not enough to 
ensure that directors have the abilities to run and control companies. Mv 
recommendation is that the Listing Rules should set out the qualification requirements 
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of directors. Training can also be provided to individuals before they take up 
directorships. In addition, guidelines on ethical issues and corporate governance 
should be provided to directors regularly. These can help to improve the quality and 
integrity of directors. The professional organisations can contribute to these areas of 
improvement by providing training courses to directors and issuing guidance notes on 
ethical issues and corporate governance practices. 
(e) Frequency ofpuh/ished accounts and reports 
As suggested by various international and professional organisations reported in 
Chapter Three, the level of disclosure in financial reports in Hong Kong needs to be 
further strengthened. Annual reports and accounts are important sources of 
information for shareholders and investors. Timely and accurate information 
provided by the published annual reports and accounts can assist investors in making 
their investment decisions. At the moment, listed companies on the Main Board of 
the Stock Exchange in Hong Kong are required to publish accounts twice in each 
year, that is, the annual report and the interim report. For the companies listed on the 
Growth Enterprise Market, quarterly reports are required. My recommendation is that 
the companies listed on the Main Board should also produce quarterly financial 
reports. With more frequent and timely disclosure of financial information, directors 
and managers can be more effectively monitored and the corporate goyernance of 
listed companies in Hong Kong can be further improved. 
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m Formation of remuneration committee 
Chapters Two and Three note that, while the UK listed companies are required to 
have remuneration committees to oversee matters relating to the remuneration of 
directors, there is no such requirement in Hong Kong. During the data collection 
process for the empirical part of the study, it was found that the level of disclosure 
concerning directors' remuneration is less than adequate. For example, the option 
benefits of directors are not clearly disclosed. In Chapter Six it is found that 
directors' remuneration does not exhibit any significant relationship with firm 
performance, though significant results are obtained in many other foreign studies. It 
may be the case, however, that the quality of the data concerning this variable in 
Hong Kong is insufficient to allow a conclusion to be reached as to whether it 
constitutes an effective corporate governance mechanism. It follows that if the 
disclosures about directors' remuneration can be improved and that if the 
remuneration policy can be monitored, corporate governance and performance in 
Hong Kong may be improved. The remuneration committee can help to achieve this 
outcome. 
In fact, in November 1999, the HKSA had already published a report entitled 
Directors' Remuneration: Recommendations for Enhanced Transparency and 
Accountability which aimed to encourage the setting up of remuneration committees 
and to improve disclosures of directors' remuneration. It is now the time for the 
regulatory authorities to consider requiring the compulsory formation of remuneration 
committees in listed companies. This would achieve both the aim of monitoring the 
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directors' remuneration policy and enhancing the level of disclosures of directors' 
remuneration. 
(g) Formation o(nomination committee 
As reported in Chapter Two, it had been suggested in the First Report of the \\' orking 
Group on Corporate Governance ("First Report") of the HKSA in December 1995 
that nomination committees and remuneration committees were impractical or 
incompatible with the corporate governance environment in Hong Kong at that time. 
According to the First Report, due to the existence of dominant shareholders in Hong 
Kong corporations, it was believed that a nomination committee would not serve an 
effective purpose. It is now time to re-consider the possibility of introducing 
nomination committees in listed companies. This may help to improve the quality of 
the directors appointed. 
(h) The role played by company secretaries 
Company secretaries play an important role in companies as, inter alia, they assist the 
board in compliance with various disclosure requirements. At present. the Listing 
Rules require that company secretaries in listed companies must possess relevant 
professional qualifications to ensure that they have the ability to perform their duties. 
My recommendation is that regulatory bodies should define with better terms of 
reference the duties and authority of company secretaries and, in particular. encourage 
them to take a more proactive role in addressing corporate goyemance matters. The 
Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries can assist in this exercise and continue 
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to provide training and seminars for company secretaries in order to maintain and 
further upgrade their professional standards. 
0) The role played bv professional bodies 
While Chapter Three of the thesis reports the fact that various professional bodies 
have attempted to enhance corporate governance practices in different ways, I would 
suggest that they could still contribute more in a number of areas. For example, they 
can provide more training courses for company directors and managers on their duties 
and on ethical issues. The importance of business ethics increased as the result of 
concerns about the types of corporate fraud perpetrated by Enron directors in 2001. 
Through better training, directors and managers can understand better their 
responsibilities to protect the interests of their investors. The professional 
organisations can also take a more active step to advise the regulatory authorities on 
their proposals to enhance corporate governance. A good example is to encourage the 
regulatory authorities to consider formulating policies on the formation of 
remuneration committees, as discussed above. 
0) Comprehensiveness of the Code of Best Practice 
In the comparative study in Chapter Two, it was noted from the analysis of ACGA 
that the Code of Best Practice in Hong Kong is small in size when compared with 
other East-Asian countries such as Korea and Japan. The Code of Best Practice in 
Singapore, though also small in size, is very comprehensive as far as the role of audit 
committees is concerned. In addition. Singapore is now working on a more 
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comprehensive code. My recommendation is that the regulatory authorities in Hong 
Kong should improve the comprehensiveness of the Code of Best Practice and define 
more clearly the standard requirements in the Code. This is an essential step to 
further enhance corporate governance standards in Hong Kong. 
(k) Corporate governance in highly concentrated family businesses 
The results of the empirical study reported in Chapter Six suggest that the family form 
of ownership, as proxied by managerial ownership, is beneficial to performance. This 
is apparent from the positive linear relationship between RSE and managerial 
ownership during the pre-crisis period and, in particular, the relatively more 
prosperous years of 1996 and 1997. However, the results also show that the 
relationship between RSE and managerial ownership takes on a cubic form, 
represented by "entrenchment-alignment-entrenchment" in 1998 after the East-Asian 
financial crisis, and also during the relatively less prosperous year of 1995. Although 
the range of alignment in this cubic relationship is still very wide (approximately 
between 160/0 and 620/0), controlling family members appear to be able to take 
advantage of minority shareholders at times of economic difficulties. and this 
behaviour is most pronounced at managerial ownership levels above 62%. which 
results in deteriorating firm performance. 
The results suggest that in order to maximise firm performance, managerial ownership 
should ideally be controlled (for example, between 16% and 62%). Howe\·er. this is 
easier "said" than "done" given that family shareholdings are not easily changed. It 
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follows that should a company's managerial ownership be highly concentrated (say. 
more than 62%), the company would need to be more vigilant about the quality of its 
corporate governance practices in order to enhance its performance. The areas for 
attention include all of the recommendations made above; for example, impro\'ing the 
effectiveness and quality of the board, in generaL and of the board's audit committee. 
The proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board should also be 
increased and their independence ensured. Companies should also consider setting up 
a remuneration committee. Improving the board structure and the remuneration 
policy are possible ways to enhance performance in this type of company. This 
opinion and recommendation arises directly from the empirical part of this study, 
which revealed that board structure variables (board size, board composition and 
directors' remuneration) are not significantly related to firm performance in Hong 
Kong. The absence of any relationship may reflect a number of possible factors: poor 
board quality arising from domination by family members or related persons; 
inadequate numbers of independent non-executive directors; lack of independence of 
non-executive directors (as very often they are friends of the executive directors); lack 
of oversight of directors' remuneration by board committees. These factors may 
explain why some board structure variables found to be significantly related to firm 
performance in other countries are not significantly related to firm performance in 
Hong Kong. If Hong Kong companies can improve their board structures as well as 
their directors' remuneration policies, I believe that corporate performance can be 
further improved, even for those companies which ha\'e \'ery high le\'els of 
managerial ownership and in which control is concentrated in the hands of substantial 
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family owners. However, this would also require an understanding of the importance 
of corporate governance by these family owners together with a commitment by them 
to improve upon the present situation. 
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7.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of limitations of the study, which mainly anse from the 
availability of data. These are summarised as follows: 
(a) Limitation of the study period to four years (rom 1995 to 1998 
As explained in Chapter Five, financial data were only available from the Pacap 
database up to the year 1998, at the time of data collection in 2000 and 2001. In 
addition, given that the collection of managerial ownership data was conducted 
manually observation by observation, the data collection process was very time-
consuming. Thus, generating more data covering the years after 1998 would not only 
have involved much more time in the collection of the ownership data, but would also 
have involved more time in the collection of financial data from sources other than the 
then available Pacap database. Matching data from other sources with data obtained 
from the Pacap database is also a significant problem. Having considered the above 
costs and the incremental benefits that would have been obtained from getting one or 
two more years' data, it was decided that the sample period for this study would 
consist of the four years from 1995 to 1998. However, it is recognised that if it had 
been practical to further extend the period of study, then the reliability of the results 
might have be improved, especially as there is only one year's data available (the year 
1998) for the 'post-crisis' analysis in this study. 
(b) Measurement of (ami Iv ownership 
As explained in Chapter Five, managerial ownership is used as a surrogate 
measureme of family ownership in this study. Initially my intention \\<1S to collect 
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data on family shareholdings and use these data in this study, gIven that a key 
objective is to determine the impact of the concentrated family ownership structure in 
Hong Kong on firm performance. However, it was noted during the manual data 
collection process that it is impossible and impracticable to collect data on family 
ownership. Although the annual reports of Hong Kong companies disclose directors' 
shareholdings, there are no disclosures of shares held by family shareholders. To 
determine precisely the number of shares held by family shareholders is not possible 
because very often shares are held by nominees or by holding companies or related 
compames. Since it is impractical to measure family shareholdings accurately in 
Hong Kong, I have therefore used managerial ownership as the explanatory variable 
in this study. In order to ascertain whether managerial ownership can be used as a 
surrogate for family ownership, I collected data on family ownership for 53 
companies that did report this information, and then ran a Pearson correlation test to 
determine the correlation between managerial ownership and family shareholdings, in 
this sub-sample. A correlation coefficient of 0.978 (p-value<O.OOOl) was found. 
With this high correlation, it is plausible to suggest that managerial ownership can be 
regarded as a surrogate for family ownership in Hong Kong. 
(c) Omission of certain corporate governance variables 
Some important corporate governance variables are missing in the regression model. 
For example, the presence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee in the 
companies, and whether the same person acts as the CEO and the chairman of the 
board. Initially, it was intended that these variables would be included among the 
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control variables in the regresslOn model to test their possible impact on firm 
performance. However, during the data collection process, it was found that 
information concerning these variables are inadequately disclosed or sometimes are 
not even mentioned in the audited reports. This inadequate disclosure, or non-
disclosure, in company reports made it impossible to use these variables. Hence, they 
were dropped from the regression analyses. 
(d) Deficiencies in the board structure and remuneration variables 
As explained in Chapter Five, I originally intended to collect data on both the number 
of independent non-executive directors and the number of non-executive directors on 
the board so as to examine them as two separate variables. However, since the 
disclosures of these variables are not adequate and not standardised in most of the 
company annual reports, the only solution was to aggregate the disclosed numbers of 
independent non-executive directors and non-executive directors of each firm, and 
then divide this aggregate number by the board size of the firm, in order to obtain the 
variable PropNexe, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board (whether 
they are independent or not). This is certainly a limitation as the separate effect of 
each of the two types of non-executive directors (independent or not) on firm 
performance cannot be determined individually. 
Another deficiency concerns the measure of directors' remuneration. Gi\'en that 
disclosure of directors' remuneration in annual reports is inadequate, the variable is 
measured by taking the natural logarithm of the aggregate \'alue of directors' fees. 
Chapter Seven - Conclusions and Recommendations 
emoluments and bonuses received during the financial year concerned. The values so 
obtained do not measure the full remuneration of directors, as very often they also 
derive other benefits, such as share options, which are not properly disclosed in 
annual reports. This limitation may affect the results of the empirical analyses as far 
as this variable is concerned. 
It is evident from the discussion above that most of the limitations of this study arise 
from inadequate disclosure in company annual reports. Hence, improving disclosure 
of company information is of the utmost importance if corporate governance is to be 
enhanced. 
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7.4 Directions for Future Research 
In this last section of the thesis, a number of possible future research avenues related 
to this study are discussed, as follows: 
(a) Further extension of the studv period to vears after 1998 
Given the constraint of data availability, explained in Chapter Five and section 7.3 
above, the sample period in the empirical study is limited to four years, from 1995 to 
1998. It is suggested that this study can be repeated with further yearly observations, 
in particular, including several more years after 1998. In this study, the pre-crisis 
period encompasses three years from 1995 to 1997 inclusive. However, the post-
crisis period only consists of one year's data for 1998. Extending the study period to 
include the years after 1998 will increase the reliability of the regression results 
concerning the effect of the East-Asian financial crisis on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. This will also reveal whether the results 
reported in the present study also apply for a more sustained period. 
(b) Include additional or alternative corporate governance variables 
Additional corporate governance variables can be included in the present regression 
model. For example, as reported in previous chapters, audit committees were only 
made a requirement for Hong Kong listed companies with effect from 1 January 1999. 
Given that the audit committee is regarded as an important corporate governance 
mechanism, the presence of it might positively affect firm performance. Hence, it can 
be included as a dummy (control) variable in future research (by including data from 
1999 onwards) so as to control for its possible effect on firm performance. Apart 
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from adding new control variables, alternative measures of existing control variables 
could also be adopted. For example, alternative measures of the debt ratio and of firm 
growth could be used. 
(e) Exploring alternative non-linear relationships 
Apart from repeating the same regression model using an extended time period or 
with more, or alternative, corporate governance variables, another possibility is to 
explore other forms of the non-linear relationship. In Davies et al (2002), where 752 
firms listed on London Stock Exchange during 1995 are analysed, the relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm value is found to be of a quintic form, which 
suggests that the relationship is represented by '"a double humped curve". This is in 
contrast to studies, including the present one, that assume a cubic specification and, 
by construction, only one hump. Hence, it is of interest to test for other possible 
forms of the non-linear relationship by exploring alternative specifications of the 
regression models. 
(d) Considering the endogeneity issue 
Given that most companies in Hong Kong are founded by families who are also major 
shareholders, and that they are involved in the management of their companies, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the nature of share ownership is not influenced by firm 
performance to the same extent as it would be in the UK or the US, where family 
ownership is less prevalent. Hence, there is reason to believe that the O\vnership 
structure of Hong Kong companies is exogenously rather than endogenously 
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determined. Managerial ownership is thus taken as exogenous throughout the \vhole 
study in this thesis. A possible future avenue for research is to consider the 
endogeneity issue by carrying out simultaneous equations analyses, on a system of 
equations using the two stage least squares method. This will help to ascertain 
whether or not managerial ownership is exogenously determined under the 
concentrated family-owned corporate structure in Hong Kong. 
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Appendix 1 - The Code of Best Practice 
Cadbury Report, the United Kingdom 
1 The Board of Directors 
1.1 The board should meet regularly, retain full and effective control over the 
company and monitor the executive management. 
1.2 There should be a clearly accepted division of responsibilities at the head of a 
company, which will ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no 
one individual has unfettered powers of decision. Where the chairman is also 
the chief executive, it is essential that there should be a strong and independent 
element on the board, with a recognised senior member. 
1.3 The board should include non-executive directors of sufficient calibre and 
number for their views to carry significant weight in the board's decisions. 
1.4 The board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it 
for decision to ensure that the direction and control of the company is firmly in 
its hands. 
1.5 There should be an agreed procedure for directors in the furtherance of their 
duties to take independent professional advice if necessary, at the company's 
expense. 
1.6 All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company 
secretary, who is responsible to the board for ensuring that board procedures 
are followed and that applicable rules and regulations are complied with. Any 
question of the removal of the company secretary should be a matter for the 
board as a whole. 
2 Non-Executive Directors 
2.1 Non-executive directors should bring an independent judgement 10 bear on 
issues of strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments, and 
standards of conduct. 
2.2 The majority should be independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere \vith the 
exercise of their independent judgement apart from their fees and 
shareholding. Their fees should reflect the time which they commit to the 
company. 
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2.3 Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms and 
reappointment should not be automatic. 
2.4 Non-executive directors should be selected through a formal process and both 
this process and their appointment should be a matter for the board as a whole. 
3 Executive Directors 
3.1 Directors' service contracts should not exceed three years \vi thout 
shareho lders' approval. 
3.2 There should be full and clear disclosure of directors' total emoluments and 
those of the chairman and highest-paid UK director, including pension 
contributions and stock options. Separate figures should be given for salary 
and performance-related elements and the basis on which performance is 
measured should be explained. 
3.3 Executive directors' pay should be subject to the recommendations of a 
remuneration committee made up wholly or mainly of non-executive directors. 
4 Reporting and Controls 
4.1 It is the board's duty to present a balanced and understandable assessment of 
the company's position. 
4.2 The board should ensure that an objective and professional relationship IS 
maintained with the auditors. 
4.3 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three non-executive 
directors with written terms of reference which deal clearly with its authority 
and duties. 
4.4 The directors should explain their responsibility for preparing the accounts 
next to a statement by the auditors about their reporting responsibilities. 
4.5 The directors should report on the effectiveness of the company's system of 
internal control. 
4.6 The directors should report that the business is a gomg con':em, with 
supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary. 
Footnote 
The company's statement of compliance should be reviewed by the auditors in so 
far as it relates to paragraphs 1.4, 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.1 to 3.3, and ".3 to ".6 of the 
Code. 
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Appendix 2 - The Code of Best Practice (Hong Kong) 
Appendix 14 of the Listing Rules in Hong Kong 
The following guidelines are intended to form the skeleton of a code of best practice 
to which listed issuers should aim. The following items are not intended to be rules 
which are to be rigidly adhered to. All issuers are encouraged to devise their own 
codes of practice in the interests not only of their independent nOl1-executiw 
directors, but of the board of directors as a whole. 
1. Full board meetings shall be held no less frequently than every six months. 
"Full" board meetings means meetings at which directors are physically 
present and not "paper" meetings or meetings by circulation. 
2. Except in emergencies an agenda and accompanying board papers should be 
sent in full to all directors at least 2 days before the intended date of a board 
meeting (or such other period as the board agrees). 
3. Except in emergencies adequate notice should be given of a board meeting to 
give all directors an opportunity to attend. 
4. All directors, executive and non-executive, are entitled to have access to board 
papers and materials. Where queries are raised by non-executive directors, 
steps must be taken to respond as promptly and fully as possible. 
5. Full minutes shall be kept by a duly appointed secretary of the meeting and 
such minutes shall be open for inspection at any time in office hours on 
reasonable notice by any director. 
6. The directors' fees and any other reimbursement or emolument payable to an 
independent non-executive director shall be disclosed in full in the annual 
report and accounts of the issuer. 
7. Non-executive directors should be appointed for a specific term and that term 
should be disclosed in the annual report and accounts of the issuer. 
8. If, in respect of any matter discussed at a board meeting, the independent non-
executive directors hold views contrary to those of the executive directors, the 
minutes should clearly reflect this. 
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9. Arrangements shall be made in appropriate circumstances to enable the 
independent non-executive directors of the board, at their request, to seek 
separate professional advice at the expense of the issuer. 
10. Every non-executive director must ensure that he can give sufficient time and 
attention to the affairs of the issuer and should not accept the appointment if 
he cannot. 
11. If a matter to be considered by the board involves a conflict of interest for a 
substantial shareholder or a director, a full board meeting should be held and 
the matter should not be dealt with by circulation or by committee. 
12. If an independent non-executive director resigns or is removed from office, the 
Exchange should be notified of the reasons why. 
13. Every director on the board is required to keep abreast of his responsibilities 
as a director of a listed issuer. Newly appointed board members should 
receive an appropriate briefing on the issuer's affairs and be provided by the 
issuer's company secretary with relevant corporate governance materials 
currently published by the Exchange on an ongoing basis. 
14. This board should establish an audit committee with written terms of reference 
which deal clearly with its authority and duties. Amongst the committee's 
principal duties should be the review and supervision of the issuers' financial 
reporting process and internal controls. For further guidance on establishing 
an audit committee listed issuers may refer to "A Guide For The Formation Of 
An Audit Committee" published by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants in 
December 1997. Listed issuers may adopt the terms of reference set out in 
that guide, except that the committee may have a minimum of two members, 
or they may adopt any other comparable terms of reference for the 
implementation of audit committees. The committee should be appointed 
from amongst the non-executive directors and a majority of the non-executive 
directors should be independent. 
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Appendix 3 - Table 1: Statement on Corporate Governance, 
Corporate Governance Disclosure in Annual Reports 
ST A TEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Directors 
number of board meetings 
attendance of directors at meetings 
responsibilities of the board 
contribution and role of non-executive directors 
committees of the board 
policy on executive directors' remuneration and share options 
details of how, and by whom, the fees and other benefits ')f non-executive directors 
are determined 
directors' appointment and termination arrangements 
any other relevant additional information 
Audit committee 
composition 
role and function 
number of meetings 
attendance at meetings 
statement on its independence 
report of work done and significant issues addressed including in respect of review of 
financial reports and internal reports 
any other relevant additional information 
Remuneration committee 
composition 
role and function 
number of meetings 
attendance at meetings 
report of work done and significant issues addressed 
any other relevant information 
Investor relations 
process of communication 
Other matters 
social responsibility (e.g. environmental protection) 
human resources and internal management structure and workplace de\'elopment 
initiatiyes 
relations with employees, creditors, suppliers and other significant parties 
contribution to community service 
any other re\eyant additional information 
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Appendix 4 - Terms of Reference of the Directors Sub-Committee, 
Corporate Governance Review 
1. In the light of -
• 
• 
• 
the predominance of controlling shareholder groups and the rights and 
interests of controlling shareholders; 
the lack of shareholder activism as a natural force for improving 
corporate governance; 
the domiciling of a significant proportion of listed companies outside 
Hong Kong, 
to review the current statute law, administrative rules and regulations and 
codes of practice relevant to the directors and boards of all companies 
incorporated or registered in Hong Kong with the objective of enhancing 
genuine accountability, disclosure and transparency, and thereby further 
improving corporate governance standards. 
2. Having regard to the above, to make specific recommendations, inter-alia, in 
respect of-
(a) The structure of the board including the establishment, where 
appropriate, of audit, executive, nomination and remuneration 
committees; 
(b) The roles and functions of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officers; 
(c) The roles and functions of the executive directors; 
(d) The roles and functions of the non-executive directors; 
(e) The composition of the board with particular reference to achieving an 
appropriate balance between executive and non-executive directors; 
(f) The appropriate procedures for the appointment, re-election and 
resignation of directors, including the establishment of a nomination 
committee (where appropriate): 
(g) The appropriate procedures for undertaking the business of the board; 
(h) The development of a statutory statement of principles on directors' 
duties; 
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(i) The development of coherent proposals on how to deal with directors' 
conflicts of interest including -
• the question of self-dealing; and 
• the establishment of a register of directors' interests 
(j) The development of appropriate training programmes and qualifications 
for directors; 
(k) The development of appropriate principles and procedures regarding 
setting and approval of the levels and composition of directors' 
remuneration, including contracts and compensation, the establishment 
of a remuneration committee (where appropriate), disclosure and 
shareholder involvement; 
(1) The roles and functions of Audit Committees; 
(m) The necessary regulatory framework and best practice to ensure that 
directors and boards are encouraged to comply with their statutory and 
non-statutory obligations. 
3. To commISSIOn research projects regarding specific areas, including those 
mentioned above, in order to obtain empirically derived data to provide a firm 
basis for recommendations. 
4. To report to the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform on the Sub-
Committee's work and recommendations at regular intervals. 
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Appendix 5 - Terms of Reference of the Shareholders Sub-Committee, 
Corporate Governance Review 
1. In the light of -
• 
• 
• 
• 
the predominance of controlling shareholder groups and the rights and 
interests of controlling shareholders; 
the existence of corporate groups; 
the lack of shareholder activism as a natural force for improving 
corporate governance; 
the domiciling of a significant proportion of listed companies outside 
Hong Kong, 
to review the current statute law, administrative rules and regulations and 
codes of practice relevant to the shareholders of all companies incorporated or 
registered in Hong Kong with the objective of enhancing genuine 
accountability, disclosure and transparency, and thereby further improving 
shareholder democracy and communications. 
2. Having regard to the above, to make specific recommendations, inter-alia, in 
respect of-
(a) The definition, tImmg, notice, agenda (including resolutions) of, and 
conduct and voting (including the rights of proxies) at, company general 
meetings, having regard to the use of audio-visual communication and 
electronic voting; 
(b) The possible development of institutional investors as a force for 
promoting shareholder democracy and good corporate governance; 
(c) The development of a proxy system, having regard to the rights of 
persons other than registered shareholders, particularly given the need to 
ensure genuine shareholder democracy in the context of the Central 
Clearing and Systems System (CCASS); 
(d) Restraints on controlling shareholders' voting having regard to the 
following considerations -
• transactions in which controlling shareholders have an interest 
different from that of other shareholders should be subject to 
approval by shareholders, with the controlling shareholder abstaining 
from voting; 
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adequate exceptions should be made available to accommodate 
immaterial transactions and bona fide transactions in the ordinary 
course of business on arm's length terms; 
compliance with rules stipulated by securities regulators shall be 
deemed to be compliance with the law; 
private companies may include exemptions in their articles: 
(e) Improved accessibility to corporate records by shareholders; 
(f) The variation of class rights; 
(g) The suitability of judicial control, multiplicity of provisions and class 
votes; 
(h) The circumstances in which it would be appropriate for minority 
shareholders to take action against the company or its directors and 
officers; 
(i) The types of action which can be taken by minority shareholders against 
the company or its directors and officers. 
3. To commISSIon research projects regarding specific areas, including those 
mentioned above, in order to obtain empirically derived data to provide a firm 
basis for recommendations. 
4. To report to the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform on the Sub-
Committee's work and recommendations at regular intervals. 
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Appendix 6 - Terms of Reference of the Corporate Reporting 
Sub-Committee, Corporate Governance Review 
1. In the light of the role of disclosure as one of the key elements in corporate 
governance to review -
• 
• 
the existing level and nature of information, both financial and non-
financial, which all companies incorporated or registered in Hong Kong 
need to disclose to their shareholders; and 
the existing processes by which this information is prepared, vetted and 
approved. 
with the objective of enhancing the standard of corporate disclosure, 
transparency and accountability. 
2. Having regard to the above, to make specific recommendations, inter-alia, in 
respect of-
(a) Reforming and strengthening the statutory disclosure requirements in 
Part IV of and the Tenth and Eleventh Schedules to the Companies 
Ordinance, taking account of -
• Possible further modification and extension of the simplified 
disclosure requirements in Part IV of and the Eleventh Schedule to 
the Companies Ordinance; 
• The possibility of mandatory publication and filing of financial 
statements by private companies. 
(b) Reforming and strengthening the non-statutory disclosure requirements 
in respect of listed companies promulgated in the Listing Rules issued by 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong; 
(c) Improving compliance with the accounting standards as promulgated by 
the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, with particular reference to 
sanctions; 
(d) The use of information technology to report and distribute, among other 
things, the annual reports and accounts of companies to enhance 
timeliness of provision of corporate information; 
(e) Strengthening the internal controls in companies with particular 
reference to internal audit functions; 
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(f) The roles and functions of Audit Committees; 
(g) The responsibilities, liabilities and independence of external auditors; 
(h) The necessary regulatory framework to ensure efficient and effective 
monitoring of compliance with reporting requirements. 
3. To commlSSlOn research projects regarding specific areas, including those 
mentioned above, in order to obtain empirically derived data to provide a firm 
basis for recommendations. 
4. To report to the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform on the Sub-
Committee's work and recommendations at regular intervals. 
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